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Tuhika Whakarāpopoto – Abstract 
In the wake of the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), self-determination has emerged 
as a norm applying to indigenous peoples globally. This is a positive step 
forward for some of the world’s most marginalised peoples and a potential 
means to achieve their decolonisation aspirations through economic, social 
and cultural development. However, many uncertainties remain as to what 
self-determination will provide indigenous peoples beyond the conceptual 
realm and in the ‘black letter’ laws that they are subject to. This thesis 
attempts to fill the void by considering how the norm can, and should, be 
operationalised in future. The framework for self-determination developed 
by James Anaya is adopted as the key analytical frame of reference. Given 
the importance of lands, waters and resources to indigenous peoples and 
their cultures, the narrative centres on self-determination through 
environment and resource management law. First, a stocktake of self-
determination compliance is carried out by applying Anaya’s framework 
to various Aotearoa and foreign (Scandinavian Sami and Aboriginal 
Canadian) legal frameworks. These analyses reveal that there is currently 
widespread non-compliance with the norm in the examples studied. In 
spite of that, the analysis also demonstrates that there are certain legal 
mechanisms that go some way towards the expression of Anaya’s self-
determination principles. These are: the operational expression of the legal 






personality concept in the Te Urewera and Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui 
River) settlements, and the balancing of interests embodied in the draft 
Nordic Sami convention, the Canadian duty to consult and the Waitangi 
Tribunal’s Ko Aotearoa Tenei report on the Wai 262 inquiry. This thesis 
concludes that while there is a long road head for the reclamation of 
indigenous self-determination, these matters potentially provide an 
insightful platform to begin this conversation in Aotearoa.






Kā Kupu Māori – Glossary1 
Aotearoa Used as the Māori name for New Zealand. 
Awa River 
Hapū Kinship group, clan, tribe, subtribe. 
Huia 
Glossy black bird, now extinct, which had prized   
white-tipped tail feathers and orange wattles. 
Iwi Extended kinship group, tribe, nation, people. 
Kaiaka2 An adult tītī. 
Kāi Tahu 
The iwi which holds mana whenua and mana moana 
over most of Te Waipounamu and Rakiura. 
Kaitiaki Trustee, minder, guard, custodian, guardian. 
Kaitiakitaka Guardianship, stewardship, trusteeship. 
Karakia Incantation, ritual chant. 
Kawa Protocol and customs. 
Kereru New Zealand pigeon. 
Kīngitanga King Movement. 
Kīwaha Colloquialism, colloquial saying, slang. 
Kōrero tuku iho History, stories of the past, traditions. 
                                               
1 Unless otherwise footnoted, definitions are taken from http://Māoridictionary.co.nz/. 
The thesis adopts the Kāi Tahu dialect of te reo Māori in most instances by replacing 
the ‘ng’ with a ‘k’ in Māori words (except in direct quotes or where the context requires 
otherwise). 
2 Taken from author’s own knowledge. 






Kotahitanga Unity, togetherness, solidarity, collective action. 
Mana Prestige, authority, control, power, influence, status. 
Mana motuhake Separate identity, autonomy, self-government. 
Mana whenua 
Territorial rights, power from the land, authority over 
land or territory. 
Manu Bird. 
Māori Indigenous New Zealander. 
Mauka / Maunga Mountain. 
Mauri Life principle, life force, vital essence. 
Motu Island. 
Ngāti Porou 
Tribal group of East Coast area north of Gisborne to 
Tihirau. 
Noa 
To be free from the extensions of tapu, ordinary, 
unrestricted. 
Pākehā New Zealander of European descent. 
Papatūānuku Earth, Earth mother and wife of Rangi-nui. 
Pepeha Tribal saying, tribal motto, proverb. 
Pōhā 
Kelp bag – receptacle made of kelp and tōtara bark to 
hold preserved birds. 
Rāhui To put in place a temporary ritual prohibition. 
Rakatira / Rangatira To be of high rank, chief, chieftain. 
Rangatiratanga Chieftainship, right to exercise authority. 







Rimurapa Bull kelp. 
Rūnanga Council, tribal council. 
Takata whenua / Tangata 
whenua 
Local people. 
Takata / Tangata Human, individual, person. 
Taonga Treasure, anything prized. 
Tapu To be sacred, prohibited, restricted. 
Tauraka waka Mooring. 
Te ao Māori Māori world. 
Te ao tūroa Natural world, earth, nature. 
Te Ara a Kewa Foveaux Strait. 
Te Awa Tupua The legal personality for the Whanganui River.3 
Te Heke Ngahuru Ki Te 
Awa Tupua 
Te Awa Tupua strategy.4 
Te hopu tītī The customary harvest of tītī.5 
Te Karewao Advisory group to Te Pou Tupua.6 
                                               
3 Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (Te Awa Tupua Act). 
4 Te Awa Tupua Act, ss 35 to 37. 
5 Michael Stevens, below n 653. 
6 Te Awa Tupua Act, s 27. 






Te Kōpuka nā Te Awa 
Tupua 
Te Awa Tupua strategy group.7 
Te Moana-nui-a-Kiwa Pacific Ocean. 
Te Pā Auroa nā Te Awa 
Tupua 
The new legal framework of Whanganui River.8 
Te Pou Tupua The human face of Te Awa Tupua.9 
Te Tiriti o Waitangi Treaty of Waitangi. 
Te Urewera The area that Tūhoe hold mana whenua over. 
Tikanga 
Correct procedure, custom, the customary system of 
values and practices that have developed over time and are 
deeply embedded in the social context. 
Tītī Muttonbird, sooty shearwater. 
Tohu Sign, mark, symbol. 
Tūhoe 
Tribal group of the Bay of Plenty, including the 
Kutarere-Ruātoki-Waimana-Waikaremoana area. 
Tūhoe Te Uru Taumatua 
The Tūhoe Trust established by trust deed dated 5 
August 2011.10 
Tuna Eel of various species. 
                                               
7 Te Awa Tupua Act, s 29. 
8 Te Awa Tupua Act, s 7. 
9 Te Awa Tupua Act, s 18. 
10 Te Urewera Act 2014. 






Tupua te Kawa 
The intrinsic values that represent the essence of Te 
Awa Tupua.11 
Tūwharetoa Tribal group of the Lake Taupō area. 
Waahi tapu Sacred place, sacred site. 
Waiata Song, chant. 
Whaikōrero Oratory, formal speech making. 
Whakapapa 
To place in layers, to recite in proper order, 
genealogy. 
Whenua Land, territory, domain. 
 
                                               
11 Te Awa Tupua Act, s 13. 






Te Tīmataka Kōrero o te Tuhikaroa – Thesis 
Introduction 
I  Overview 
This thesis concerns the ‘operationalisation’ of the ill-defined norm 
of indigenous peoples to self-determination pursuant to international law, 
particularly for Māori in Aotearoa.12 After many decades of debate the 
international community has now confirmed in the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) that 
indigenous peoples are owed a right to self-determination. While this is a 
positive step forward for some of the world’s most marginalised people, 
little is known what this means for indigenous peoples beyond the 
theoretical and into the realm of ‘black letter’ legal frameworks. 
 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the lack of debate by considering 
Aotearoa’s adherence to the norm historically, presently and in future. 
James Anaya’s nuanced analytical framework (substantive and remedial 
self-determination) is adopted to carry out this exercise. Anaya’s 
framework helps to take stock and reveal how close Aotearoa has come to 
the expression of the norm both historically and currently. The same 
                                               
12 The thesis generally uses the term ‘Aotearoa’ to refer to Aotearoa/New Zealand, unless 
in the context it makes more sense to use the term ‘New Zealand’. 






analysis is then applied to specific frameworks within two overseas case 
studies: the Sami in Scandinavia, and the Aboriginal peoples in Canada 
(adopting a comparative legal method). It is argued that the closer a legal 
framework is to the full expression of Anaya’s principles, the more likely 
that framework can guide the future understandings of the norm’s 
operational requirements. This thesis finds that the historical and existing 
frameworks are largely non-compliant, but some emerging concepts in the 
Treaty settlement process13 and in relation to the balancing of interests14 
are insightful and go some way toward complying with Anaya’s self-
determination principles. 
 
Using these analyses, this thesis posits a way to translate the 
underlying principles of the norm into practical expression. It concludes 
that while self-determination is a potentially revolutionary vehicle for 
indigenous peoples to realise their decolonisation and development 
aspirations, both law reform and greater debate are needed to make this a 
reality. 
 
                                               
13 For example, the legal personality and pluralism concepts discussed in chapter 3 in 
respect of the Te Urewera and Whanganui River settlements. 
14 See discussions in chapter 4 regarding the draft Nordic Sami convention and the 
Canadian common law duty to consult; and see chapter 5 for a discussion regarding the 
Wai 262 framework. 






On the surface this thesis is about the operation of rules and norms 
that exist within the international law system. At essence, it is about the 
survival of indigenous peoples’ cultures and ways of life, in the widest 
sense, and the extent that the international law system can be used to 
achieve this end. 
II  Background 
Prior to colonisation, the groups of people now collectively referred 
to as ‘indigenous peoples’15 were self-determining. In other words, they 
lived in accordance with their own rules, customs, and cultural institutions 
on their own lands and territories. This was until Europeans arrived and 
“started to lay claims to their lands, overpowering their political 
institutions and disrupting the integrity of their economies and cultures.”16 
In many instances, any resistance by the indigenous occupants was met 
                                               
15 The term ‘indigenous peoples’ is generally defined as follows: 
 
“Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their 
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now 
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant 
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future 
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their 
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social 
institutions and legal systems.” 
 
José Martínez Cobo Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous 
Populations: Final Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur (United Nations, New 
York, USA, 1981) at paras 379-382. 
16 James Anaya Indigenous peoples in international law (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1996) at 3. 






with force by the newcomers, resulting in largescale murder. Those that 
survived the skirmishes were forced to navigate new diseases and, in some 
cases, the imposition of slavery.17 
 
The processes of colonisation are the genesis for the social, economic 
and cultural repression of many generations of indigenous peoples. James 
Anaya captures this point accurately in his 1996 text Indigenous Peoples 
in International Law, which is worth quoting in full:18 
 
In the contemporary world, indigenous peoples characteristically 
exist under conditions of severe disadvantage relative to others 
within the states constructed around them. Historical phenomena 
grounded on racially discriminatory attitudes are not just blemishes 
of the past but rather translate into current inequities. Indigenous 
peoples have been deprived of vast landholdings and access to life-
sustaining resources, and they have suffered historical forces that 
have actively suppressed their political and cultural institutions. As 
a result, indigenous peoples have been crippled economically and 
socially, their cohesiveness as communities has been damaged or 
threatened, and the integrity of their cultures has been undermined. 
In both industrial and less-developed countries in which indigenous 
people live, the indigenous sectors almost invariably are on the 
lowest rung of the socioeconomic ladder, and they exist at the 
margins of power. 
 
The history of indigenous peoples since colonisation is therefore a 
story of depravation, inequality and injustice. 
                                               
17 At 3. 
18 At 3-4. 







During the latter half of the twentieth century the international 
community has attempted to address the colonial misdeeds of the previous 
centuries. One theatre for this attempted reconciliation, and the focus of 
this thesis, is the international human rights framework. Namely, the norm 
(or right) of peoples to self-determination.19 It is argued that the regaining 
of an indigenous peoples’ self-determination will empower that group to 
achieve their social, cultural and economic aspirations.20 Therefore, self-
determination is a potential tool for indigenous peoples to wield in order 
to address the intergeneration inequities resulting from the colonial 
encounter. 
 
Early articulations of a principle of ‘self-determination’ are generally 
attributed to Woodrow Wilson in his 1916 ‘Fourteen Points’ speech.21 
Throughout the course of the twentieth century self-determination 
                                               
19 Although, as discussed in chapter 1, Corntassel notes there are inherent limitations 
regarding the extent at which the international law system can make amends for colonial 
misdeeds related to indigenous peoples given that this framework was created and is 
continually shaped by ‘states’. See Jeff Corntassel “Toward Sustainable Self-
Determination: Rethinking the Contemporary Indigenous-Rights Discourse” 2008 
33(1) Alternatives: Global, Local, Political. 
20 And this is the focus of the key articulations of the right in international instruments: 
“Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.” United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, art 3. 
21 Neil MacFarlane and Natalie Sabanadze “Sovereignty and self-determination: Where 
are we?” 2013 68(4) International Journal. 






developed from a conceptual principle to an enforceable right of peoples 
under positive international law.22 From the 1950s onward there were 
major developments in the accepted application of the right, which was 
previously only considered to apply to a ‘people’ in the sense of an 
aggregate population of a sovereign state, opposed to sub-state groups such 
as indigenous peoples.23 In other words, it applied in contexts such as the 
African decolonisation programme. With the decolonisation of Africa 
largely complete, the application of self-determination was forced to 
evolve to encompass new contexts. Following the ratification of the 
International Labour Organization’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention 1989 (No. 169), and the adoption of the UNRIP by the UN 
General Assembly, it can be argued that an international law right of 
indigenous peoples to self-determination has crystallised pursuant to 
customary international law. It follows that international law requires the 
historical violations of indigenous peoples’ self-determination to be 
remediated. 
 
                                               
22 For example, in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
993 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 
1976) [ICESCR], and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 
UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 
[ICCPR]. 
23 Erica-Irene Daes “Some considerations on the right of indigenous peoples to self-
determination” 1993 3(1) Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems. 






Now that the question as to whether the right is owed to indigenous 
peoples has been answered in the affirmative, questions remain as to how 
this norm will find expression in the laws of the modern-day states that 
have developed out of the historical territories of indigenous peoples. At 
international law, this necessitates consideration of the precise scope and 
content of the right owed to indigenous peoples. There is a general dearth 
of scholarly commentary on this topic. Although, one author adds much 
value and intellectual rigour to the existing scholarship: James Anaya. 
Anaya, the ex-UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
theorises a nuanced framework that can be adapted to test domestic legal 
frameworks against the scope and content of the indigenous self-
determination norm. 
 
According to Anaya, there are two aspects to indigenous self-
determination: ‘substantive’ and ‘remedial’. Substantive self-
determination, as the name suggests, relates to the substance of the norm, 
which can be described as “the precepts that define a standard of 
governmental legitimacy”.24 This consists of two strains: constitutive and 
ongoing self-determination. The constitutive inquiry considers whether the 
institutional framework was created through the participation and consent 
                                               
24 James Anaya “A contemporary definition of the international norm of self-
determination” 1993 3(1) Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems. 






of the relevant people (the right to freely determine political status).25 
Ongoing self-determination considers the legitimacy of the form and 
functioning of the institutional framework itself. The underlying inquiry is 
whether the institutional framework embodies principles of subsidiarity26 
and cultural pluralism,27 and whether it enables individuals and groups to 
“live and develop freely on a continuous basis.”28 The substantive aspect 
must be distinguished from the remedial aspect, which describes the 
remedial prescriptions that are implemented to remedy an historical 
violation of the substance of the norm.29 Classical African decolonisation 
is a useful example to demonstrate the application of this framework. In 
this context, the unilateral imposition of systems of alien rule (and the 
discriminatory character of those imposed system) violated the substantive 
self-determination of those peoples. In many cases, independent states 
were created to remedy this violation (remedial self-determination).30 
 
                                               
25 At 145. 
26 The idea that decisions should be made at the most local level possible. At 153. 
27 Anaya notes that “If the cultures of diverse groups are not valued, neither are their 
distinctive ways of life or interactive patterns which extend well into the social and 
political realms.” The cultural pluralism aspect of ongoing self-determination therefore 
enjoins respect for the unique cultural, social and ecnomic characteristics of indigenous 
peoples, but also provision for these matters in the governing institutional order. At 
154-155. 
28 At 157. 
29 At 144. 
30 This framework will be outlined in greater detail below in chapter 1. 






Anaya’s framework is adopted for the purposes of this thesis to 
consider the extent at which various domestic environmental and resource 
management law frameworks (in Aotearoa and overseas) give expression 
to the norm. The purpose of this inquiry is twofold: (1) to take stock of the 
substantive violations of the indigenous right to self-determination at 
international law; and (2) to identify the instructive aspects of the analysed 
frameworks (i.e. those that should be a source of inspiration in other 
contexts). It is intended that (2) will uncover insights from the existing 
frameworks to inform the future application of the norm. This exercise is 
necessary as there is a general lack of material regarding the 
operationalisation of the indigenous self-determination norm. As 
Valmaine Toki notes, “Despite the international jurisprudence and 
constitutional examples articulating the recognition of Indigenous rights, 
including that of self-determination, how this right can be manifested, for 
Māori, is still unclear.”31 
III   Research questions 
This thesis consists of two main inquiries that are weaved into the 
six substantive chapters: (1) whether Aotearoa has historically or is 
currently giving expression to the indigenous self-determination norm; and 
(2) the shape of law reform required to ensure Aotearoa adheres to the 
                                               
31 Valmaine Toki “Maori seeking self-determination of Tino Rangatiratanga? A note” 
2017 5 Journal of Maori and Indigenous Issues at 144. 






norm in future. To address these foci, the following research questions are 
adopted for this thesis: 
 
1. What is the scope and content of the indigenous self-determination 
norm? 
2. What can this provide to indigenous peoples operationally? 
3. Is there a coherent way to analyse domestic legal frameworks 
against the norm? 
4. Has Aotearoa ever complied with the norm? 
5. What lessons can be learnt from overseas jurisdictions (Sami and 
Canada)? 
6. What is the future of indigenous self-determination in Aotearoa? 
IV  Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the international law material 
and the literature regarding the general development and the scope and 
content of the self-determination norm (particularly as it applies to 
indigenous peoples). It explores the various theories of indigenous self-
determination before outlining why Anaya’s framework is appropriate for 
this thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 reorients this thesis to Aotearoa, as the key focus for this 
thesis is the operationalisation of indigenous self-determination in the 






Aotearoa context. The Aotearoa portion of the thesis begins with an 
historical stocktake of the country’s adherence to the self-determination 
norm through the application of Anaya’s framework. Ultimately, it is 
concluded that Māori have suffered the same violations of substantive self-
determination as virtually all indigenous peoples, leading to widespread 
social, cultural and economic disparities.32 It is demonstrated that in spite 
of Te Tiriti o Waitangi (the Treaty of Waitangi), a treaty purportedly 
guaranteeing certain rights for Māori in 1840,33 and the development of 
various “experiments in Māori autonomy” by the Crown post-1840,34 
Aotearoa has not adhered to Anaya’s principles in the historical models 
studied. In fact, many of the historical examples are archetypal breaches of 
the constitutive aspect of self-determination as the frameworks were 
unilaterally imposed on Māori without any processes of consultation or 
consent. 
 
Chapter 3 continues the Aotearoa analysis by considering various 
legal frameworks of the contemporary period against Anaya’s framework 
                                               
32 Claire Charters and Tracey Whare “Shaky Foundations: The fundamental flaw at the 
heart of a “model” treaty involving New Zealand and the Indigenous Māori 
community” 2017 34(4) World Policy Journal 
33 Such as the art 2 right to “tino rangatiratanga”. This will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter 2. 
34 Paul McHugh The Maori Magna Carta: New Zealand law and the Treaty of Waitangi 
(Oxford University Press, Auckland, N.Z, 1991). Native Exemption Ordinance 1844; 
Native Districts Regulation Act 1858; New Zealand Constitution Act 1852, s 71. 






(including section 33 of the Resource Management Act 1991, the Te 
Urewera settlement and the Whanganui River settlement). The chapter 
concludes that, on the whole, each model fails to adhere to the principles 
of Anaya’s framework, and, therefore, law reform is required to remedy 
this deficit and to ensure Aotearoa’s compliance with the self-
determination norm. 
 
It will be shown that there are, although very few, certain promising 
aspects to the studied models. Chapter 3 concludes that the Te Urewera 
and Whanganui River settlements are insightful for their adherence to the 
cultural pluralism aspect of Anaya’s ongoing self-determination 
framework. For example, both frameworks give expression to the 
fundamental Māori principle of whakapapa, and the pre-European Māori 
view of the world as a nexus of kin relationships. The attribution of a legal 
personality to Te Urewera and the Whanganui awa can be seen as a modern 
expression of this idea.35 Furthermore, the ability for executive decision-
making bodies to apply tikanga Māori in their environmental decision-
making is a laudable expression of the cultural pluralism principle. These 
insights can be adapted to inform the future operational character of 
indigenous self-determination in Aotearoa. 
 
                                               
35 Te Urewera Act 2014; Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017. 






Chapter 4 analyses the development of both Scandinavian Sami and 
Aboriginal Canadian models of self-determination. The chapter concludes 
that the Norwegian Sami parliament (and the associated Planning and 
Building Act36 and Finnmark Act37 processes) is ultimately non-compliant 
when viewed against Anaya’s framework. However, the draft Nordic Sami 
Convention, which is yet to be concluded between the Nordic states, is 
potentially insightful for its operationalisation of the free, prior and 
informed consent aspect of self-determination, and for its adoption of a 
‘relativistic’ balancing approach.38 In terms of the Aboriginal Canadian 
law, chapter 4 is scathing of the Indian Act 1876 and the paternalistic 
system of band governance, concluding that this framework is in breach of 
every aspect of Anaya’s self-determination framework.39 In spite of this, 
there are insights to be obtained from the common law in Canada, which 
has developed a duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal interests.40 
Chapter 4 considers how the balancing approach of this common law 
doctrine might assist the development of norm-compliant operational self-
determination models in future. 
                                               
36 Planning and Building Act 2008 (Norway). 
37 Finnmark Act 2005 (Norway). 
38 Mattias Åhren Indigenous Peoples' Status in the International Legal System (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2016). Draft Nordic Saami Convention 
(2005) English version. 
39 Indian Act 1876 (Canada). 
40 Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests) [2004] 3 SCR 511. 







Chapter 5 shifts focus and considers in detail the recommendations 
of the Waitangi Tribunal in its Wai 262 inquiry report: Ko Aotearoa 
Tenei.41 In the Wai 262 report the tribunal develops and applies an 
analytical framework for assessing whether the current environmental and 
resource management law regime is giving adequate expression to article 
2 of Te Tiriti o Waitangi (the right to tino rangatiratanga). Chapter 5 
concludes that the balancing of interests inherent in the tribunal’s approach 
is insightful, and that this dimension of pragmatism should inform the 
future operationalisation of indigenous self-determination in Aotearoa. 
 
Finally, chapter 6 weaves the strands of the preceding chapters 
together into an analysis regarding the future of self-determination in 
Aotearoa. While the preceding chapters are focused on Anaya’s 
substantive self-determination, chapter 6 looks to how the remedial aspect 
of self-determination can, and should, apply in light of the findings of this 
thesis. It is argued that a norm-compliant legal framework would give 
operational expression to the following ‘remedial principles’: the 
balancing of interests; an indigenous locus of decision-making; indigenous 
influence over decision-making; and pluralism. The Wai 262 framework 
                                               
41 Waitangi Tribunal Ko Aotearoa Tenei: A Report into Claims Concerning New Zealand 
Law and Policy Affecting Māori Culture and Identity. Te Taumata Tuatahi (Wai 262, 
2011). 






is promoted as a vehicle to operationalise these remedial principles in any 
given case where there has been a breach of substantive self-determination. 
The model is then applied to a case study to demonstrate its application: 
the Rakiura tītī / muttonbird islands. 
V  Limitations 
There were few limitations to this study, which was assisted by the 
fact that this was a ‘desktop study’. The main limitation was the side effects 
of the choice to undertake a Scandinavian case study, when the author is 
not familiar with any of the Nordic languages. This limited the scope of 
material that was able to be considered. However, there was ample English 
language material outside of the Nordic material, so this was not a major 
issue. The author managed to make direct contact with Norwegian 
government (Department of Sami and Minority Affairs) to obtain English 
language translations of the draft Nordic Sami convention.






Chapter 1: Indigenous Self-Determination – An 
Analytical Framework 
I   Chapter Introduction 
If a right of self-determination has crystallised in favour of 
indigenous peoples pursuant to customary international law precepts, there 
is potential for this avenue to satisfy outstanding Māori self-determination 
claims.42 First, however, there is a need to assess the extent at which the 
Crown is currently giving expression to the norm. Accordingly, this 
chapter examines the current legal position of the scope and content of the 
right at international law. The chapter concludes by formulating an 
analytical framework, based on the scholarship of James Anaya, that can 
be adopted to test legal structures against the requirements of the 
indigenous self-determination norm. The balance of the thesis then adopts 
this framework to assess the extent at which Aotearoa is currently giving 
(and has historically given) expression to the norm. Chapter 4 adopts the 
analytical framework to assess whether any insights can obtained from 
                                               
42 Kiri Rangi Toki “What a Difference a 'Drip' Makes: The Implications of Officially 
Endorsing the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” 2010 
16 Te Mata Koi: Auckland University Law Review. 






various indigenous self-determination models applying to the Sami in 
Scandinavia and the Canadian Aboriginal43 peoples.44 
 
II Self-Determination and International Law 
A Overview 
As this thesis concerns the implementation of indigenous peoples’ 
right to self-determination under international law, it is pertinent to 
consider the source of such a right and to analyse the scope and content of 
that right under existing international law. This section undertakes such an 
analysis and concludes by formulating a framework for examining the 
levels of self-determination inherent in environmental law frameworks, 
based on the scholarship of James Anaya. This framework is then used in 
the balance of the thesis to analyse various legal structures (both domestic 
and foreign) for the extent that they provide for precepts of indigenous self-
determination. Conclusions are then drawn as to whether the current 
Aotearoa legal framework adequately provides for indigenous self-
determination, whether a new model is required in Aotearoa to implement 
the norm, and the potential foundations of a new model. 
                                               
43 Note, this thesis uses the term ‘indigenous’ to refer to all indigenous peoples generally, 
but it uses the term ‘Aboriginal’ to refer to the indigenous peoples of Canada to maintain 
consistency with the Canadian scholarship. 
44 The rationale for analysing these case studed in particular is discussed in chapter 4. 






B Self-determination as a concept and right in international law 
The conceptual underpinnings of the term ‘self-determination’ in 
international law are succinctly captured by Anaya as: “a universe of 
human rights precepts concerned broadly with peoples, including 
indigenous peoples, and grounded in the idea that all are equally entitled 
to control their own destinies.”45 The concept came to be prominent in the 
international political arena around World War I, when President 
Woodrow Wilson linked the concept to Western liberal democracy and 
European nationalism, and Lenin/Stalin linked the idea to the fundaments 
of Marxist class struggle. Self-determination justified the breakup of the 
Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires and the re-division of Europe at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, the downfall of classical 
colonialism, and more recently, the end of South African apartheid. In all 
of these cases, Anaya argues, self-determination was adopted as a 
“standard of legitimacy against which institutions of government were 
measured,” and deemed to be illegitimate.46 
 
Self-determination was first articulated in positive (i.e. written) 
international law as a principle of ‘peoples’ in the United Nations (UN) 
                                               
45 James Anaya Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2004). 
46 At 99. 






Charter.47 It was enunciated as a binding right of peoples in the major 
international human rights instruments,48 and is now widely considered to 
be a general principle of international law,49 a norm of customary 
international law, and, as Anaya notes, it has potentially reached the status 
of jus cogens (a peremptory norm).50 The extent that the norm applies to, 
and is binding in respect of, indigenous peoples remains to be fully settled. 
However, recent events go some way toward settling this issue. In 2007, 
after some twenty years of negotiations, the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (‘UNDRIP’) was adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations.51 The UNDRIP is significant for its 
contribution to the development of international indigenous rights law, 
particularly through its recognition of indigenous rights to self-
determination, autonomy and self-government.52 As per the orthodox 
position, the UNDRIP, as a General Assembly resolution, is non-binding 
in-and-of-itself and can be described as ‘soft-law.’ While that may be the 
case, UN General Assembly declarations can develop a normative 
                                               
47 Charter of the United Nations, art 1, para 2. 
48 ICESCR; ICCPR. 
49 Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217; Antonio Cassese Self-
determination of peoples: a legal reappraisal (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; 
New York, 1995). 
50 Anaya, above n 45. 
51 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples  GA Res 61/295 UN 
Doc. A/RES/61/295 (2007) [UNDRIP]. 
52 Articles 3 and 4. 






character and become a primary source of customary international law. 
Declarations can therefore act as a catalyst for the recognition and 
implementation of binding international standards. As Laura MacKay 
notes: “The Declaration’s potential to crystallise into international 
customary law … means that a simple dismissal [of the UNDRIP] as an 
aspirational, non-binding document cannot be sustained.”53 
C Customary international law: a vehicle for the recognition of 
indigenous rights? 
Various commentators contend that at least some of the provisions 
of the UNDRIP have crystallised into customary international law.54 This 
includes the much-debated right to self-determination, and the related 
rights of autonomy and self-government55 and free prior and informed 
consent (‘FPIC’).56 Customary international law is a primary source of 
                                               
53 Laura MacKay “The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; 
a step forward of two back?” 2013(11) Public Interest Law Journal of New Zealand 
54 See Mauro Barelli “The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System: The Case 
of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” 2009 58(4) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly; Megan Davis “To bind or not to bind: 
The United Nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples five years on” 2012 
19 Australian International Law Journal; International Law Association “Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples” (The Hague Conference, The Hague, August 2010); Toki, above 
n 42. 
55 Federico Lenzerini “Sovereignty revisited: international law and parallel sovereignty 
of indigenous peoples” 2006 42(1) Texas International Law Journal; Siegfried Wiessner 
“Rights and status of indigenous peoples: a global comparative and international legal 
analysis” 1999 12 Harvard Human Rights Journal. 
56 Leena Heinämäki “The Nordic Saami Convention: The Right of a People to Control 
Issues of Importance to Them” in Nigel Bankes and Timo Koivurova (eds) The 
Proposed Nordic Saami Convention: National and International Dimensions of 
Indigenous Property Rights (Hart Publishing, Oxford, UK; Portland, USA, 2013). 






international law and forms part of Aotearoa’s common law. Because it is 
automatically incorporated into Aotearoa’s domestic law (unlike norms 
derived from international conventions), it is potentially significant for 
Māori wishing to implement a model of self-determination over their 
traditional resources.57 There is no need for a Te Heuheu Tukino-esque 
statutory incorporation before a customary international norm is integrated 
into Aotearoa’s domestic framework.58 
 
A two-limb test exists for the establishment of a rule of customary 
international law. This test is found in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, and it requires (1) state practice; and (2) 
opinio juris sive necessitates (opinio juris).59 State practice is the objective 
element, requiring actual practice of a custom, and the identification of 
state action as evidence of the existence of the custom. On the other hand, 
opinio juris is the subjective aspect of the test, requiring state practice to 
be undertaken with a belief that the law requires such action.60 Evidence 
                                               
57 Dunworth points out that customary international law has traditionally been neglected 
in the Aotearoa legal context. Treasa Dunworth “Hidden Anxieties: Customary 
International Law in New Zealand” 2004 2(1) New Zealand Journal of Public and 
International Law. 
58 Trendtex Trading Corp Ltd v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] QB (CA); Marine Steel 
Ltd v Government of the Marshall Islands [1981] 2 NZLR 1 (HC); Controller and 
Auditor-General v Davison [1996] 2 NZLR 278 (CA); and Sellers v Marine Safety 
Inspector [1999] 2 NZLR 44 (CA). 
59 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v Denmark; Germany Netherlands) 
[1969] ICJ Reports 3. 
60 Dunworth, above n 57. 






of opinio juris is found in statements of such a belief, “rather than actual 
beliefs.”61 According to Roberts there are two schools of approach to the 
test: the ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ approaches. The traditional approach, 
emphasising the importance of state practice, is an inductive inquiry 
whereby the custom is derived from specific instances of state practice.62 
The modern approach, however, deductive in nature, emphasises the 
importance of opinio juris and relies on statements of state intention in the 
formation of custom.63 
 
It is possible, and some commentators maintain, that a customary 
international norm of self-determination for indigenous peoples has 
crystallised since the adoption of the UNDRIP.64 Evidence could be 
adduced to prove the existence of such a custom, such as the widespread 
support for the UNDRIP initially amongst the international community, 
and the subsequent endorsement of the CANZUS states.65 However, the 
                                               
61 Anthea Elizabeth Roberts “Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary 
International Law: A Reconciliation” 2001 95(4) The American Journal of International 
Law at 758. 
62 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v Denmark; Germany Netherlands), 
above n 59. 
63 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United 
States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14. See also Roberts, above n 61. 
64 International Law International Law Association, above n 54; Anaya, above n 45; Lorie 
Graham and Siegfried Wiessner “Indigenous sovereignty, culture, and international 
human rights law” 2011 110(2) South Atlantic Quarterly. 
65 ‘CANZUS’ is an acronym for Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 
all of whom failed to adopt the UNDRIP upon the final General Assembly vote in 
September 2007. 






reality is that the test is exacting and “notoriously difficult to achieve.”66 
The conservative view is that certain provisions of the UNDRIP, including 
the rights to self-determination, autonomy and self-government, and FPIC, 
have yet to reach the status of customary international norms.67 
Nonetheless, it is possible that even if the difficult test for the 
establishment of customary norms was met, the New Zealand state would 
be insulated from any such norms as a persistent objector.68 The New 
Zealand government could rely on the various statements made throughout 
the drafting process rejecting the adoption of the UNDRIP.69 Although, 
ambiguities contained in New Zealand’s explanation of vote,70 and their 
subsequent endorsement of the UNDRIP, means a finding of persistent 
objector would be far from certain. 
                                               
66 Davis, above n 54 at 40. 
67 See Davis, above n at 54. Davis contends that jurists such as Anaya and Wiessner have 
been “over-eager” in declaring that provisions of the UNDRIP have reached the status 
of customary international law (see James Anaya and Siegfried Wiessner “The UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Towards Re-empowerment” (2007) 
Jurist <www.jurist.org/forum/2007/10/un-declaration-on-rights-of-indigenous.php>). 
68 Ian Brownlie and James Crawford Brownlie's principles of public international law 
(8th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 
69 For example, see New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Explanation of 
Vote by HE Rosemary Banks, New Zealand Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations (2007), cited in Toki, above n 42 at 266. 
70 New Zealand’s 2007 Explanation of Vote, while rejecting the text of the proposed 
declaration, contains statements of support for the principles underpinning the 
declaration:  
New Zealand fully supports the principles and aspirations of the Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples. New Zealand has been implementing most of the standards in 
this declaration for many years. We share the belief that a Declaration on the rights of 
indigenous peoples is long overdue, and the concern that, in many parts of the world, 
indigenous peoples continue to be deprived of basic human rights.  
See above n 69. 







Regardless of whether the strict test has been met, it is certainly 
arguable that a norm of self-determination for indigenous peoples is 
developing under customary international law. This is strongly influenced 
by the near universal adoption of UNDRIP amongst UN member states. It 
is entirely possible that binding norms will crystallise in favour of 
indigenous peoples based on the UNDRIP, in a similar way that provisions 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights71 eventually became 
binding norms of customary international law (and were later reflected in 
the major binding human rights conventions).72 In turn, these international 
norms would be incorporated into the common law of Aotearoa in 
accordance with Blackstone’s thesis.73 The potential for international law 
to provide a concrete avenue for the recognition of indigenous authority 
over traditional lands and resources, particularly for Māori in Aotearoa, is 
therefore an exciting prospect.74 To reorient this discussion in terms of te 
ao Māori, the UNDRIP’s potential for the ongoing development of 
indigenous rights may be seen as a tauraka waka, a place from which the 
                                               
71 Universal Declaration of Human Rights  GA Res 217 A (1948). 
72 ICCPR/ICESCR above n 48. 
73 In his seminal work, Blackstone declared that “ the law of nations [or customary 
international law] is part of the law of the land”. Sir William Blackstone Commentaries 
on the Laws of England (16th ed, Cadell & Butterworth, London, 1825) at ch 5 (cited 
in Dunworth, above n 60 at 69). 
74 Toki, above n 42. 






waka can disembark toward a brighter horizon.75 Given this, such a 
discussion would be incomplete without examining the precise content and 
scope of the right of indigenous people to self-determination. The 
following section explores the parametres of the right and considers a 
framework for testing whether the existing legal framework amounts to an 
operationalisation of the norm.  
D Scope and content of the right to indigenous self-determination 
There is no clear consensus on the precise parametres of the right to 
self-determination, one commentator noting the right generally is 
“imprecise, inconclusive and ill-defined”76 and another that the field 
generally is a “conceptual morass”.77 The definitional difficulties for 
indigenous peoples partly stems from the nature of the debate to date: in 
the past twenty years scholars and international lawyers in this field have 
been preoccupied with the fundamental question as to whether the right 
extends to indigenous peoples, i.e. a segment of society as opposed to the 
aggregate population of a state, the traditional beneficiary of the right. This 
plays into the traditional liberal tension between group and individuals’ 
                                               
75 Sacha McMeeking UNDRIP presentation - Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu. 
76 Russell Miller “Collective discursive democracy as the indigenous right to self-
determination” 2007 31(2) American Indian Law Review at 343. 
77 Benedict Kingsbury “Reconstructing Self-Determination: A Relational Approach” in 
Pekka Aikio and Martin Scheinin (ed) Operationalizing the Right of Indigenous Peoples 
to Self-Determination (Gummerus Printing, Turku, Finland, 2000) at 20. 






rights.78 “Consequently, international legal sources offer limited guidance 
as to the content and scope of the internal aspect of the right to self-
determination, when applied to indigenous peoples.”79 Now that this 
debate has been somewhat resolved,80 the question remains as to what 
exactly the right provides to rights-holders.  
 
It makes sense to first consult the relevant international 
documentation. Article 3 of the UNDRIP provides: “Indigenous peoples 
have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.” This wording essentially mirrors that of common 
Article 1 of ICCPR, and the ICESCR.81 The UN Charter, however, 
provides that a key purpose of the United Nations is to uphold the principle 
of self-determination. It is helpful therefore to note that self-determination 
in international law manifests itself as both a right and a principle. This 
thesis, however, concerns the implementation of self-determination as a 
right, which indigenous rights scholar Helen Xanthaki considers is 
                                               
78 For example, see Will Kymlicka Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority 
rights (Clarendon Press, New York; Oxford [England], 1995). 
79 Åhren, above n  at 133. 
80 The UNDRIP confirming the right to self-determination extends to indigenous peoples 
in article 3 and the potential for this right to develop under customary international law. 
81 Note that these conventions refer to the “right of self-determination”, whereas the 
UNDRIP refers to the “right to self-determination”. New Zealand is a signatory to both 
of these conventions. 






essentially the political control of a peoples’ destiny.82 It will be 
established below that for indigenous peoples the political sphere of self-
determination is about more than simply the transfer of authority to 
replicated ‘Western’ or pākehā political institutions. This thesis argues that 
political control is a means to an end; the means to enable indigenous 
rights-holders to achieve their economic, cultural and social development 
aspirations. 
 
First, before considering what self-determination is, or could be, it is 
necessary to consider what it is not by dispelling the common 
misconception that the term simply refers to the pursuit of ‘secession’ or 
‘independence’ from the so-called ‘host state’. 
1 Does self-determination simply mean secession or independence? 
It is a widely held but misguided view that groups seeking 
recognition of a right to self-determination can unilaterally secede from 
their overarching sovereign state. This view has pervaded the discourse of 
self-determination, particularly for indigenous peoples, for decades, and 
has hindered the conversation, recognition and implementation of the right. 
The misconception has its genesis in the decolonisation programme of the 
                                               
82 See Alexandra Xanthaki Indigenous rights and United Nations standards: self-
determination, culture and land (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2007) 
at 155 for a discussion on the implications of self-determination as a right versus a 
principle. 






international community following World War II, which “involved the 
transformation of colonial territories into new states under the normative 
aegis of self-determination.”83 This led to states associating the right with 
secessionist movements, as this was the poignant frame of reference for 
the implementation of the right in that context. 
 
As Anaya notes, the core of the misconception is that it fails to 
distinguish between the substance of the norm of self-determination and a 
prescribed remedy that was applied in various context specific breaches of 
self-determination. In other words, secession may be available as a remedy 
in very limited cases (i.e. in the case of gross human rights violations) when 
self-determination has been breached, but the remedy must not be 
conflated with the substance of the right itself.84 It therefore cannot be said 
with any legitimacy that self-determination equates with independent 
statehood. In any case, there exists no general entitlement at international 
law to a remedy of secession. The legal instruments which contribute to 
the development of the general international law on self-determination are 
                                               
83 James Anaya “Self-Determination as a Collective Human Right under Contemporary 
International Law” in Pekka Aikio and Martin Scheinin (eds) Operationalizing the 
Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination (Institute for Human Rights, Åbo 
Akademi University, Turku, Finland, 2000) at 12. 
84 See Anaya, above n 45. 






vehement that the territorial integrity of states must be protected, provided 
governments are:85 
 
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a 
Government representing the whole people belonging to the territory 
without distinction... 
 
 Myntti sums up this point as follows: “…there is no general 
unilateral right in international law to secession or independent statehood 
by part of the population of a sovereign democratic state.”86 This, of 
course, applies to all peoples (including indigenous peoples). While Article 
3 of the UNDRIP provides indigenous peoples with a right to self-
determination, Article 46 essentially mirrors the restriction against the 
dismemberment of states’ territorial integrity contained in the Friendly 
Relations Declaration and the Vienna Declaration. In fact, it goes further 
in protecting the state by removing the proviso that territorial integrity may 
be impaired when a state is acting oppressively. With that said, secession 
may be available to indigenous peoples in very rare circumstances in spite 
of Article 46 of the UNDRIP (i.e. remedial secession, where there are 
                                               
85 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations  GA Res 
2625 (XXV) (1970) [Friendly Relations Declaration]. Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action  A/CONF.157/23 (1993) [Vienna Declaration]. 
86 Kristian Myntti “The Right of Indigenous Peopels to Self-Determination and Effective 
Participation” in Pekka Aikio and Martin Scheinin (eds) Operationalizing the Right of 
Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination (second ed, Institute for Human Rights, Åbo 
Akademi University, Turku, 2000) 85. 






ongoing gross human rights breaches which prevent the expression of self-
determination).87 
 
Nonetheless, as Åhren states, “No peoples, including indigenous 
peoples, are legally entitled to a general right of unilateral secession.”88 As 
Erica-Irene Daes, a principal drafter of the UNDRIP, states “The right of 
self-determination, as it is contained in Article 3, according to the opinion 
of the Chairperson-Rapporteur, does not carry with it a right to 
secession.”89 Regardless, it appears very unlikely that many indigenous 
peoples aspire to achieve independent statehood. In fact, the literature 
notes that most indigenous groups aspire for the recognition of their self-
determination through constitutional reform within the framework of the 
existing sovereign state.90 Anaya goes as far to say that secession would be 
“a cure worse than disease” for any peoples outside of the decolonisation 
context.91 This thesis does not consider that the right to self-determination 
                                               
87 See Xanthaki, above n 82 at 168-169; Mauro Barelli “Shaping Indigenous Self-
Determination: Promising or Unsatisfactory Solutions?” 2011 13(4) International 
Community Law Review; and Reference re Secession of Quebec, above n 49. 
88 Åhren, above n 79. 
89 Erica-Irene Daes “An overview of the history of indigenous peoples: self-determination 
and the United Nations” 2008 21(1) Cambridge Review of International Affairs at 23. 
90 See Miller, above n 76; James Anaya “The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-
Determination in the Post-Declaration Era” in Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen 
(eds) Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2009); and Daes, above n 89. 
91 Anaya, above n 45 at 109. 






can (or should) be invoked to achieve independent statehood for Māori in 
Aotearoa. 
2 Traditional approach: external and internal self-determination 
Traditionally the right to self-determination was considered to have 
two spheres: external and internal. This conception of self-determination 
has continued to develop over time with changes in the international 
context. Under the classical decolonisation paradigm (discussed above), 
external self-determination provided the rights-holder with a right to be 
free from alien rule, and this led, in many cases, to decolonisation by 
secession.92 The internal aspect of the right in this context entailed a right 
to democratic government representing all peoples, and a right to 
participate in the democratic process. In both cases, the holder of the right 
was the aggregate population of individuals in the state, opposed to one 
identified group within the state.93 This binary understanding of the content 
and beneficiary of the right evolved once the decolonisation process had 
largely concluded and novel contexts emerged for the application of self-
determination. Conceptual questions arose as to whether sub-state groups 
(e.g. indigenous peoples) were owed a right of self-determination, in 
                                               
92 But this could also lead to free association or integration with the overarching colonial 
state. Principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not an 
obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73 e of the Charter  
GA Res 1541 (1960) at vi; and Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples  GA Res 1514(XV) (1960). 
93 Daes, above n 23; Cassese, above n 49. 






addition to the aggregate population of the state (the traditional 
beneficiary). In relation to indigenous peoples, while there were many who 
opposed such a view throughout the many years spent drafting, the 
UNDRIP has answered this question in the affirmative. As discussed, this 
is likely to influence the development of customary international law on 
this point. Given that the international community has accepted a right of 
self-determination applies to some sub-state groups opposed to aggregate 
populations only, at least in the context of non-binding General Assembly 
resolutions, the traditional binary understanding of self-determination has 
been forced to evolve. The section below examines how the internal aspect 
of self-determination has developed in the context of indigenous peoples’ 
rights, particularly the manifestation as a right to autonomy and self-
government.94 Further below this chapter critiques the value of the binary 
framework and promote an alternative theory of indigenous self-
determination at international law, consistent with Anaya’s scholarship.95 
3 Self-determination as ‘autonomy’ 
This section will now consider the more precise characteristics of 
self-determination in what is considered to be the internal aspect, as it 
                                               
94 While this will not be covered in any detail, it has been suggested that the external 
aspect of self-determination also applies to indigenous peoples, and entitles 
beneficiaries to representation within the international legal system (e.g. at United 
Nations fora). Åhren, above n 79. 
95 See Anaya, above n 45. 






applies to indigenous peoples under international law. In light of the 
UNDRIP, the content of the right owed to indigenous peoples in the post-
decolonisation context consists of the twin aims: (1) autonomy/self-
government; and (2) participatory engagement in civil society (where it is 
desired by the indigenous group), in other words, the simultaneous right to 
be both distinct from, and attached to, the modern democratic majoritarian 
society.96 Susan Ferrell views this as a form of “hybrid autonomy,” and 
explains that “The goal is neither the complete independence of Indigenous 
Peoples nor the kind of local autonomy which would lead to social or 
political isolation and continuing vulnerability of Indigenous Peoples.” 
Instead, Ferrell notes, most indigenous peoples seek effective participation 
in all matters affecting their destinies, a measure of control over their own 
affairs, and a “sharing of power in national politics.”97 This thesis focusses 
mostly on the autonomous aspect of the right, rather than the participatory 
aspect.98 Article 4 of the UNDRIP elaborates on how the right to self-
determination guaranteed by Article 3 is to be exercised. It states: 
 
                                               
96 Barelli, above n 87; UNDRIP, arts 3, 4, 5, 18 and 19. 
97 Susan J. Ferrell “The concepts of self-determination and autonomy of indigenous 
peoples in the draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” 
2001 14(2) St. Thomas Law Review at 269. 
98 While the participation of indigenous peoples in the state’s civil procedures is an 
undoubtedly important aspect of the right to self-determination, it is outside the scope 
of this thesis. 






Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, 
have the right to autonomy or self-government99 in matters relating 
to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for 
financing their autonomous functions. 
 
Article 4 signals that self-determination for indigenous peoples tends 
to manifest in the internal aspect, and is to encompass autonomy exercised 
within the confines of the state’s overarching sovereignty.100 This is 
consistent with the orthodox position that indigenous peoples are not 
entitled, as of right, to ‘external’ self-determination, at least as that concept 
was previously understood in the decolonisation context (i.e. secession).101 
Article 46 further ensures this is the case by protecting the territorial 
integrity of states, reflecting the position of the Friendly Relations 
Declaration and the Vienna Declaration. Precisely what the entitlement to 
‘autonomy’ or ‘self-government’ provides the indigenous beneficiary 
remains to be seen, particularly because the right has scarcely been 
                                               
99 ‘Autonomy’ and ‘self-government’ are considered to be “coterminus” in the UNDRIP 
and therefore in this thesis as well. For ease of reference, I adopt the term ‘autonomy’ 
generally in place of using both terms. See International Law Association, above n 54 
at 13. 
100 Whereas, external self-determination for indigenous peoples in the post-classical 
decolonisation environment is a more contentious matter. Scholars and international 
lawyers disagree on the extent that indigenous peoples are beneficiaries of self-
determination in the external aspect (discussed above). Whether external self-
determination applies for indigeneous peoples and the content of that right is outside 
the scope of this thesis. However, it is interesting to note that some scholars argue the 
external aspect is beginning to manifest itself in innovative ways for sub-state groups 
such as indigenous peoples. In particular, the international legal personality enjoyed by 
indigenous peoples throughout the drafting of the UNDRIP. See Åhren, above n 79. 
101 Although, some scholars, including Åhren, argue that a right to secession may be 
available for indigenous peoples in very rare circumstances, e.g. where they are 
suffering under gross discrimination and human rights violations. At 121. 






‘operationalised’ since the UNDRIP was adopted. Further, the articulation 
of a right to autonomy in the UNDRIP is an innovation as groups have no 
general right to autonomy itself under international law.102 Many 
international legal scholars consider that a right of indigenous peoples to 
autonomy under international law has crystallised (i.e. separate from, but 
related to, the right to self-determination), reaching the status of general 
international law principle as confirmed by state practice and evidence of 
opinio juris.103 Given this, it is necessary to consider the traditional 
definitions and manifestations of autonomy articulated by scholars and 
international lawyers.104 It is likely these conceptual understandings of 
autonomy would inform the parametres of the autonomous arrangements 
permitted under Article 4, given that autonomy and self-government have 
not been conceptualised as a general right under international law prior to 
the UNDRIP.105 
                                               
102 Stefania Errico “The Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An 
Overview” 2007 7(4) Human Rights Law Review. 
103 International Law Association, above n 54; Anaya and Wiessner, above n 67; Siegfried 
Wiessner “Indigenous sovereignty: a reassessment in light of the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” 2008 41(4) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law. 
104 To build on this, chapter 3 analyses models of self-determination in other jurisdictions 
to explore ways that the norm could be better implemented in Aotearoa. 
105 Anna Cowan “UNDRIP and the intervention: Indigenous self-determination, 
participation, and racial discrimination in the Northern Territory of Australia” 2013 
22(2) Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal. 






4 What is ‘autonomy’ generally? 
As Hurst Hannum notes, autonomy “is not a term of art in 
international or constitutional law.”106 Autonomy, like self-determination, 
does not have one universally accepted definition.107 However, there is a 
consensus on many aspects of the concept. Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff 
note that common definitions all refer “directly or indirectly [to] the 
transfer of certain powers from a central government to that of the (thereby 
created) autonomous entity.” They define autonomy generally as:108 
 
the legally entrenched power of ethnic or territorial communities to 
exercise public policy functions (legislative, executive and 
adjudicative) independently of other sources of authority in the state, 
but subject to the overall legal order of the state.” 
 
Similarly, James Crawford envisages that autonomous communities 
are districts of a state “usually possessing some ethnic or cultural 
distinctiveness, which have been granted separate powers of internal 
administration, to whatever degree, without being detached from the State 
of which they are part.”109 Building on Crawford, Stefania Errico considers 
                                               
106 Hurst Hannum Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation 
of Conflicting Rights (2nd ed, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2011) at 
4. 
107 Errico, above n 102. 
108 Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff (eds) Autonomy, self-governance, and conflict 
resolution: innovative approaches to institutional design in divided societies 
(Routledge, New York; London, 2005) at 12-13. 
109 James Crawford The creation of states in international law (Clarendon Press, Oxford; 
New York, 1979) at 211-212. 






autonomy to generally encompass “the devolution of a range of powers to 
a part of a State’s population so as to enable that population to manage its 
internal affairs.”110  
 
It is generally accepted that different forms of autonomy exist: 
territorial, non-territorial/personal and cultural autonomy. Territorial 
autonomy is predicated on the idea that the autonomous entity is “defined 
in territorial terms,”111 and “in its most general sense, describes self-
governance of a demographically distinct territorial unity within the 
state.”112 Territorial autonomy therefore refers to the phenomenon of a sub-
state group exercising law making and enforcement powers (in relation to 
defined subject matters) within a specifically defined portion of territory, 
subject to the overarching powers of the host-state. Errico contends that 
this would only be feasible where indigenous communities live in or 
occupy a clearly demarcated geographical territory and comprise a 
majority in that area.113 One example of territorial autonomy is the reserve 
                                               
110 Errico, above n 102. 
111 Weller and Wolff, above n 108. 
112 Marc Weller Towards a General Comment on Self-Determination and Autonomy 
(Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/WP.5, 2005) at 5. 
113 Errico, above n 102. 






system applying to First Nations in Canada (irrespective of how 
problematic this system is).114 
 
For personal (or non-territorial) autonomy the subjects of the 
autonomous entity are defined in personal terms i.e. “a particular (ethnic) 
group is granted autonomy rights and all its members can enjoy these 
rights, regardless of where they live on the territory of their host-state.”115 
This is similar to territorial autonomy except the jurisdiction is not limited 
to a specific territorial area, and can apply regardless of where a person 
lives or the locale of their landholdings. Cultural autonomy can refer to the 
ability of a minority cultural group to assume a corporate or legal identity 
to foster and promote the unique characteristics of the group (i.e. cultural 
and linguistic matters) within the framework of the state.116 There is no 
clear differentiation between non-territorial and cultural autonomy in the 
scholarship – some authors treat these as separate categories of 
autonomy117 while others group them together.118 Regardless of the 
                                               
114 The legal framework of autonomy for First Nations in Canada will be discussed further 
below in chapter 3. 
115 Weller and Wolff, above n 108 at 15. 
116 Weller, above n 112. Also see Bertus de Villiers “Self-determination for aboriginal 
and Torres strait islander people: Is the answer outside the territorial-square?” 2014 
16(Dec 2014) University of Notre Dame Australia Law Review. Arguably modern iwi 
organisations in New Zealand exercise cultural autonomy to some extent, but not 
territorial autonomy. Richard Hill “New Zealand Maori: The Quest for Indigenous 
Autonomy” 2016 15(1) Ethnopolitics. 
117 Weller, above n 112. 
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semantic arguments, the Sami parliaments of Scandinavia provide an 
example of non-territorial autonomy in practice. The Sami parliaments 
have certain delegated powers relating to language and cultural 
preservation and these are exercised irrespective of the territorial residence 
of their members.119 
 
While article 4 does not expressly mention that territorial autonomy 
is the version of autonomy envisaged, some form of control over traditional 
lands must be contemplated by the provision given the strong spiritual 
connection indigenous peoples have in relation to their lands, and the 
recognition of this view in the UNDRIP (in preambular paragraph 7 and 
article 25).120 With that said, certain provisions of the UNDRIP indicate 
that the right to autonomy can also be expressed through cultural 
autonomy.121 In any given case, it is likely that the overarching form of 
autonomy that is adopted to give effect to the UNDRIP will be dependent 
upon what is appropriate in the circumstances, such as the social context. 
                                               
119 This will be further discussed in chapter 3 below. 
120 Steven Wheatley “Conceptualizing the Authority of the Sovereign State over 
Indigenous Peoples” 2014 27(2) Leiden Journal of International Law; Centre for 
Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of 
Endorois Welfare Council) v Kenya 276/2003. 
121 For example, art 14: “the right to establish and control their educational systems and 
institutions providing education in their own languages”; art 16: “the right to establish 
their own media in their own languages”; and art 24: the right to traditional medicines 
and health practices. See also Errico, above n 102. 






5 Self-determination as ‘free, prior and informed consent’ 
Another contested feature of indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination is the requirement for free, prior and informed consent 
(‘FPIC’). As Heinämäki notes, the general meaning of FPIC can largely be 
found in its phrasing: “it is the right of indigenous peoples to make free 
and informed choices about the development of their culture, lands and 
resources.”122 Accordingly, the basis for the concept is that when major 
decisions or development proposals that will substantially impact 
indigenous peoples’ land, territories or resources are being considered, that 
those peoples are not coerced or threatened as a part of that process. Their 
consent must also be actively sought out and given before any proposal is 
allowed to go ahead by public authorities. The precise scope, content and 
status of the right for indigenous peoples is a matter of international law 
that remains unsettled. One view is that indigenous peoples only have a 
right to culturally appropriate, prior, and good faith consultation in relation 
to resource development proposals.123 This section will consider these 
matters and discuss whether a binding right to FPIC exists for indigenous 
                                               
122 Leena Heinämäki “The Rapidly Evolving International Status of Indigenous Peoples: 
The Example of the Sami People in Finland” in Christina Allard and Susan Funderud 
Skogvang (eds) Indigenous Rights in Scandinavia: Autonomous Sami Law (Ashgate, 
Farnham, Surrey (UK); Burlington, VT (USA), 2015) at 196. 
123 Tara Ward “The Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent: Indigenous Peoples' 
Participation Rights within International Law” 2011 10(2) Northwestern Journal of 
International Human Rights125. This view is reflected in the second draft version of 
the Nordic Sami Convention, concluded in late 2016, which removes the right to FPIC 
contained in articles 16 and 36 of the 2005 version. 






peoples under international law, based on the development of a customary 
norm. 
 
Prior to the UNDRIP there existed no codified articulation of FPIC 
under positive international law. Instead, UN treaty supervisory bodies 
recognised a right of indigenous peoples to participation in resource 
decision-making derived from other rights in existing human rights 
conventions. For example, the Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’) has 
consistently concluded that article 27 of the ICCPR (the right to culture) 
requires states to positively consult with indigenous peoples regarding 
proposed resource developments on their lands and territories.124 Further, 
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (‘CERD’), in 
applying the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (‘ICERD’), has stated that decisions relating 
directly to indigenous peoples’ land and resources should not be made 
without prior and informed consent.125 While these interpretations by UN 
supervisory bodies are non-binding outside of their immediate context, 
they are nonetheless important for their influence over a developing 
customary international norm of FPIC in favour of indigenous peoples. 
                                               
124 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights General Comment No. 23: The rights of 
minorities (Art. 27) (U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (Apr. 8, 1994) 
125 UN Commission on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Report of the Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Annex V - General Recommendation XXIII 
(UN Doc. Supplement No. 18 (A/52/18) (Sept. 26, 1997), 1997); Ward, above n . 







There have been many recent developments in this area of 
international human rights law, many of them occurring within the Inter-
American regional system. This system regulates the application and 
interpretation of the American Convention on Human Rights126 (a binding 
international treaty) and the non-binding, American Declaration on the 
Rights and Duties of Man.127 Recent developments have led to the 
crystallisation of a binding norm in the Inter-American system requiring 
full FPIC in certain contexts, opposed to mere consultation. This was most 
clearly articulated in a recent case of the Inter-American Court: Saramaka 
People v Suriname.128 In that case, the Suriname government granted 
logging and mining concessions to private companies to extract resources 
within the territories of the Saramaka People, without consultation with, or 
the consent of, the latter. The Court held that the state had failed to uphold 
the Saramaka peoples’ right to judicial protection and property in granting 
the concessions. Furthermore, the Court held: 
 
... that, regarding large-scale development or investment projects 
that would have a major impact within Saramaka territory, the State 
has a duty, not only to consult with the Saramaka, but also to obtain 
                                               
126 American Convention on Human Rights  (1969). 
127 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man  (1948). 
128 Saramaka People v Suriname (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs) IACtHR (ser. C) No. 172 (28 November 2007). 






their free, prior, and informed consent, according to their customs 
and traditions. 
  
 Therefore, Saramaka identified an unequivocal and binding norm 
in the Inter-American system that the consent of the indigenous people is 
required when a project is of such a scale that it will have major negative 
implications on the future survival of the people (i.e. by disrupting their 
traditional food sources and forms of economy). It is necessary to consider 
the extent at which a similar norm may have developed outside of the Inter-
American system. 
 
The UNDRIP contained the first clear articulation of a right to FPIC 
in positive international law (previously, FPIC or other participation rights 
were derived from other positive law sources). As Ward contends, the 
UNDRIP clearly re-orientates the right to FPIC within the rubric of self-
determination, whereas it has previously been associated with rights to 
property, culture and non-discrimination in the human rights 
conventions.129 The UNDRIP makes provision for FPIC in articles 10, 19, 
29 and 32.130 As discussed above, although the UNDRIP is technically 
                                               
129 Ward, above n 125. 
130 For example, article 32 states: 
 
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned 
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed 
consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other 






non-binding, its primary value is that it has created norms that can develop 
into customary international law (including the right to FPIC). The near 
universal adoption of the UNDRIP by UN member states gives this 
argument strong credence, as does the subsequent adoption by the initial 
objector states.131 
 
Soon after the UNDRIP was adopted, the Human Rights Committee 
in Poma Poma v Peru132 further contributed to the development of an FPIC 
norm (albeit not referring to the UNDRIP itself). This case concerned the 
development of freshwater infrastructure in rural Peru. The diversion of 
water from a natural spring to a coastal city deprived indigenous peoples 
of access to their water resource, and this removed their ability to graze 
livestock in accordance with their cultural traditions. In applying the right 
to culture under article 27 ICCPR, the HRC held that where resource 
exploitation will have a substantially negative impact on the “culturally 
                                               
resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation 
of mineral, water or other resources. 
 
131 E.g. New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the United States all objected to the UNDRIP 
initially in 2007, but all have since changed their position and adopted the resolution 
(albeit, with reservations). CBC “Canada votes 'no' as UN native rights declaration 
passes” (2007) www.cbc.ca/news/canada/canada-votes-no-as-un-native-rights-
declaration-passes-1.632160. 
132 Poma Poma v Peru Human Rights Committee, Communication No 1457/2006, Doc 
CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006 of 27 March 2009. 






significant economic activities of … [an] indigenous community,” FPIC is 
required and mere consultation is not enough.133 
 
The draft Nordic Sami Convention is also important in this context 
for its contribution toward the development of an FPIC norm. The Nordic 
states involved (Norway, Sweden and Finland) have sanctioned the 
drafting of a convention to codify the existing international norms applying 
to Scandinavia’s indigenous Sami. A draft version of this document was 
agreed upon by the expert drafting group in 2005. The 2005 draft contains 
strong references to a Sami right to FPIC: article 16(2) states that the state 
shall not sanction activities or measures that may significantly damage the 
basic conditions for Sami culture, livelihoods or society, unless consented 
to by the Sami.134 Given its mandate, the expert committee evidently 
considered that this was current international practise applying to the Sami 
as an indigenous people. 
 
As Heinämäki points out, given the delivery of the judgments in 
Saramaka and Poma Poma, and the widespread adoption of the UNDRIP 
(containing FPIC provisions), an indigenous right to FPIC, encompassing 
the ability to withhold consent when projects will have a substantial impact 
                                               
133 At para 7.6. 
134 Article 36(3) contains a similar provision creating a right of FPIC over permits for 
natural resource prospecting or extraction. 






on the fundaments of the indigenous peoples’ survival “does not 
necessarily exceed the present international commitments [of the Nordic 
states].”135 The International Law Association, in its 2010 Hague 
Conference report seems to concur: “the existence of the right of veto in 
favour of indigenous peoples seems to be confirmed by [the UNDRIP], as 
well as by pertinent international practice [referring to the draft Nordic 
Sami Convention].”136 It appears arguable that the requisite state practice 
and opinio juris exists, and a binding right to FPIC has crystallised in 
favour of indigenous peoples, or is in the latter phases of development. 
This encompasses a right to withhold consent for developments relating to 
their traditional lands, territories or resources, that will have a substantial 
impact on the survival of the people, their livelihoods and/or their 
wellbeing (for example, a nickel strip mine that interferes with a traditional 
food source). It is more than a mere right to consultation. This thesis will 
promote the adoption of such a view in implementing indigenous self-
determination in Aotearoa. 
6 Parametres of the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination 
under international law 
The precise design of autonomous arrangements that indigenous 
peoples are entitled to under international law remains unclear and will 
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differ depending on the context the indigenous people exist within 
(regional, national, cultural, geographical and legal).137 It should first be 
stated that fulfilling indigenous self-determination does not require 
creation of one specific political/institutional structure within the state (an 
essentialist view of implementing self-determination).138 Even so, the 
salient characteristics of autonomous arrangements can be identified and 
elaborated on, based on the existing understandings of autonomy and self-
government. 
a. Devolved, autonomous powers 
It is possible for the indigenous self-determination norm to find 
expression through forms of autonomy. As discussed above, autonomy can 
encompass the devolution of legislative, administrative and/or judicial 
powers relating to the “internal affairs” of the indigenous people, to that 
people.139 Under this conception of autonomy, an indigenous group would 
be vested with authority from the state through legislative delegation or 
constitutional restructuring, effecting a division of competences between 
the state and the sub-state indigenous group. Additionally, it can allow the 
latter to make/enforce laws and execute administrative functions with 
respect to various specified subject matter relating to their ‘internal and 
                                               
137 Åhren, above n 79. 
138 Anaya, above n 90; Brenda Gunn “Moving beyond rhetoric: working toward 
reconciliation through self-determination” 2015 38(1) Dalhousie Law Journal. 
139 See the “What is ‘autonomy’?” section above. 






local affairs.’140 There is no precise definition for the “internal and local 
affairs” of the indigenous people. It is clear that matters usually exclusively 
associated with the overarching state are not encompassed by this right, 
e.g. foreign affairs and military matters.141 An earlier draft version of 
article 4 of the UNDRIP, which was omitted from the final adopted 
version,142 set out a positive list of subject matter over which the 
indigenous autonomy contemplated by that provision would apply. This 
included:143 
 
… culture, religion, education, information, media, health, housing, 
employment, social welfare, economic activities, land and resources 
management, environment and entry by non-members, as well as 
ways and means for financing these autonomous functions. 
 
 As the operationalisation of indigenous self-determination under 
international law depends upon the particular circumstances of the state 
and the indigenous people, it is not possible to prescribe the specific 
subject matters that will apply to all autonomous arrangements. Although, 
the matters set out above provide an authoritative guide for the character 
                                               
140 International Law Association, above n 54; Daes, above n 89. 
141 Ferrell, above n 97. 
142 Throughout the lengthy negotiations of the UNDRIP this provision was removed. 
143 Draft United Nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples  Sub-Comm Res. 
1994/45 (1994). This is the first draft Declaration and is commonly known as the 
‘original draft’ or ‘Daes draft’ of the UNDRIP, after the Chariperson-Special 
Rapporteur of the WGIP, Erica-Irene Daes. 






of ‘internal and local affairs’ that article 4 of the UNDRIP intends to 
address. It is possible for a number of permutations to occur, depending on 
the situation. This will likely depend upon factors such as: the degree of 
geographical concentration on traditional territory; the extent that the 
indigenous people are a majority or a minority in that territory; the degree 
of integration with the majority population; socio-economic indices; and 
the performance of the overarching state economy (inter alia). 
b. Cultural pluralism – expression of indigenous cultural 
values and legal traditions 
Articles 5 and 20 of the UNDRIP provide that an indigenous peoples’ 
own cultural institutions, laws, customs and/or practices (i.e. those existing 
prior to colonisation) should be embodied in the operationalisation of 
indigenous self-determination. As Anaya notes, this aspect of the norm 
entitles indigenous peoples to have their unique character and cultural 
preferences reflected in the operational regime.144 That is, the practical 
institutions for implementing autonomy are reflective of the bespoke 
values of that group, and the regime of law that is ‘created’ and applied by 
the institutions reflects the groups laws, customs or legal traditions.145 The 
ILA’s Hague report sums up this aspect of the right succinctly:146 
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States are therefore obliged to recognize the right of indigenous 
peoples to autonomy or self-government – which finds expression in 
their own political and legal institutions, structured and managed in 
accordance with their own laws, traditions and customs – in the 
context of national law. [emphasis added] 
 
And as Steven Wheatley puts it:147 
… the idea of ... autonomy of indigenous peoples is also to be 
understood in terms of allowing the communities concerned to 
organize their social, economic and political life through their own 
laws, customs and practices. [emphasis added] 
 
In other words, the practical implementation of indigenous self-
determination should be framed less by ‘Western’ liberal democratic 
institutions and legal systems,148 and more by the unique cultural values or 
legal traditions of that group.149 This applies both to the underlying nature 
of the institutions that are imbued with the devolved authority outlined 
above, as well as the ‘rules’ that those institutions are authorised to apply. 
For example, in the Aotearoa context, this aspect of indigenous self-
determination requires the ability for autonomous institutions regulating 
the environment to apply tikanga Māori when exercising their regulatory 
powers.  
                                               
147 At 54 at 13. 
148 See Eruera Prendergast Tarena “Indigenising the Corporation - Indigenous 
Organisation Design: An Analysis of Their Design, Features, and the Influence of 
Indigenous Cultural Values” (PhD Thesis, University of Canterbury, 2015) for an 
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c. Host-state’s ‘sovereignty’ remains intact 
A crucial feature of the right to autonomy for indigenous peoples 
under international law is that the framework of political and legal 
empowerment (discussed above) is to be exercised within the context of 
the state’s overarching sovereignty. That is, the right is not an entitlement 
to secession, and the territorial integrity of the ‘host-state’ must be 
maintained in the exercise of the right.150 As Åhren puts it, “it is inherent 
in the concept of autonomy that the autonomous people enjoy considerable 
decision-making powers, albeit within the framework of the state.”151 It 
should come as no surprise that international law reflects this stance as 
international norms are largely developed through the consent of states, 
and states continue to uphold the primacy of the Hobbesian view of state 
sovereignty.152 In practice, this means any autonomy arrangement born of 
this context will always be subject to the oversight of the central 
government claiming and exercising sovereignty over the indigenous 
lands. For as long as states are the agents of creation for international law, 
and indigenous self-determination is a creature of international law, this is 
likely to remain the case.153 
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This aspect of indigenous self-determination affects the ability of 
indigenous peoples to negotiate, design and implement meaningful 
autonomous structures, ones that incorporate and provide for indigenous 
institutions, traditions and customs (as discussed above) in a meaningful 
manner. The state machinery will likely remain largely intact, with the 
state maintaining a near monopoly on sovereign decision-making power in 
the realm. This notion, and the fact that the existing understandings of 
autonomy and self-determination are crafted by state parties, is discussed 
in further detail below with reference to Corntassel’s scholarship. 
 
To offset this power imbalance, and to ensure the longevity of 
autonomous arrangements, the right may require some form of 
constitutional protection. Daes comments on the need for some form of 
protection of autonomous arrangements within the legal and constitutional 
framework of the state: “…self-determination is never secured if it depends 
entirely on legislation and high-level political decision-making.”154 This 
could be achieved through the entrenchment of the legislation which 
creates (or empowers the establishment of) the autonomous arrangement. 
However, it is not clear whether this factor is part of the norm currently. 
Given the above point regarding the supremacy of state sovereignty, there 
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is likely to be little constitutional protection of arrangements for 
indigenous autonomy. 
 
Article 4 of the UNDRIP also encompasses the indigenous right to 
“ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.” Any 
institution with regulatory and/or enforcement powers requires resources 
to constitute and fund their day-to-day operations and long-term goals. 
Governments (local and central) fund their functions mainly through 
taxation (direct and indirect). At its essence, the right to self-determination 
and autonomy envisages that indigenous peoples will assume similar 
functions to a central or local government, albeit in a culturally bespoke 
manner and over specifically defined subject matters. That being the case, 
the right requires that any autonomous arrangement created under this 
regime must be financially sustainable. This could be achieved through the 
enactment of laws providing tax jurisdiction for the indigenous people,155 
or, less desirably, via the provision of central government funds to the 
autonomous entity.156 
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E Does self-determination entail more than the establishment of 
autonomous institutions? 
Does the right of self-determination simply entitle indigenous 
peoples to replicate existing precedents of autonomous institutions, 
explored above? Or is there a more nuanced way to view the substance to 
the right? Xanthaki contends that the essential core of the right is “political 
power” and the “political control of the peoples’ destiny…”. In reaching 
this conclusion Xanthaki discredits the ‘maximalist’ approach to self-
determination, whose proponents argue that self-determination is “an 
umbrella right that accommodates all claims” (i.e. international rights to 
land and natural resources, rights to intellectual property, as well as rights 
to autonomy and self-government).157 Xanthaki believes a wide approach 
distorts the importance of the right and is ultimately a poor tactic for those 
seeking recognition of their rights. Applying Xanthaki’s ‘political essence’ 
approach, self-determination involves little more than the implementation 
of the machinery of political power (such as legislative, executive and 
judicial institutions) subject to overarching state supervision. However, to 
adopt such an approach, this thesis argues, would be too narrow and would 
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involve acceptance of the state-framed definitions of the right.158 As Daes 
contends:159 
 
The true test of self-determination is not whether Indigenous Peoples 
have their own institutions of self-determination, legislative 
authorities, laws, police or judges. The true test ... is whether 
Indigenous Peoples themselves actually feel they have choices about 
their way of life... [and therefore] to live well and humanly in their 
own ways. 
 
This mirrors Anna Cowan’s view that: “The key to defining self-
determination is not to incorporate the specific substantive content of all 
other rights related to its exercise, but to distil the overarching right to its 
normative essence.”160 In other words, the effective implementation of 
self-determination requires more than simply describing and creating a 
regime of institutions to allow an indigenous people to exercise political 
power over their traditional territory. Granted, autonomous institutions 
exercising political power are an important aspect of the implementation 
of the right, but they are not the essence of the right, as Xanthaki 
contends.161 Applying Cowan’s view, it is argued that the normative 
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essence of the right is whether the governing institutions empower a people 
to flourish in all spheres of life, including culturally, economically and 
socially. Therefore, the successful implementation of self-determination 
must also involve an assessment of the extent at which the dominant 
system of power and authority over lands, resources, and people (and 
therefore the worldview and cultural practices of the indigenous people) 
allows that indigenous way of life to be sustained. To the extent that way 
of life is at risk, self-determination requires the deficiency to be 
remediated, potentially through the creation of autonomous institutions. 
Applying this view, that implementing indigenous self-determination 
requires more than simply the transfer of competences from the central 
government to replicated Western institutions, requires us to consider 
alternatives to the dominant self-determination theories (i.e. those built on 
the internal/external paradigm).162 
 
Kingsbury promotes an alternative theory of indigenous self-
determination, a so-called ‘relational’ approach, based on a reconstruction 
of the current understandings of the international law norm.163 While 
autonomy may be a desirable mechanism to protect indigenous ways of 
life from the encroachment of non-indigenous majoritarian society, 
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Kingsbury underlines the limitations associated with viewing autonomy as 
a panacea, which is often based on an ‘end-state’ paradigm view of self-
determination.164 This view holds that the majority of the indigenous 
peoples of the modern world and non-indigenous societies and 
governments are interdependent and subject to a complex web of 
relationships. According to Murphy, relational self-determination 
therefore:165 
 
encourages the view that indigenous peoples must seek influence in 
a variety of different political forums to manage the complex web of 
relationships in which they have become entangled with non-
indigenous communities and governments. 
 
Kingsbury and Murphy’s point is that autonomous governance alone 
may not be enough to ensure the full expression of indigenous self-
determination. Exclusively relying on such an approach leads to missed 
opportunities for the indigenous people to utilise political capital through 
collaboration with the wider political community and non-indigenous 
people (i.e. to exercise influence inside and outside of state institutions).166 
A wider degree of influence can be achieved through guaranteed 
indigenous representation in government forums, consultation 
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mechanisms, and, at times, alternative methods such as litigation or less 
conventional methods such as civil disobedience.167 Thus, a relational 
approach recognises that a wide scope of influence is preferable when 
implementing indigenous self-determination. 
 
Similarly, Corntassel criticises the utility of autonomy as a vehicle 
for indigenous self-determination, particularly as the current 
understandings of autonomous governance in international law are 
prescribed by the state hegemony, with little thought given to indigenous 
ways of knowing, governance or values. As the current discourse of the 
right is driven by states, international institutions, and their officials, the 
legal definitions for the right are inherently state favoured and flavoured. 
Therefore, a ‘ground-up’, indigenous community based approach to the 
implementation of self-determination is to be preferred, one that is 
“rearticulated on indigenous terms as part of a sustainable, community-
based process rather than as narrowly constructed political/legal 
entitlement.”168 He argues that self-determination needs to be sustainable: 
“In order for indigenous self-determination to be meaningful, it should be 
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economically, environmentally, and culturally viable and inextricably 
linked to indigenous relationships to the natural world.”169 
 
Clearly, when positing the implementation of indigenous self-
determination at international law, it is not sufficient to simply articulate 
the salient characteristics of autonomy and propose that a similar 
framework be implemented within states to satisfy their indigenous self-
determination claims. Such an approach lacks depth and fails to consider 
the normative value of the proposed remedial framework. It also fails to 
touch on the core nature of self-determination claims: whether the current 
or proposed institutional structure enables the free pursuit of economic, 
social and cultural development as indigenous peoples. Instead, it becomes 
clear that Anaya’s conception of the right, described by Anna Cowan as 
“persuasive and illuminating”,170 is appropriate for this thesis. Anaya 
transcends the binary internal/external approach to self-determination and 
offers an alternative framework, one which appreciates that the substance 
of the norm encompasses much more than replicating the existing 
operational institutions which claim to give effect to the norm.171 
                                               
169 At 108. 
170 Cowan, above n 105 at 268. 
171 Anaya, above n 45; Anaya, above n 90; Anaya, above n . 






F Anaya’s framework 
Anaya deviates from traditional scholarly analyses of self-
determination which aim to dissect the wording of international 
instruments to identify the scope and content of the norm. Instead, while 
he bears in mind the text of the written instruments, he focuses “primarily 
on the common ground of normative precepts and patterns of behavior that 
are fairly associated with the concept of self-determination.”172 Anaya 
considers these are the core values of freedom and equality, and notes that 
it is “concerned broadly with individuals and groups as they relate to the 
structure of government under which they live.”173 
 
Anaya is critical of the traditional internal/external self-
determination dichotomy, arguing this approach to the content of the norm 
is distorting as it is premised on a world divided into mutually exclusive 
spheres of community (i.e. monolithic ‘peoples’). He argues this view is 
not applicable in a globalised and interconnected world as the human 
experience consists of “multiple, overlapping spheres of community, 
authority, and interdependency”.174 The binary approach also perceives 
self-determination in terms of states’ rights opposed to human rights. 
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Accordingly, a more holistic approach to the content of the norm ought to 
be preferred, one that recognises the substance of the norm and enables the 
assessment of institutional structures against this substance. 
 
Anaya contends that the substance of the norm of self-determination 
becomes easier to perceive once it is distinguished from the remedial 
aspects of the norm. Further above it was argued that to consider self-
determination as a right to secession is to conflate the substance of the right 
with a bespoke remedy that was applied in certain specific situations of 
breach (e.g. under classical decolonisation, the historical denial of the self-
determination of African peoples was remedied through the creation of 
new states). In that sense, secession was a remedy that was applied when 
the substance of self-determination had been breached by colonial 
imperialism. The same logic applies to the idea that indigenous self-
determination, manifested as a right to territorial autonomy, merely entitles 
the beneficiary to a regime of institutions holding political power over their 
traditional territory. Again, this logic confuses the substance of the right 
with the possible remedies available in situations of its breach (i.e. the 
latter could involve the creation of autonomous institutions). The substance 
of the right to self-determination, under Anaya’s conception, is more 
nuanced than simply articulating the architecture for a scheme of 
autonomous governance. For this reason, the thesis contends that 
implementing indigenous self-determination requires more than simply 






replicating the existing understandings of autonomous arrangements that 
were outlined above. A deeper assessment of the institutional framework 
is required, one which tests the existing institutional framework (and the 
proposed remedy) against the substantive aspects of self-determination. 
The following section discusses Anaya’s analytical framework, and this 
will be applied in the balance of this thesis to assess whether Aotearoa has 
or is currently giving expression to the norm. 
1 Substantive self-determination: constitutive 
According to Anaya, the substance of the norm can be divided into 
two normative strains: constitutive and ongoing. The first, the realm of 
‘constitutive self-determination’, concerns the procedures whereby 
governing institutions are developed. When such governing institutions are 
created or altered “it imposes requirements of participation and consent 
such that the end result in the political order can be said to reflect the 
collective will of the people…”.175 It does not impose the outcome of such 
procedures. This aspect of self-determination corresponds with the 
provision in the ICCPR, ICESCR and the UNDRIP that peoples “freely 
determine their political status”.176 This aspect therefore exists as a 
standard against which the procedures of institutional birth are measured, 
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so that the result is not imposed from external authorities.177 The essential 
question here is whether the processes leading to the creation of the 
governing (or proposed) institutional order encapsulate the will of the 
people. For example, when African nations were colonised by European 
empire-builders, this entailed the illegitimate expansion of authority by one 
people over another. The result was the imposition of foreign government 
structures on the existing inhabitants. The African inhabitants were not 
afforded any input into the establishment of the ensuing governing 
order.178 
2 Substantive self-determination: ongoing 
The second realm, ‘ongoing self-determination’, is not concerned 
with the procedures leading to the creation of governing institutional 
orders, nor their expansion of authority. It is concerned with the ongoing 
nature of the order itself. 
 
Anaya notes that since the height of the classic decolonisation 
movement there have been two developments in the international 
community’s requirements for a legitimate government. These concepts 
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strongly influence the understanding of self-determination in its ongoing 
aspect. 
 
Firstly, the decline of Marxism and the embrace of non-authoritarian 
notions of democracy. The international community now requires that the 
governing institutional order promotes democracy, civil participation and 
the principle of subsidiarity (the idea that government decisions should be 
made at the most local level possible).179 
 
Second, the international community has increasingly embraced 
diversity and cultural pluralism in place of the promotion of cultural 
homogeneity (e.g. the views promoted by movements such as national 
socialism),180 such that “the contemporary global trend is toward securing 
for cultural groups and their members contextually appropriate 
                                               
179 Anaya, above n 171 [A Contemporary Definition]. An example given by Anaya is the 
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accommodations in the governing order.”181 These trends underpin 
Anaya’s conception of ongoing self-determination. 
 
Ongoing self-determination therefore requires the form and function 
of the governing institutional order (i.e. the character of the governance 
structures themselves and their role respectively) to empower individuals 
and groups to develop and make meaningful choices in all spheres of life, 
on a continuous basis. Anaya links this aspect to the wording adopted in 
the ICCPR, ICESCR and the UNDRIP – the right of peoples to “freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”182 To continue 
the African example, European government institutions were imposed on 
African inhabitants via colonisation, structures that have their foundations 
in European political and constitutional theory and have very little in 
common with the pre-existing indigenous government structures. This also 
entailed foreign domination by the European powers: the African nations 
were denied the freedom to govern themselves, let alone select the 
character of the governing institutions. 
 
Incorporating these precepts, an inquiry of the ongoing aspect of self-
determination would consider a number of factors relating to the form and 
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function of the governing (or proposed) institutional structure. Chief 
among these are considerations as to: 
 
(1) whether authority is exercised at the most local level possible 
(subsidiarity or decentralised government precepts); and 
(2) whether the design of the institutional structure itself reflects the 
unique cultural characteristics and preferences of the group 
(cultural pluralism or integrity principles). 
 
The overall question in each case is whether the institutional 
structure actively enables the indigenous people to develop and make 
meaningful choices about their economic, social, and cultural development 
3 Remedial self-determination 
Under Anaya’s framework, if the substantive self-determination of a 
people has been transgressed, an entitlement to a remedy will likely 
crystallise. As discussed above, only in very rare circumstances will the 
international community impose a remedy of secession in the case of a 
substantive breach of self-determination. In any case, there is no general 
right to such a remedy, even if a breach is established. Rather, it appears 
the international law has developed so that remedial self-determination for 
indigenous peoples will entail a remedy of autonomy, or internal self-
determination (the potential parametres of this remedy have been discussed 






above). However, remedies are ultimately to be determined with regard to 
the particular circumstances, cultural patterns and preferences of the 
aggrieved group. As Anaya contends, “A wide range of possibilities exists 
for developing within a remedial context a new institutional order within 
which all concerned can be said to be in control of their own destiny.”183 
 
The approach articulated above is adopted in this thesis because it 
recognises that simply articulating a remedy for the breach of self-
determination (i.e. a suite of autonomous institutions) ignores questions 
surrounding the substance of the right. Instead, analysing the ongoing form 
and function of the governing institutional framework shifts the focus away 
from a remedial analysis to the substance of self-determination, which 
could be described as “the precepts that define a standard of governmental 
legitimacy.”184 Once a breach is established, by analysing the institutional 
structure against Anaya’s constitutive and ongoing self-determination, the 
possibility of a remedy can then be considered.  
 
This thesis adopts Anaya’s framework to analyse whether Aotearoa 
is currently giving effect to the self-determination norm through its 
environmental law framework. This thesis will apply the constitutive self-
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determination standard to assess the extent at which Māori were able to 
participate and consent to the governing institutional orders that they have 
been subjected to historically. This thesis also applies the ongoing self-
determination standard, which looks at the heart of the legal framework 
governing indigenous peoples and analyses it against minimum standards 
based on the principles of subsidiarity185 and cultural pluralism.186
                                               
185 The idea that decision-making should occur at the most local level possible, unless it 
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III  Chapter Conclusion 
Overall, this thesis concerns the operationalisation of the indigenous 
self-determination norm within Aotearoa’s environmental law framework. 
The chapter has attempted to cover the vast scholarship relating to this field 
to delineate the source, content, scope and general approach to the 
indigenous rights of self-determination, autonomy and free, prior and 
informed consent under the current international law. It has presented an 
analytical framework for the ‘measurement’ of institutional and legal 
structures against the indigenous self-determination norm, based on the 
scholarship of Anaya. The analytical foci for the model are: (1) the 
processes leading to the development of institutional structures 
(constitutive self-determination); and (2) the ongoing form and functioning 
of the institutional structure itself and whether it embodies indigenous 
subsidiarity and cultural pluralism (ongoing self-determination). 
 
The chapter first noted that an international law right of indigenous 
peoples to self-determination may have crystallised or has the potential to 
develop in the near future as customary international law, based on the 
UNDRIP. If such a right has/does crystallise(d), this is an exciting prospect 
for Māori as Aotearoa common law automatically incorporates customary 
international norms into the domestic legal system. Requirements for 
statutory incorporation of international norms derived from treaties (under 






the rule in Te Heuheu Tukino) could therefore be circumvented to attain 
the goals of Māori self-determination claims. 
 
While the salient characteristics of the right were identified (e.g. 
devolved autonomous governance, cultural pluralism, consistency with 
state sovereignty etc.), it was argued that the implementation of indigenous 
self-determination cannot be solely considered from the point of view of 
the institutional framework a right-holder proposes to implement. To do so 
would conflate the substance of the right with its remedial 
manifestations.187 
 
Instead, the analysis must as a first step consider whether the 
institutional framework is giving effect to the substance of the norm. 
Anaya’s conception of the self-determination right is therefore appropriate 
as it considers both the processes of creation (constitutive self-
determination) and the ongoing form and functioning of the existing and/or 
proposed governing institutional structure (ongoing self-determination). 
Additionally, based on the above mentioned, Anaya’s inquires whether the 
structure is giving expression to the norm. Only once a breach of 
substantive self-determination is established can the remedial aspect of the 
right be invoked to consider the type of institutional structures appropriate 
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to remedy the transgression (and this may encompass some of the salient 
features of autonomous structures discussed above). 
 
The balance of this thesis applies Anaya’s analytical framework to 
consider whether Aotearoa’s environmental law framework is currently 
giving (or has historically given) expression to the indigenous self-
determination norm. The framework will also be used to assess whether 
any insights can be obtained from the Sami and Canadian case studies that 
would aid the formation of a norm compliant model in Aotearoa.188 
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Chapter 2: Historical Approaches to Māori Self-
Determination – Were they Compliant? 
I Chapter Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider, by applying the analytical 
framework developed in chapter 1, whether various historical legal 
developments regarding Māori in Aotearoa have enabled the expression of 
the indigenous self-determination norm. The chapter first provides some 
necessary background relating to Te Tiriti o Waitangi or the Treaty of 
Waitangi (‘Te Tiriti’). It then examines, against Anaya’s framework, 
various proposals of the early New Zealand government that would have 
enabled Māori to exercise forms of autonomous governance. The chapter 
concludes that the state’s historical frameworks have failed to give 
expression to Anaya’s conception of the norm. 
II Background 
A Te Tiriti o Waitangi 
A discussion about Māori self-determination is incomplete without 
considering Te Tiriti. Te Tiriti was initially signed by northern Māori 
rakatira (chiefs) and the British Crown on 6 February 1840.189 The 
document consists of two versions, a Māori and an English text, the former 
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being the one signed by the majority of Māori rakatira. Textual 
inconsistencies in these versions have caused issues that remain extant 
today (and may never be fully resolved).190 The crux of the issue is that the 
text of Articles 1 and 2 in the two different versions are not direct 
translations of one another, and there are differences of approach as to 
which text shall govern the treaty relationship (i.e. whether the contra 
proferentum principle should apply). 
 
Modern Māori language experts have pointed out the inconsistencies 
in these articles in the context of major case law or Waitangi Tribunal 
reports. The Māori text of article 1 states that the chiefs relinquished “te 
Kawanatanga katoa o o ratou wenua”. Professor Sir Hugh Kawharu, in his 
translation of Te Tiriti adopted by then President Cooke of the Court of 
Appeal in the New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General (‘SOE 
case’) case, translated this as the giving of “complete government”. This 
is regarded by the Court of Appeal as something less than ‘full’ 
sovereignty, akin to ‘governance.’191 Article 1 of the English Treaty, on 
the other hand, purported to formalise the cession of ‘sovereignty’ from 
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Māori to the Crown.192 The Māori text of article 2 provided that the chiefs 
were guaranteed “te tino rangatiratanga o o ratou wenua o ratou kainga me 
o ratou taonga katoa”. Kawharu’s translation adopted in the SOE case 
interpreted this as: “the unqualified exercise of their chieftainship over 
their lands, villages and all their treasures.”193 The English version of 
Article 2 provided the chiefs retained the “full exclusive and undisturbed 
possession of their lands and estates, forests, fisheries, and properties.” As 
the Waitangi Tribunal has said: “…it is the meaning of kāwanatanga – and 
indeed its relationship to rangatiratanga – that lies at the heart of the debate 
about the meaning of Te Tiriti.”194 While the language was not available 
at the time, the core of this debate is about the historical recognition of the 
indigenous right to self-determination (when viewed against general 
international law precepts). 
 
In the decades following the signing of Te Tiriti the early colonial 
government developed various legislative mechanisms which temporarily 
extended to (some) Māori kin groups the jurisdiction to regulate the affairs 
of their people and lands, on their own terms, operating within the context 
                                               
192 Although, this proposition remains controversial. In their Te Paparahi o te Raki report 
the Waitangi Tribunal determined that the northern rangatira who signed the treaty in 
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Whakaputanga me te Tiriti - The Declaration and the Treaty: The Report on Stage 1 of 
the Te Paparahi o te Raki Inquiry (Wai 1040, 2014) 
193 At 663. 
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of the Crown’s sovereignty.  It is arguable that these mechanisms gave 
some expression to the promises of rangatiratanga, and, when viewed 
retrospectively, aspects of the indigenous self-determination norm. 
Nonetheless, as is discussed below, the mechanisms were ultimately 
crafted exclusively by Crown officials in order to obtain the Crown’s own 
objectives. These mechanisms will be critiqued against Anaya’s 
framework below to demonstrate that the Crown has failed to give 
expression to the indigenous self-determination norm historically. 
III  Genuine attempts to recognise Māori self-determination? 
Immediately following the signing of Te Tiriti, for practical reasons, 
British law was not immediately applied and enforced outside the 
boundaries of the early British settlements – it slowly ‘leaked’ into the 
Māori communities which remained, by de facto, regulated by tikanga 
Māori.195 The colonial government faced practical difficulties in extending 
their authority and law over Māori settlements and in securing land from 
Māori for the increasing numbers of incoming settlers. To address these 
issues, various statutory instruments, described by Paul G. McHugh as 
“experiments” in Māori autonomy,196 were promulgated in the mid-1800s. 
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While they may not have reflected a genuine attempt by the government to 
give effect to rights of rangatiratanga (or self-determination),197 they 
reflect an early willingness for the British to allow Māori to regulate their 
own affairs according to their own rules and customs. This section outlines 
the various instruments and considers whether they give expression to 
Anaya’s conception of self-determination. 
A Tikanga and criminal justice 
1 Native Exemption Ordinance 1844 and Resident Magistrates Court 
Ordinance 1846 
A series of incidents tested the enforceability of English criminal law 
over Māori following the signing of the Treaty.198 For the British these 
events underlined the need for concerted efforts to extend English law into 
areas that remained under Māori influence. To that end, George Clark 
Senior, the ‘Protector of Aborigines’, proposed the ‘legalisation’ of Māori 
customs to obtain Māori obedience to English law.199 In 1844 the Native 
                                               
197 Vincent O’Malley contends there was never any intention to allow these mechanisms 
to “develop into state-sanctioned instruments of genuine self-government.” See Vincent 
O'Malley “English Law and the Māori Response: A Case Study from the Runanga 
System in Northland, 1861-65” 2007 116(1) The Journal of the Polynesian Society at 
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Exemption Ordinance was passed which gave iwi the ability to regulate 
criminal justice within their communities through the application of 
aspects of tikanga Māori (and, significantly, to the exclusion of English 
law). Under the scheme, chiefs were tasked with arresting offenders and 
bringing them through the justice system. The British could only intervene 
in crimes between Māori at the request of chiefs. The Māori concepts of 
utu (the restoration of balance) and muru (‘plundering parties’)200 were 
also adopted in sentencing.201 Governor Grey’s Resident Magistrates Court 
Ordinance 1846, built on the 1844 ordinance by providing for the 
appointment of ‘Native Assessors’ who were usually chiefs that “were 
charged with working alongside the Resident Magistrates to resolve 
various disputes.”202 The preamble to this ordinance stated its aim as: “the 
adaptation of law to the circumstances of both races.”  
2 Analysis against Anaya’s framework 
Constitutive self-determination 
The 1844 and the 1846 ordinances both fail when viewed against 
Anaya’s constitutive self-determination principle, which considers 
                                               
200 Vincent O'Malley “Reinventing tribal mechanisms of governance: The emergence of 
maori runanga and komiti in New Zealand before 1900” 2009 56(1) Ethnohistory. Early 
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of ‘plunder’. The concept is more appropriately seen as a form of restitution or 
reparation. 
201 Law Commission Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law (NZLC SP9, 2001). 
See also Ward, above n 195. 
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whether the procedures which lead to the development of institutional 
arrangements facilitate indigenous participation and consent.203 While the 
two ordinances were ostensibly promising as tools to enable Māori self-
determination in the area of criminal law, the legislation was wholly 
drafted by the colonial government with no involvement from Māori in the 
process. The mechanisms were designed to fulfil the Crown’s own 
objectives, outlined by the preamble to the Native Exemption Ordinance, 
which states: 
 
WHEREAS it is greatly to be desired that the whole aboriginal 
native population of these Islands, in their relations and dealings 
amongst themselves, be brought to yield a ready obedience to the 
laws and customs of England: And whereas this end may more 
speedily and peaceably be attained by the gradual than by the 
immediate and indiscriminate enforcement of the said laws, so that 
in course of time, the force of ancient usages being weakened and 
the nature and administration of our laws being understood, the 
Native population may in all cases seek and willingly submit to the 
application of the same. 
 
Given that the underlying rationale for the two ordinances was to 
erode the expression and character of traditional Māori authority, it cannot 
be said that the procedures leading to the development of the ordinances 
encapsulated the will of the Māori people, and therefore, these mechanisms 
strongly fail to give expression to Anaya’s constitutive self-
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determination.204 In fact, the assimilative underpinnings of the framework 
(evidenced by the above preamble) suggest the criminal ordinances are an 
archetypal example of a violation of this principle. 
 
Ongoing self-determination: subsidiarity 
While the ordinances contain positive aspects when viewed against 
Anaya’s ongoing self-determination principle, which considers the 
ongoing form and functioning of the institutional order itself,205 ultimately 
the regime fails to give expression to this principle. Together, the 
legislative measures gave Māori communities a significant degree of 
autonomy over the regulation of criminal justice in Māori communities, on 
a Māori basis, and many chiefs saw them as a belated recognition of their 
chiefly authority.206 This authority was exclusive in that chiefs alone were 
empowered to regulate the administration of justice when crimes occurred 
between Māori, strongly linking the framework to subsidiarity principles.  
 
Ongoing self-determination: cultural pluralism 
As noted, that framework also enabled chiefs to apply certain central 
facets of Māori criminal justice, such as utu and muru. Therefore, the 
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framework was not wholly deficient when viewed against the requirements 
of cultural pluralism. 
 
With that said, it is a stretch to conclude that the two ordinances are 
an expression of Anaya’s notions of ongoing self-determination. The 
authority was limited to very narrow aspects of criminal law, as prescribed 
by the Crown. The adoption of muru and utu in the legislation, while 
positive, was ultimately framed by pākehā understandings of these Māori 
concepts. Overall, as the framework was wholly developed by Crown 
officials to ensure the eventual subjugation of Māori to European 
conceptions of law, it cannot be said that the form and functioning of the 
framework enabled Māori to freely develop economically, socially and 
culturally. 
 
Later mechanisms developed by the colonial government to establish 
autonomous ‘native districts’ will now be considered against the analytical 
framework developed in chapter 1. 
B ‘Native Districts’ frameworks 
1 New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 
The New Zealand Constitution Act, passed by the English legislature 
in 1852, would have advanced the recognition of Māori autonomy further 
than ever before, if the mechanism had been applied. The statute generally 







introduced representative government to the fledgling colony and was 
intended to extend significant powers to the provinces. Significantly, 
section 71 enabled the creation of ‘native districts’, which could be 
regulated through principles of tikanga Māori, “so far as they [were] not 
repugnant to the general principles of humanity”. As Brookfield contends, 
the level of autonomy provided under section 71 was “not slight” and under 
the scheme Māori could have “overridden any conflicting local New 
Zealand legislation”.207 No native districts were formally set apart under 
the Act, and it was eventually repealed by the Constitution Act 1986.208 
The potential for recognising Māori self-determination and for giving 
expression to the right to rangatiratanga under this framework was left 
unrealised. 
2 Native Districts Regulation Act 1858 and Native Circuit Courts Act 
1858 
Later schemes incorporated the principles envisaged by section 71 
(autonomous Māori or ‘native’ districts). By the mid-1850s, rakatira were 
becoming increasingly concerned with the loss of land and mana they were 
facing with the extension of Crown influence and the ever-increasing 
demand for land by new settlers. The Kīngitanga movement was gaining 
traction in the north island, advocating for Māori kotahitanga (unity) under 
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a united Māori king, and an end to land sales to Pākehā. At the same time, 
in response to the steady extension of British authority into Māori 
communities, the pre-contact institutions of rūnanga (village governing 
councils) were being revitalised and adopted by Māori in many parts of the 
country as a means to regulate Māori areas in accordance with tikanga.209 
The Governor hoped to bring these informal rūnanga institutions under the 
influence of the Crown in order to undermine the Kīngitanga movement 
and to influence the expansion of English law and British authority into 
Māori settlements. In 1858 the General Assembly passed the Native 
Districts Regulation Act and the Native Circuit Courts Act.210 Under these 
frameworks, ‘native districts’ could be proclaimed by the Governor over 
areas where native title had not yet been extinguished. Bylaws to regulate 
local matters within the native district could be promulgated by the 
Governor-in-Council. Native Circuit Courts were to be responsible for the 
enforcement of the bylaws along with the common law (through ‘resident 
magistrates’ and ‘Māori assessors’). Bylaws could be made for such local 
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matters as fencing,211 cattle trespass,212 weed control,213 and, 
significantly:214 
 
For ascertaining, prescribing, and providing for the observance and 
enforcement of the rights, duties, and liabilities, amongst 
themselves, of Tribes, Communities, or Individuals of the Native 
Race, in relation to the use, occupation, and receipt of the Profits of 
Lands and Hereditaments. 
 
In other words, the scheme envisaged rakatira having a degree of 
control over matters of resource management, land use and local taxation 
within the villages and lands under their mana. It was effectively the power 
to constitute and exercise power as a form of local government, over areas 
where native title remained extant (albeit to a narrowly prescribed degree). 
The 1858 legislation largely sat dormant, and while Mangonui was the first 
district constituted under the legislation in March 1859,215 it was Governor 
Grey who would have the most influence under the 1858 legislation when 
he returned for his second term as Governor in September 1861. 
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3 Governor Grey’s ‘new institutions’ 
Grey arrived back in Aotearoa with a comprehensive plan for the 
government of the country, including areas that remained under Māori 
influence. His plan for governance of Māori areas came to be known as 
‘the new institutions’ or the ‘rūnanga system’. Grey’s plan was simply to 
allow limited Māori autonomy to “harness the energies of [the unofficial 
rūnanga] in pursuit of government objectives”, i.e. to undermine the 
Kīngitanga and extend Crown authority and English law into Māori 
communities.216 Legislative authority for the scheme was to be found in 
the 1858 legislation.217 Under Grey’s scheme the North Island was to be 
demarcated into ‘native districts’, each governed by a ‘district rūnanga.’ 
Each district would contain up to six ‘hundreds’ (or villages, each one 
having their own rūnanga). The ‘village rūnanga’ would appoint two 
representatives to the district rūnanga. Significantly, the rūnanga in 
conjunction with resident magistrates and the ‘civil commissioner’ could 
make bylaws relating to matters of local concern, such as infrastructure 
development, and land use, as well as to facilitate land alienation 
(customary or native title investigation). These would be enforced by 
salaried Māori officials (wardens and constables) under the guise of native 
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assessors. Proposed bylaws would need the approval of the Governor-in-
Council.218 
 
4 Analysis against Anaya’s framework 
This section groups together the above ‘native districts’ frameworks 
(section 71 of the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852, Native Districts 
Regulation Act 1858, Native Circuit Courts Act 1858 and Grey’s ‘new 




As with the criminal justice ordinances passed in the 1840s, and for 
similar reasons, the native district frameworks fail to give expression to 
Anaya’s conception of constitutive self-determination. The native districts 
frameworks were wholly crafted by Crown officials with no involvement 
of iwi in the process. The frameworks, while ostensibly resembling 
vehicles to give expression to article two rights to tino rangatiratanga, were 
ultimately designed to further Crown objectives. As O’Malley notes, the 
various schemes were intended to undermine the influence of the 
developing Kīngitanga movement by extending British law into the 
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influential Māori settlements and Europeanising the applicable systems of 
law. They also prioritised the identification of customary land holders with 
the objective of freeing up Māori owned land, subject to native title, for 
alienation to settlers. Given the underlying objectives, and the lack of 
involvement of Māori in their development, it cannot be said that the 
processes leading to the creation of the various native districts frameworks 
enabled the will of the people to be heard in their development. 
Accordingly, these frameworks, as with the 1840s ordinances, are 
archetypal breaches of the constitutive self-determination principle.219 
 
Ongoing self-determination: subsidiarity 
The various native districts arrangements were ostensibly promising 
when viewed against the subsidiarity precepts of Anaya’s ongoing self-
determination principle. The systems involved the devolution of a degree 
of autonomy to Māori communities (i.e. powers of law-making and 
enforcement). For some chiefs, this is what was envisaged by Te Tiriti. 
Alan Ward argues: “For the first time comprehensive machinery was being 
set in motion to involve the Māori in a substantial measure of legislative, 
judicial and administrative authority in their own districts.”220 The schemes 
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allowed the setting aside of exclusive areas of Māori jurisdiction, where 
upon Māori would have authority to regulate areas of law prescribed by 
the governing legislation, subject to the overarching authority of the 
Crown. The arrangements exhibited some of the hallmark attributes of 
‘autonomy’ outlined in chapter 1. 
 
However, the native district systems failed to recognise the inherent 
nature of the authority of chiefs, instead, delegating powers through 
legislation. The autonomous decision-making powers were narrowly 
prescribed in legislation by the Crown, and any autonomous laws created 
were subject to the approval and ongoing oversight of the Crown. It is 
difficult to come to any other conclusion than that the native districts 
scheme was designed to Europeanise the long term and day-to-day 
regulation of Māori villages, to secure British colonial objectives. The 
preamble to the Native Districts Regulation Act stated: 
 
WHEREAS it is expedient, in order to promote the civilization of 
the Native Race, that the Governor in Council be enabled to make 
and put in force … such Regulations on matters of Local 
concernment, or relating to the Social Economy of the Native 
Race… [emphasis added] 
 
Ongoing self-determination: cultural pluralism 
Furthermore, the native districts frameworks failed to embrace or 
incorporate tikanga Māori to any material extent (aside from section 71 of 







the Constitution Act 1852, which was never applied and contained the 
proviso that Māori custom could only be applied so long as it was not 
“repugnant to the general principles of humanity.”). The framework itself, 
and any secondary legislation (i.e. bylaws) created and applied under the 
framework, was wholly framed by European conceptions of the law (Māori 
legal tradition or tikanga could not form the basis of decision-making). The 
native districts frameworks fail to embody the two underlying facets of 
Anaya’s ongoing self-determination principle: subsidiarity and cultural 
pluralism. Ultimately, as O’Malley says:221 
 
A half-hearted effort at co-opting Māori runanga was never going to 
succeed in the absence of any willingness to grant them real powers 
and to acknowledge Māori custom within the framework of the legal 
system. 
 
On these bases, the native districts frameworks, when retrospectively 
viewed against Anaya’s self-determination principles, failed to embody the 
principles of indigenous self-determination as required by modern 
international law.
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IV  Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has adopted the analytical framework developed in 
chapter 1 to consider whether various colonial legislative mechanisms, 
when viewed retrospectively, adhere to the indigenous self-determination 
norm. The mechanisms analysed ostensibly provided Māori with a 
significant level of autonomous decision-making authority over both the 
criminal law and the general regulation of life within Māori villages (i.e. 
areas where native title was not yet extinguished). The objective of these 
mechanisms was the erosion of traditional Māori institutions of authority 
and the replacement of Māori legal traditions with more ‘civilised’, 
European, notions of law. This is clearly evidenced by the preambles to the 
Native Exemption Ordinance and the Native Districts Regulation Act. 
Both the criminal ordinances and the native districts frameworks were 
wholly developed by Crown agents and imposed on Māori to achieve the 
Crown’s objectives (the extension of European law and authority into 
Māori village, the Europeanisation/civilisation of the governing legal 
framework, and the identification of customary land holdings to catalyse 
alienation). This is an archetypal violation of both Anaya’s constitutive and 
ongoing self-determination principles. This chapter therefore concludes 
that Aotearoa has historically failed to give expression to the self-
determination norm when these mechanisms are viewed against Anaya’s 
framework. This thesis now moves to consider various contemporary 







environmental law frameworks in Aotearoa to consider whether the Crown 
is currently giving adequate expression to the norm. The chapter focuses 
on the interrelationship between the Crown, local authorities and Māori 
groups in relation to natural resources.  







Chapter 3: Current Approaches to Māori Self-
Determination – Are they Compliant? 
I  Chapter Introduction 
 This chapter has two key foci: (1) to consider whether the Crown is 
adequately implementing the indigenous self-determination norm in 
Aotearoa (by applying Anaya’s analytical framework to various resource 
frameworks);222 and (2) if the current system is failing to comply, to 
consider whether any specific insights can be observed from the Aotearoa 
examples to formulate a model that is compliant. While the chapter 
concludes that the Crown is overall failing to comply with the norm, there 
are positive aspects of the emerging legal framework that go some way 
toward demonstrating compliance with the norm. For example, both the 
Whanganui River and Te Urewera settlement frameworks provide 
promising insights under Anaya’s cultural pluralism heading. 
 
The chapter first takes stock of current Aotearoa law and examines 
whether any current mechanisms are implementing the indigenous self-
determination norm. Because the underlying thesis of this work is 
concerned with the reclamation of indigenous agency in environmental 
management, the chapter focuses specifically on tools and mechanisms in 
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this field. While there are many such tools in Aotearoa law, the chapter 
specifically focuses on mechanisms that provide takata whenua with forms 
of ‘partnership’ (the Whanganui River settlement arrangement), and 
‘control’ (the Te Urewera settlement and section 33 of the Resource 
Management Act 1991 (RMA)).223 Anaya’s framework is then adopted to 
consider whether these models comply with Aotearoa’s international 
obligations, i.e. whether they provide for the expression of indigenous self-
determination. While there are aspects of the models which go some way 
toward realising the requirements of the norm (e.g. the legal personality 
examples and their expression of cultural pluralism), ultimately the 
mechanisms are non-compliant, and this speaks to a general dearth of 
norm-compliant tools in Aotearoa’s environmental law.
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II  Existing Tools under Aotearoa Law 
The Crown might contend that many tools in Aotearoa law provide 
for the expression of Māori self-determination. This notion can be tested 
using the normative framework developed in chapter 1. For convenience, 
the existing tools can be conceptualised into three overarching categories: 
‘influence’ (reactive participatory or consultative models), ‘partnership’ 
(power-sharing models) and ‘control’ (autonomy-based models).224 Each 
category provides Māori with a different level of influence over 
environmental decision-making, outlined below. 
A Influence tools 
Influence mechanisms are those that provide Māori with an 
opportunity to incorporate their views into public decision-making 
processes, usually by way of consultation, such as the mechanisms 
contained in Part II of the RMA. These mechanisms are reactive in nature, 
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external to the general international law context), it is nonetheless insightful when 
measuring the existing environmental management tools against self-determination 
standards, given the similarities between self-determination and treaty based 
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enabling Māori groups to react to the priorities or decisions of third parties 
whom hold the ultimate decision authority, such as local authorities under 
the local government and resource management legislation. 
 
Part II of the RMA is an example of this (sections 6, 7 and 8).225 
These sections govern the incorporation and consideration of Māori views 
in resource management decision-making (inter alia). They apply, to “all 
persons exercising functions and powers” under the RMA, for example, 
when regional or district plans are developed or amended by local 
authorities, or when resource consent applications are considered by 
consent authorities. The mechanism allows Māori to attempt to influence 
resource development proposals in such cases, but only once the process 
has been initiated. Section 6 provides that decision-makers must 
“recognise and provide for” matters of national importance, including “the 
relationship of Māori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral 
lands, water … and other taonga.” Section 7 provides that decision-makers 
must “have particular regard to” ‘kaitiakitanga,’ defined in section 2 as 
“the exercise of guardianship by the tangata whenua of an area in 
accordance with tikanga Māori in relation to natural and physical 
resources; and includes the ethic of stewardship.” Finally, section 8 states 
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that decision-makers must “take into account” the principles of Te Tiriti o 
Waitangi. 
 
These tools provide a mere opportunity for Māori to participate in 
resource management decision-making: no decision-making authority 
itself is provided to Māori, nor are their interests afforded any priority 
above other interests in the process.226 Under this influence model, Māori 
are “consigned to the less positive role of objectors.”227 While Māori are 
able to appeal local authority decisions to the Environment Court under 
this mechanism (i.e. on the basis that a council has not recognised or 
provided for their relationship with their lands, waters or taonga, under 
section 6), Māori have had little success with this approach in the past.228 
 
Influence models are ultimately an ineffective vehicle for the 
expression of indigenous self-determination. When viewed against 
Anaya’s framework, they do not provide for the requirements of 
subsidiarity or cultural pluralism to any material extent. They provide 
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Māori with no competency to regulate environment management directly. 
Instead, existing power structures are maintained, and Māori are given the 
opportunity to submit their views to processes initiated and adjudicated on 
by third party public bodies. Māori views have no priority over non-Māori 
interests in this process. Influence tools such as Part II of the RMA are 
arguably the antithesis of indigenous subsidiarity contemplated by 
Anaya’s framework, especially where a local authority is tasked with 
regulating the management of resources of high importance to Māori and 
very little importance to anyone else, e.g. waahi tapu (sacred sites). It 
cannot be argued that such mechanisms enable the decentralisation of 
governance to indigenous peoples. 
 
Furthermore, Māori cultural precepts are not given expression via 
the influence mechanisms to any genuine extent. It is positive that the 
RMA and related local government instruments have begun to express the 
language of Māori environmental management concepts (e.g. the adoption 
of concepts such as kaitiakitaka (guardianship), taonga (treasured things) 
and waahi tapu into the RMA). However, as alluded to above, these 
concepts play a very limited role in genuine environmental decision-
making under the RMA (they are but one consideration for third party 
decision-makers to bear in mind). There is little room for Māori concepts 
of environmental management (i.e. tikanga Māori) to form the basis of 
decision-making under these influence tools. Therefore, these tools fail to 







give expression to the cultural pluralism principles promoting by Anaya’s 
self-determination framework. 
 
These conclusions apply equally to other influence mechanisms, 
such as the statutory acknowledgments tool contained in various Treaty 
settlements229 and the recent Mana Whakahono-a-Rohe amendments to the 
RMA (iwi participation arrangements).230 This chapter will not consider 
influence tools in any further detail because they do not enable the 
expression of indigenous self-determination, at least in terms of Anaya’s 
subsidiarity and cultural pluralism principles. 
B Partnership tools 
Partnership tools can be characterised as power sharing, co-
management or co-governance arrangements. Such models generally 
entail a spectrum of arrangements involving, to various degrees, “the 
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sections 205 to 222 Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998. 
230 Section 58M, RMA. Mana Whakahono-a-Rohe arrangements provide a mechanism 
for iwi and local authorities to discuss, agree and record ways in which tangata whenua 
may participate in resource management decisions-making processes under the RMA 
(for example, the development of planning documents). 







sharing of power between governments and local communities.”231 
Partnership tools therefore allow Māori to exercise shared decision-
making authority in conjunction with public authorities over resources, a 
form of supervised or shared autonomy. This thesis contends that the 
partnership model can be used to operationalise indigenous self-
determination in certain cases,232 provided the principles of subsidiarity 
and cultural pluralism are given expression to a material extent. As was 
discussed in chapter 1, the operationalisation of the self-determination 
norm does not require any one specific type of institutional arrangement.233 
Such an analysis unduly focuses on the remedial rather than the substantive 
aspects of the norm (i.e. the line of reasoning that generalises and equates 
self-determination claims with secessionist movements). 
 
There are many potential examples of the partnership models that 
developed through the RMA and the treaty settlement process. It is 
questionable, though, whether these models adhere to the requirements of 
the self-determination norm applied in this thesis (Anaya’s framework). 
                                               
231 Fikret Berkes and others “The Benefits of the Commons” 1989 Nature 91 at 93. See 
also Rachael Caroline Harris “The changing face of co-governance in New Zealand: 
how are Ngāi Tahu and Ngāi Tūhoe promoting the interests of their people through 
power-sharing arrangements in resource management?” (LLM Thesis, University of 
Canterbury, 2015) for a general overview of co-management and its application to the 
Kāi Tahu context in Aotearoa. 
232 See chapter 5 below for a discussion on the balancing test suggested by the Waitangi 
Tribunal in Wai 262. The tribunal’s conceptual model suggests that partnership models 
may be appropriate when there are many third parties interested in the resource, as well 
as iwi. Waitangi Tribunal, above n 224. 
233 Anaya, above n 90. 







For example, under ss 36B to 36E of the RMA, a local authority may 
conclude a joint management agreement (‘JMA’) with an iwi authority, 
provided certain statutory requirements are satisfied by the parties 
(including an ‘efficiency’ test). JMAs enable the parties to jointly perform 
the local authority’s functions relating to natural or physical resources in 
the region/district. For example, a JMA has been concluded between the 
Tūwharetoa Māori Trust Board and Taupō District Council.234 This 
provides that publicly notified resource consents and private plan changes 
relating to Māori freehold land in the district can be heard by a joint panel 
of decision-makers.235 It effectively provides the Tūwharetoa entity with 
an equal share in statutory decision-making power, although this is limited 
to a narrow and specific context. Other, similar, examples are the JMA 
entered into between Te Rūnanganui o Ngāti Porou Trustee Limited and 
Gisborne District Council,236 and the various Waikato River co-
management arrangements.237 
                                               
234 Joint Management Agreement between Taupō District Council and The Tūwharetoa 
Māori Trust Board on behalf of Ngāti Tūwharetoa Iwi  (2008). 
235 Consisting of two commissioners appointed by each party and a jointly chosen 
chairperson. 
236 This JMA provides for the sharing of functions relating to notified resource consent 
applications and planning which relate to the Waiapu catchment. Joint Management 
Agreement between Gisborne District Council and Te Rūnanganui o Ngāti Porou 
Trustee Limited  (2015). 
237 Waikato-Tainui Rauptau Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010, which gives 
effect to a Deed of Settlement dated 22 August 2008. This agreement resulted from the 
resolution of Waikato-Tainui’s historical grievances regarding the Crown’s 
management of the Waikato River. It provides for the co-management of the awa by 
various Crown and iwi entities, and the formulation of a ‘vision and strategy’ for its 
restoration. Various statutory decision-makers when exercising their powers/functions 
must ‘give effect to’ the strategy and vision (e.g. those exercising decision powers under 








While the mentioned partnership models are a positive development 
for the incorporation of Māori views in resource management, they are not 
without criticism for their lack of ability to provide for genuine self-
determination. As Linda Te Aho notes:238 
 
There are some who are deeply concerned about whether co-
management can ever truly work in New Zealand when there is such 
an imbalance of power and resourcing and when the Crown partner 
is the ultimate decision-maker. 
 
The shared nature of the decision-making locus, and the lack of 
overall influence available to Māori under the frameworks239 means that 
the partnership category ranks lower against Anaya’s conception of 
ongoing self-determination than the control models.240 A case study of the 
Whanganui River settlement, a partnership model, will be considered 
                                               
RMA, Conservation Act 1987 and National Parks Act 1980); or ‘have particular regard 
to it’ (Local Government Act). The legislation also created an obligation for the parties 
to enter into a JMA within 18 months from settlement date. Other parts of the Waikato 
River are now subject to JMAs with other river iwi/hapū: see Ngati Tuwharetoa, 
Raukawa, and Te Arawa River Iwi Waikato River Act 2010 (s 43) and Nga Wai o 
Maniapoto (Waipa River) Act 2012 (s 17). 
238 Linda Te Aho, above n ; at at 292. 
239 Gail Tipa “Indigenous communities and the co-management of natural resources: the 
case of New Zealand freshwater management” (PhD Thesis, University of Otago, 
2002). 
240 See Natalie Coates “Joint-management agreements in New Zealand : simply empty 
promises?” 2009 13(1) Journal of South Pacific Law for an overview of other criticisms 
relating to the JMA regime. These include: the requirement for the JMA to meet an 
‘efficiency test’; the fact that JMAs can be cancelled at any time; and the lack of 
political willingness of local authorities to adopt a JMA. 







further below to assess whether this partnership model complies with 
Anaya’s requirements of the self-determination norm. 
C Control tools 
Legal mechanisms that provide Māori with the ability to manage, 
control or exercise authority directly and unilaterally over natural 
resources (within the rubric of central government’s overarching 
sovereignty) can be described as control tools. These are the tools that most 
resemble forms of autonomous governance, whether territorial or non-
territorial.241 Control models can be adopted to implement self-
determination, provided they give expression to the subsidiarity and 
cultural pluralism requirements. The examples explored under this 
category are: (1) the Te Urewera framework; and (2) section 33 transfers 
under the RMA. The Crown is likely to identify these two models as prime 
examples of the self-determination norm. The chapter considers this 
position and analyses whether these case studies adequately operationalise 
the self-determination norm, or whether better control models are needed 
to give effect to the norm. The concept of a legal personality for natural 
resources will be explored first to provide necessary background to the 
Whanganui River (partnership) and Te Urewera (control) case studies. 
                                               
241 See chapter 1 for a discussion regarding the types of autonomy (e.g. territorial, non-
territorial and cultural). 







III  Legal Personality - Background 
A Theoretical foundations 
The idea of attributing rights to nature has many proponents but the 
most cohesive exegesis of the idea comes from Christopher Stone in his 
seminal work: “Should Trees Have Standing? – Toward Legal Rights for 
Natural Objects.”242 Stone advocated for all ‘natural objects’ (i.e. forests, 
oceans, rivers etc.) and the entire natural environment to be recognised as 
legal personalities, equipped with their own bundle of rights. Stone, who 
contended that the concept would lead to better environmental outcomes 
for society, argued that the extension of rights to nature was a natural 
progression of rights in law. He noted that the extension of human rights 
to African-Americans and women was seen as radical at the time because 
the dominant social theories perceived African-Americans and women 
effectively as chattels to be productively utilised by civilised European 
men. Stone refers to Lockean theory to demonstrate similarly how natural 
resources have “traditionally been regarded by the common law … as 
objects for man to conquer and master and use – in such a way as the law 
once looked upon “man’s” relationship to African Negroes.”243 Stone’s 
idea, in the context of the dominant political theories, therefore offers an 
                                               
242 Christopher Stone “Should Trees Have Standing? - Toward Legal Rights for Natural 
Objects” 1972 45 Southern California Law Review. 
243 At 463. 







alternative way of viewing the world, natural resources and the human 
relationship between the two (vis-a-vis previously dominant social 
paradigms). 
 
Stone’s legal personality idea encompassed three aspects: (1) the 
“natural object” would have legal standing in its own capacity (an action 
could be brought in the name of the resource itself where harm is caused); 
(2) the quantification of loss assessment would consider the actual impact 
of the harm to the resource (rather than the diminution in economic value 
to human right holders);244 and (3) any remedies would be applied to the 
resource directly (rather than compensating human rights holders). 
 
The governments of two South American states have adopted 
Stone’s concept in the drafting of their constitutional documents. Bolivia 
has restructured its constitutional and legal frameworks to extend rights to 
nature, based on indigenous philosophies of ‘Pachamama’ (mother earth) 
as a living being.245 The reforms have created 11 new rights for the 
environment, including a right to life and a right to continue vital cycles 
and processes free from human alteration.246 Similarly, Ecuador amended 
                                               
244 E.g. riparian owners adjacent to a river. 
245 Law of the Rights of Mother Earth 2010 (Bolivia). 
246 Articles 7 and 8. 







its constitution in 2008 to include a section on the rights of nature, 
including the right to exist and maintain its lifecycles, and the right to be 
restored.247 As mentioned above, Stone’s concept has now penetrated 
Aotearoa’s legal system with the conclusion of the Whanganui River and 
Te Urewera settlements in 2017 and 2014 respectively. Before examining 
these frameworks in detail, the section will now assess the extent at which 
the concept aligns with the Māori worldview. 
B Link to Māori worldviews 
Stone’s concept is important because it aligns with many 
fundamental Māori environmental concepts, evidenced with reference to 
the Whanganui River and Te Urewera case studies. It will be demonstrated 
throughout this chapter that these two case studies, which reflect Stone’s 
concept, also strongly align with Anaya’s conception of cultural pluralism. 
Therefore, aspects of these frameworks are insightful when considering the 
future shape of Māori self-determination in Aotearoa. First, this section 
examines the connection between tikanga Māori and Stone’s legal 
personality concept. 
 
 In the author’s view it can be risky to refer to a homogenous ‘Māori 
worldview’, especially in twenty-first century Aotearoa society, given the 
                                               
247 Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador 2008 (Ecuador), arts 71 and 72. 







history of colonisation and racial integration, and the wide range of 
contexts that modern Māori derive from and live within.248 Clearly, not all 
Māori hold, or historically held, the same views regarding their own 
personal relationship with the natural world. Nonetheless, the salient 
characteristics, or principles, of pre-contact Māori understandings of the 
natural world (te ao tūroa) can be identified, and it is useful to use this idea 
in contexts such as this thesis. 
 
Pre-contact Māori generally viewed the world through a holistic lens, 
perceiving inextricable links between people, the natural environment and 
the metaphysical. In Māori cosmogony and anthropogony, all things were 
ordered in accordance with whakapapa, which means literally ‘to place in 
layers’. Michael Stevens explains this meant that “everything from flora 
and fauna to the weather, emotions, as well as humankind, were arranged 
into genealogical groups.”249 Te Aho notes that each iwi/hapū had its own 
traditions, but:250 
 
…all are inextricably bound to the environment … by virtue of 
whakapapa (genealogy) which derives from the creation stories of 
human-kind in cosmology. We see ourselves as direct descendants 
                                               
248 Tānia Ka’ai (ed) Ki te whaiao: an introduction to Māori culture and society (Pearson 
Longman, Auckland, NZ, 2004). 
249 Michael Stevens “Muttonbirds and Modernity in Murihiku: Continuity and Change in 
Kāi Tahu Knowledge” (PhD Thesis, University of Otago, 2009) at 21. 
250 Linda Te Aho, above n ; at at 285. 







of our earth mother and sky father and consequently not only ‘of the 
land’ but ‘as the land.’ 
 
Such perspectives are interspersed through pepeha (tribal sayings), 
whaikōrero (oratory), karakia (incantations), waiata (songs), kīwaha 
(idioms) etc. For example, in introductory pepeha it is common for a 
person to introduce where they are from with reference to the significant 
geographical features of their tribal area (i.e. mountains, rivers, lakes 
etc.).251 The common saying “Ko au te awa, ko te awa ko au,” which 
translates as “I am the river, the river is me,” encapsulates the view that 
humans and their environment are intrinsically connected.252 Over many 
generations Māori developed tikanga (Māori laws, customs and practices) 
founded on this worldview and relating to human respect for their 
personified environment.253 This tikanga recognised that if people cared 
for the environment, the environment would continue to sustain them.254 
                                               
251 It is customary for the author to exclaim: Ko Takitimu te mauka; Ko Aparima te awa; 
Ko Te Ara-a-Kewa te Moana – Takitimu is the mountain; Aparima is the river; Foveaux 
Strait is the ocean [from whence I come]. 
252 James Morris and Jacinta Ruru “Giving voice to rivers : legal personality as a vehicle 
for recognising Indigenous peoples' relationships to water?” 2010 14(2) Australian 
Indigenous Law Review at 299. 
253 This has been described as a ‘chthonic’ system of law by authors such as Glenn Patrick. 
Glenn Patrick Legal traditions of the world: sustainable diversity in law (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford; New York, 2007). 
254 Linda Te Aho, above n 226. See also Re Tipene [2016] NZHC 3199, an application to 
the High Court for an order recognising customary marine title over the marine and 
coastal area surrounding Pohowaitai and Tamaitemioka (Tītī Islands). In this judgment, 
the court-appointed pūkenga, Jane Davis, refers to the tikanga of the Tītī Islands which 
she was taught by her grandmother and mother. They were taught, “if you look after the 
island, the island will look after you.” (At [116]).  








Given the nature of the Māori relationship with the environment, it 
can be argued that the Māori worldview, so far as one can be identified, 
aligns with the legal personality concept proposed by Stone in that it moves 
away from the idea that humans are the sovereign conquerors of the natural 
world and its resources. Instead, the idea recognises the fundamental 
connection between humans and the natural world, the intrinsic value of 
the latter and the responsibilities of care which therefore arise. Perhaps, 
though, it is better to say that in a legal environment founded on Western 
liberal concepts of law, society and environmental management, the legal 
personality concept is a shift toward incorporating within our legal system 
alternate (i.e. indigenous) ways of seeing the world (i.e. cultural and legal 
pluralism). This is what Glenn describes as a ‘sustainable diversity in law’, 
a theory promoting the incorporation of differing legal traditions or 
normative orders.255 The section will now consider the ways in which these 
concepts have been adopted in partnership and control models under two 
recent Treaty of Waitangi settlements (the Whanganui River and Te 
Urewera settlements). It analyses: (1) whether each framework gives 
adequate expression to the indigenous self-determination norm, and (2) the 
                                               
255 Patrick Glenn “Sustainable Diversity in Law” 2011 3(1) Hague Journal on the Rule of 
Law 39. 







extent at which any insights can be drawn from the case study for future 
reference. 
 







IV  Te Awa Tupua – Whanganui River 
A Introduction 
After many years of petitioning the government to remedy historical 
breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi, Ruruku Whakatupua, the Whanganui 
iwi Deed of Settlement,256 was signed in 2014 and given effect through Te 
Awa Tupua Act in 2017.257 Te Awa Tupua Act establishes a new legal 
framework for Te Awa Tupua based on the legal personality concept, 
called ‘Te Pā Auroa nā Te Awa Tupua’.258 The framework is designed to 
involve all stakeholders259 in the management of the river, predicated on 
the idea of ‘upholding the mana’ of the awa and improving it’s mauri (life 
force).260 This section will explore the partnership model embodied in the 
2017 legislation and the Deed of Settlement. 
B Te Pā Auroa – legal framework 
1 Overview of framework 
Section 12 recognises Te Awa Tupua as “an indivisible and living 
whole, comprising the Whanganui River from the mountains to the sea, 
                                               
256 Ruruku Whakatupua - Te Mana o Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Deed of 
Settlement). 
257 Signed in 2014 and given effect by the Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims 
Settlement) Act 2017 [“Te Awa Tupua Act”]. 
258 Which translates as ‘the broad eel weir’. 
259 Aside from the various Whanganui iwi, there are many different stakeholders whom 
rely on the river for sustenance and to support industry and energy generation. 
260 Linda Te Aho “Ruruku Whakatupua Te Mana o te Awa Tupua – Upholding the Mana 
of the Whanganui River” May 2014 Māori Law Review 12. 







incorporating all its physical and metaphysical elements.” The awa is 
attributed a legal personality in section 14, and as such it “has all the rights, 
powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person.” These two sections 
together are referred to as the ‘Te Awa Tupua status’.261 Section 13 
articulates ‘Tupua te Kawa’: the four ‘intrinsic values’ representing the 
essence of the awa, based on the iwi’s pre-European notions of resource 
management. The four kawa are: 
 
• “Ko te Awa te mātāpuna o te ora: the River is the source of 
spiritual and physical sustenance.”262 The awa is a spiritual 
and physical entity that supports the life and resources within 
it, as well as the people. 
• “E rere kau mai te Awa nui mai te Kahui Maunga ki 
Tangaroa: the great River flows from the mountains to the 
sea.”263 The awa is an indivisible and living whole from the 
mountains to the sea, encompassing all of its physical and 
metaphysical elements. 
• “Ko au te Awa ko te Awa ko au: I am the River and the River 
is me.”264 The iwi and hapū of the awa have an inalienable 
                                               
261 Section 7. 
262 Kawa Tuatahi. Section 13(a). 
263 Kawa Tuarua. Section 13(b). 
264 Kawa Tuatoru. Section 13(c). 







connection with, and responsibility to, the awa and its health 
and wellbeing. 
• “Ngā manga iti, ngā manga nui e honohono kau ana, ka tupu 
hei Awa Tupua: the small and the large streams that flow into 
one another and form one River.”265 The awa is a singular 
entity comprised of many elements and communities 
working together for the common purpose of the health and 
wellbeing of the awa. 
 
The practical effect of the Tupua te Kawa is that specified statutory 
decision-makers,266 when making decisions regarding the river or its 
catchment, must either “recognise and provide for” or “have particular 
regard to” Tupua te Kawa.267 In other words, these iwi conceptual 
understandings of the environment must be considered in environmental 
decision-making when this is undertaken by non-iwi public authorities. 
The importance of this to Anaya’s cultural pluralism principles will be 
discussed in further detail below. 
                                               
265 Kawa Tuawhā. Section 13(d). 
266 I.e. non-iwi decision-makers who exercise certain functions, powers or duties under 
one of a number of specified statutes. 
267 The applicable statutory directive (e.g. ‘recognise and provide’ or ‘have particular 
regard to’) depends on the statutory power, function or duty being exercised. Schedule 
2, Te Awa Tupua Act. 







2 Formal institutions of partnership 
The various institutions established to give effect to the Whanganui 
settlement framework reflect a power-sharing approach to resource 
management, which demonstrates the partnership nature of this example. 
This is evidenced by the joint nature of the appointment processes to the 
governance structure, and the joint management of the institutions 
themselves (i.e. between both iwi and other stakeholders). 
 
A ‘human face’ known as Te Pou Tupua is established to act in the 
name of the awa.268 The function of Te Pou Tupua is to: act and speak on 
behalf of the awa;269 to uphold both the new legal status of the awa and 
Tupua te Kawa;270 and to promote and protect the health and wellbeing of 
the awa271 (inter alia). Te Pou Tupua consists of two people jointly 
appointed by the Crown and the iwi,272 and it administers a $30 million 
contestable fund designed to support the health and wellbeing of the 
awa.273 An advisory group known as Te Karewao (supplejack vine) is 
                                               
268 Section 18. 
269 Section 19(1)(a). 
270 Section 19(1)(b). 
271 Section 19(1)(c). 
272 Section 20. The first two appointees are Dame Tariana Turia and Turama Hawira, 
which were made on 4 September 2017. Hon Christopher Finlayson and Gerrard Albert 
“First Te Pou Tupua appointed [4/9/17]” (2017) 
www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1709/S00132/first-te-pou-tupua-appointed-4917.htm. 
273 Known as Te Korotete (Subpart 6). 







established to provide practical advice and support to Te Pou Tupua, 
comprising appointees by the iwi with interests in the awa and the local 
authorities of the area.274 
 
A strategy is to be developed identifying the issues relating to the 
environmental, social, cultural and economic health and wellbeing of the 
river (known as Te Heke Ngahuru Ki Te Awa Tupua or “the first autumn 
migration of tuna [eels] signifying well-stocked storehouses for 
winter”).275 Like other resource management instruments,276 Te Heke 
Ngahuru must provide strategies to deal with the identified issues and 
recommend specific actions to be taken. The strategy document is to be 
developed collaboratively by all stakeholders and persons with interests in 
the river, in order to address and advance the health of the awa. 
Accordingly, the strategy group, Te Kōpuka nā Te Awa Tupua (white 
mānuka, the material used to build the pā auroa), will prepare and monitor 
the implementation of the strategy and will comprise representation from 
all community stakeholders (e.g. iwi, local authorities, conservation 
groups, commercial interests etc.).277 
                                               
274 Sections 27 and 28. 
275 Section 35. 
276 E.g. regional and district plans under the RMA. 
277 Section 29 to 33. 







3 Decision-making procedures 
Existing non-iwi decision-makers, exercising a statutory function, 
power or duty in relation to the river or its catchment, derived from 
specified enactments,278 must ‘recognise and provide for’ the Te Awa 
Tupua status and Tupua te Kawa.279 A lower standard applies to a different 
set of specified statutory decision-makers,280 whom must, under the same 
circumstances, ‘have particular regard to’ the Te Awa Tupua status and 
Tupua te Kawa.281 These provisions will be analysed against Anaya’s 
framework below. 
 
Furthermore, under the legislation, Te Pā Auroa (the name for the 
new legal framework) is deemed to be a relevant consideration for the 
exercise of all statutory functions, powers and duties relating to the awa, 
or to activities in the catchment which affect the river.282 It further follows 
that where a statutory decision-maker makes an administrative decision 
                                               
278 The enactments listed in clause 1 of Schedule 2. These include: the RMA (specifically 
with respect to the preparation or amendment of regional policy statements, regional or 
district plans), Conservation Act 1987 and Local Government Act 2002 (inter alia). 
279 Section 15(2). 
280 The powers, functions or duties derived from clause 2 of Schedule 2. These are: 
Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga Act 2014, Public Works Act 1981 and the RMA 
to the extent it is not captured by s 15(2)/clause 1 (in other words, all statutory powers 
of decision under the RMA except the development or amendment of regional policy 
statements, regional or district plans – such as the consideration of resource consent 
applications). 
281 Section 15(3). 
282 Section 11. 







without considering Te Pā Auroa, that decision is amenable to judicial 
review on the grounds of illegality (and there is potential for the decision 
to be set aside). Additionally, specified statutory decision-makers must 
“have particular regard to” Te Heke Ngāhuru, the awa strategy.283 
C Analysis against Anaya’s framework 
1 Constitutive self-determination 
This section will now consider the extent at which the Whanganui 
framework adheres to Anaya’s principles of self-determination. To recap, 
as discussed in chapter 1, the constitutive aspect considers whether the 
procedures which led to the creation of the institutional structure can be 
said to have encompassed the will of the people. In other words, were the 
requirements of participation and consent embodied by this principle 
adhered to in the negotiation of the Whanganui settlement, such that the 
settlement can be said to reflect the will of the Whanganui people? 
 
As discussed in chapter 1, Anaya’s key frame of reference for the 
constitutive standard is African colonialism, which resulted in the 
illegitimate expansion of European authority over existing nations, and the 
imposition of foreign government structures over another people. While 
there are parallels between the colonisation of Africa and the original 
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colonisation of Aotearoa that the Whanganui people experienced 
(discussed in the introduction), the immediate inquiry instead focuses on 
the establishment of the Whanganui settlement itself. As such, the thesis 
does not explore the colonial history of each indigenous group against this 
heading, except as far as that history concerns the negotiation and 
establishment of the institutional structure in question (in this case, the Te 
Awa Tupua settlement). 
 
In this context, constitutive self-determination raises questions 
regarding the vastly different negotiating positions of the Whanganui 
people vis-à-vis the Crown (through its Office of Treaty Settlements 
organ). This equally applies to all other Treaty settlement negotiations.284 
As canvassed above, the recognition and implementation of Māori rights 
(at international law generally and pursuant to rights sourced from Te Tiriti 
o Waitangi) is subject to the exercise of the Crown’s discretion. There is 
no legal mechanism available to iwi to have their general international law 
or Treaty of Waitangi rights invoked and recognised unilaterally (i.e. 
through the judicial process), transferring questions around the recognition 
of Māori rights from the legal and into the discretionary political realm. 
Given this, and the fact that the Crown has a significant resource base (it 
                                               
284 Nicola R. Wheen and Janine Hayward Treaty of Waitangi settlements (Bridget 
Williams Books with the New Zealand Law Foundation, Wellington, N.Z, 2012); Ann 
Sullivan “The politics of reconciliation in New Zealand” 2016 68(2) Political Science. 







has the power to tax, enforce laws and compel compliance through the 
police and army), especially compared to pre-settlement iwi groupings 
(which often have very limited financial resources available to them), in 
the author’s view, it cannot be said that any agreement born of the treaty 
settlement process is fully capable of giving expression to Anaya’s 
constitutive self-determination. Given these inherent power imbalances, it 
can be concluded that on the basis of Anaya’s framework, the processes 
leading to the conclusion of the Whanganui settlement ultimately did not 
allow the Whanganui iwi to freely determine their own political status.285 
 
2 Ongoing self-determination: subsidiarity 
The most pertinent question under Anaya’s ongoing self-
determination for the Whanganui settlement is the extent at which the iwi 
is practically able to influence the outcome of natural resource 
management decision-making under the framework (based on subsidiarity 
precepts). Included here are considerations regarding whether the 
manawhenua are able to truly influence proposals that might be detrimental 
to the awa and its catchment. Under this consideration, the example ranks 
lower than it does against Anaya’s cultural pluralism precepts (discussed 
below). 
                                               
285 Nan Seuffert “Nation as Partnership: Law, "Race," and Gender in Aotearoa New 
Zealand's Treaty Settlements” 2005 39(3) Law & Society Review. 








The first significant feature of the legal framework is that it does not 
give any exclusive decision-making powers to the manawhenua. The pre-
existing powers of decision relating to the awa and its catchment are 
retained by those who held them prior to the passage of the Te Awa Tupua 
Act. This includes all functions, powers or duties under the RMA, which 
remain the responsibility of the pre-existing, non-iwi, decision-makers. No 
direct autonomous powers in relation to the regulation of the resource are 
given to the iwi under the settlement. 
 
While the existing public authorities retain their decision-making 
competences regarding the awa/catchment, their decision-making 
framework is modified by the settlement legislation. Under the new 
arrangement iwi are able to influence environmental outcomes, however 
the ability to do so depends upon the application of a set of ‘RMA-esque’ 
statutory provisions contained in the Te Awa Tupua Act. As discussed, 
specified (non-iwi) statutory decision-makers must either “recognise and 
provide for” or “have particular regard to” Tupua te Kawa (the intrinsic 
values) and the Te Awa Tupua status (recognition of the awa as: an 
indivisible and living whole with physical and metaphysical elements; and 
as a legal person).286 Specified decision-makers must also “have particular 
                                               
286 Sections 15, 12 and 14. 







regard to” to Te Heke Ngahuru (the river strategy).287 These provisions are 
distinctive in that they mirror the wording and hierarchical manner that 
Māori views are directed to be accounted for under Part II of the RMA 
itself. Under the RMA certain matters relating to Māori interests must be 
“recognised and provided for”;288 “had particular regard to”;289 or “taken 
into account” by local authorities when exercising powers of decision 
under the RMA.290 RMA jurisprudence has, in the context of these RMA 
sections, characterised these statutory directives as hierarchical in the 
extent at which they constrain local authority decision-making.291 For 
example, the High Court has held that the direction to ‘recognise and 
provide for’ in section 6 means that the factors listed must actually be 
provided for by the decision-maker – they cannot merely be considered 
and discarded.292 Similarly, the Environment Court has noted that the 
direction to ‘have particular regard to’ the factors listed in section 7 is 
                                               
287 Section 37. The specified decision-makers are: those listed in cl 1 of sch 2; Heritage 
New Zealand Pouhere Taonga Act 2014; and the balance of the RMA. 
288 Section 6. This relates to matters of national importance, including: the relationship of 
Māori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, water, sites, waahi tapu, 
and other taonga. 
289 Section 7. This includes kaitiakitanga. 
290 Section 8. This relates to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
291 Long Bay-Okura Great Park Society Inc. v North Shore City Council EnvC A078/08. 
292 Similar to the ‘matters of national significance’ under s 6 RMA. See Bleakley v 
Environmental Risk Management Authority [2001] 3 NZLR 213 (HC). 







weaker than section 6 – there is no obligation to make provision for the 
listed factors so long as they are considered by the decision-maker.293 
 
While sections 6, 7 and 8 of the RMA apply to persons exercising 
powers of decision-making under the RMA (i.e. local authorities), the 
Whanganui framework applies to a much wider range of statutory 
decision-makers (set out in Schedule 2, clauses 1 and 2).294 As Rodgers 
notes:295 
 
This applies to the most important environmental governance 
measures in New Zealand and is intended to ensure that the unique 
status of the Te Awa Tupua is reflected in plans and project 
governance under, inter alia, the National Parks Act 1980, Local 
Government Acts 1974 and 2002, the River Boards Act 1908, the 
Walking Access Act 2008, the Reserves Act 1977 and the Resource 
Management Act 1991. 
 
While the framework ostensibly establishes a ‘power-sharing’ 
arrangement over the management of the awa. For example, appointments 
to/the operational running of the ‘human face,’ the advisory group, and the 
strategy group are shared between manawhenua, local/central government 
and/or other interested parties. The framework is more appropriately 
                                               
293 Long Bay-Okura Great Park Society Inc. 
294 These are set out in cls 1 and 2 of sch 2, Te Awa Tupua Act. 
295 Christopher Rodgers “A new approach to protecting ecosystems: The Te Awa Tupua 
(Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017” 2017 19(4) Environmental Law 
Review at 269. 







characterised as a reactive influence model.296 The extent that the various 
Whanganui iwi can influence the outcome of proposals relating to the awa 
and its catchment under this framework will depend upon the discretion of 
the non-iwi statutory decision-maker itself (i.e. local authorities in 
considering resource consents or drafting planning documents) and their 
palate for interpreting and applying pre-European Māori management 
concepts (Tupua te Kawa), as well as the Te Awa Tupua status. This will 
likely exist on a spectrum of minimal to a very high degree of provision 
for these matters. These tools are reactive in nature and provide very little 
ability for the Whanganui iwi to directly influence environmental decision-
making. Therefore the Whanganui model is more appropriately 
characterised as a ‘reactive influence’ model (discussed at the beginning 
of chapter 3) and it fails to adhere to Anaya’s subsidiarity principle to any 
material extent. 
 
3 Ongoing self-determination: cultural pluralism 
The obvious starting point for this assessment is the extent that the 
mechanism aligns with Māori ways of seeing the world and allows the 
expression of these concepts in environmental management. As Morris and 
Ruru point out, the legal personality model provides for “the Māori legal 
                                               
296 In fact, it resembles the archetypal influence model discussed above (Part II of the 
RMA and the provisions for incorporating Māori interests). 







concept of a personified natural world.”297 It diverts from many traditional 
principles underpinning Western liberal legal systems and their systems 
for resource management, namely that ‘man’ is the sovereign conqueror of 
the natural world, which is a divisible resource designed to be exploited 
for the value it can provide to human people.298 Instead, as discussed 
above, the pre-European Māori worldview perceived an inherent 
connection between all physical and metaphysical things, where order is 
established by whakapapa, and where natural features are personified as 
ancestors. Under this system, humans have distinct responsibilities to 
maintain balance and uphold the life sustaining essence of ecosystems 
(mauri). James Morris and Jacinta Ruru consider that the value of the 
concept is that it “takes a western legal precedent and gives life to a 
[resource] that better aligns with a Māori worldview that has always 
regarded [resources] as containing their own distinct life forces.”299 
 
This worldview is translated into the legal framework for Te Awa 
Tupua, complementing the previous wholly anthropocentric management 
structure. The awa is recognised as a living and indivisible whole and 
attributed a legal personality. Part of the intrinsic value system of the 
                                               
297 Morris and Ruru, above n 252 at 50. 
298 Stone, above n 242. 
299 Morris and Ruru, above n 252 at 58. 







Whanganui iwi is identified and articulated in the legislation as Tupua te 
Kawa.300 These capture the underlying values that tie the Whanganui iwi 
to their awa. Together, these fundamental Whanganui Māori concepts 
(Tupua te Kawa, the awa as a living and indivisible whole, and the 
personification of resources) are provided for in the management of the 
river (and its catchment) by statutory decision-makers (albeit, non-iwi).301 
In other words, distinctively Māori ways of perceiving and interacting with 
the world can form the basis of environmental decision-making. 
  
To link this to Anaya’s framework, the governing institutional order 
reflects the distinct character and preferences of the Whanganui 
manawhenua, to a high degree. Accordingly, when the Whanganui 
framework is viewed against Anaya’s minimum standards of cultural 
pluralism, the legal personality concept as it is currently applied in this 
context ranks relatively highly and has a lot to offer any innovative tool for 
self-determination.302 
 
                                               
300 These translate as follows: (1) the river is the source of spiritual and physical 
sustenance; (2) the great river flows from the mountains to the sea; (3) I am the river 
and the river is me; and (4) the small and large streams that flow into one another and 
form one river. Section 13. 
301 As discussed above, specified decision-makers must either ‘recognise and provide for’ 
or ‘have particular regard to’ these matters when exercising a specific function, power 
or duty. Section 15. 
302 This will be discussed further in chapter 4. 
 







Although, this conclusion must be tempered. As noted above, the 
extent that Māori concepts will practically form the basis of environmental 
decision-making depends upon how third-party decision-makers interpret 
and apply these inherently Māori concepts in accordance with their 
statutory mandate. The models positive adherence to cultural pluralism 
precepts (i.e. the ability for environmental decision-making to be based on 
Māori conceptual understandings of the world) is therefore limited by the 
model’s lack of commitment to subsidiarity principles (i.e. iwi views will 
only be incorporated if non-iwi decision-makers consciously apply them 
to a material extent). 
 
Overall, while self-determination can be expressed through power-
sharing or partnership models, the Whanganui model ultimately fails to 
give effect to this when viewed against the subsidiarity standards. Little 
decision-making authority is shared with the manawhenua, and their 
influence over the awa is dependent upon third parties. It cannot be said 
that the Whanganui model is an operational expression of the self-
determination norm, at least according to Anaya’s conception of the norm. 
 
Two case studies of the control model will now be considered (Te 
Urewera and section 33 of the RMA) to assess whether they comply with 
Anaya’s conception of the self-determination norm. 
 







V  Te Urewera 
A Introduction 
The Tūhoe people of the central North Island have traditionally held 
manawhenua over the majority of the area known as Te Urewera, and prior 
to Pākehā contact the iwi expressed its rangatiratanga over this and 
surrounding areas. The area is highly isolated and densely forested, and 
mainly the domain of the Tūhoe people.303 The iwi suffered many 
generations of injustice at the hands of the settler government. In 1865 
most of Tūhoe peoples’ productive lands were confiscated by the Crown 
under the so-called New Zealand Settlements Act 1863. The Crown waged 
war in Te Urewera until 1871, during which the involved Crown agents 
employed ‘scorched earth’ tactics against the Tūhoe people. The 
introduction of the Native Land Court to the region between the 1870s and 
the 1890s led to the transfer of large parcels of land out of the hands of the 
iwi. Interestingly for the present purposes, local self-government was 
intended to be provided to Tūhoe over the 656,000-acre Te Urewera 
reserve under the Urewera District Native Reserve Act 1896, which would 
have enabled the iwi to make decisions regarding resource use based on 
Tūhoe tikanga or Tūhoe legal tradition. The Act was never implemented. 
In 1954 Te Urewera National Park was created without consultation or any 
                                               
303 Judith Binney Encircled lands: Te Urewera, 1820-1921 (Bridget Williams Books, 
Wellington, NZ, 2009). 







consideration of Tūhoe’s interest in the whenua. National park policies led 
to restrictions over Tūhoe’s customary use of the land.304 After many years 
of claims negotiations the Tūhoe Deed of Settlement was signed on 4 June 
2013, and Te Urewera Act passed in 2014 (giving effect to the Deed).305 
The settlement attempts to give effect to the long held Tūhoe principle of 
mana motuhake.306 The framework establishes Te Urewera as a legal 
personality in its own right, giving expression to Stone’s concept. The 
following section will outline the Te Urewera framework and then analyse 
it against Anaya’s conception of the self-determination norm. 
B Legal framework 
1 Overview of framework and board 
Under the new legal framework, Te Urewera’s previous national 
park status is removed, the area ceases to be Crown land and is attributed 
                                               
304 Section 8, Tūhoe Claims Settlement Act 2014. 
305 The Tūhoe Claims Settlement Act deals with the balance of the Tūhoe settlement (i.e. 
all matters external to the new Te Urewera framework). Te Uru Taumatua and The 
Crown Te Whakatauna o Na Tohe Raupatu Tawhito - Deed of Settlement of Historical 
Claims [Tūhoe Deed]. 
306 Mana motuhake has been loosely be translated as self-determination, although it has 
many different meanings for different iwi/hapū. As Te Rangimārie Williams points out: 
“Tūhoe inherited their obsession for mana motuhake from their eponymous ancestor, 
Tūhoe-Pōtiki and have always strove and will continue to strive for independence and 
self-determination.” The mana motuhake provisions of the settlement empower the 
PSGE to deliver some Crown social services directly to Tūhoe communities. This is 
directed by a social service management plan, the goal of which is that “Tūhoe become 
well housed, in good health, with good educational opportunity and social support so 
that they may manage their own affairs to the maximum practical extent.” Te 
Rangimārie Williams “Crown offer to settle the historical claims of Ngāi Tūhoe” 2012 
October Māori Law Review 19 at 20; Ministry of Business Innovation and 
Employment, Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development Ngāi Tūhoe 
Service Management Plan. 







its own legal personality. Te Urewera has all the rights, powers, duties and 
liabilities of a legal person.307 Instead of the Department of Conservation, 
Te Urewera is governed by a new board which is tasked to “act on behalf 
of, and in the name of, Te Urewera,”308 in a similar manner as the “human 
face” of Te Awa Tupua. In its first three years the board consisted of eight 
appointees, four appointed by the iwi and four by the Crown. After three 
years the board will increase to nine members, six appointed by the iwi and 
three by the Crown. The board is empowered to: prepare, approve and 
advise on the management plan applying to Te Urewera;309 make bylaws 
to regulate a wide range of matters with respect to Te Urewera (including 
the management, safety and preservation of Te Urewera; controlling the 
use of internal combustion engines; and excluding the public from any 
specified part of Te Urewera);310 authorise certain activities (e.g. activity 
permits and concessions);311 and generally to advocate on Te Urewera’s 
behalf “in any statutory process or at any public forum.”312 (These 
mechanisms will be elaborated further below.) At the operational 
                                               
307 Section 11. 
308 Section 17(a). 
309 Section 44. The purpose of the management plan is to identify how the purpose of the 
Act will be achieved through management of Te Urewera and to set objectives and 
policies for Te Urewera: s 45. 
310 Section 70. 
311 Subpart 4, ss 55 to 62. 
312 Section 18. 







management level, the Chief Executive of Tūhoe Te Uru Taumatua313 and 
the Director-General of Conservation are jointly responsible for the day-
to-day running of Te Urewera.314 
2 Decision-making procedures 
The purpose of the Act is set out in section 4. Its stated purpose is: 
to establish and preserve in perpetuity a legal identity and protected 
status for Te Urewera for its intrinsic worth, its distinctive natural 
and cultural values, the integrity of those values, and for its national 
importance, and in particular to – (a) strengthen and maintain the 
connection between Tūhoe and Te Urewera ... 
 
The principles for implementing the Act and achieving the purpose 
are set out in section 5. It states that persons performing functions or 
exercising powers under the Act must act so that, as far as possible: 
“Tūhoetanga, which gives expression to Te Urewera, is valued and 
respected” (inter alia).315 Sections 4 and 5 therefore clearly signal to the 
Board that Tūhoe understandings of resource management are to have a 
level of priority within its decision-making processes. 
 
Section 18 provides further direction to the Board in its discretionary 
decision-making. It states that the Board in performing its functions may 
                                               
313 The post-settlement governance entity for Ngāi Tūhoe. 
314 Section 50. 
315 Section 5. 







“consider and give expression to … Tūhoetanga” and “Tūhoe concepts of 
management” such as rāhui, tapu me noa, mana me mauri and tohu.316 In 
other words, it can apply pre-European Tūhoe concepts of management 
when making resource use decisions. The specified Tūhoe management 
concepts are elaborated in subsection (3): 
 
Mana me mauri conveys a sense of the sensitive perception of a 
living and spiritual force in a place; 
 
Rāhui conveys the sense of the prohibition or limitation of a use for 
an appropriate reason; 
 
Tapu means a state or condition that requires certain respectful 
human conduct, including raising awareness or knowledge of the 
spiritual qualities requiring respect; 
 
Tapu me noa conveys, in tapu, the concept of sanctity, a state that 
requires respectful human behaviour in a place; and in noa, the sense 
that when the tapu is lifted from the place, the place returns to a 
normal state;  
 
Tohu connotes the metaphysical or symbolic depiction of things. 
 
Further elaboration of these concepts is contained within the Deed of 
Settlement. For tapu/noa, the Deed provides the example of discovering 
the existence of a huia in Te Urewera.317 In such a case, the location would 
                                               
316 Section 18(2). 
317 A species of wattle thought to be extinct. Michael Szabo “Huia” (2013) 
http://nzbirdsonline.org.nz/species/huia. 







be recognised as tapu and a rāhui implemented to prevent human entry. 
However, if the discovery was sadly disproved, the tapu and rāhui would 
be lifted and the valley would become normal, or noa.318 
 
With respect to mana me mauri, the Deed states:319 
 
In a conservation context "mana" resonates with the apprehension of 
the five senses: feel, sight, smell, taste, hearing. One may feel the 
moss in the bush; see the coursing waves of Waikaremoana; smell 
the burst of buds on harakeke; taste the water; thrill to the sound of 
birdsong at the dawn. 
 
But then there is mauri, the living and spiritual force and context of 
mana. Why has the moss flourished or perished? Why are the waves 
so ragged? Why is the flax bush barren? Why do the birds sing, or 
not? Why is the water sour? 
 
Further, the Deed outlines the anthropomorphic nature of the tohu 
concept. Tohu thus has the effect of:320 
 
…investing things, including ideas, with human qualities or 
associations. Thus, ahikāroa, which invokes the image and comfort 
of a fire. The associations are manifold: that it is safe to light a fire 
because one is at home; stalking through the bush one sees the fire 
of one's whanau and knows that it assures comfort, companionship, 
sustenance, albeit that it may also mark the frontier of darkness. The 
ethos is conservation. 
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Therefore, when the board exercises a function, power or duty it has 
the opportunity to form its decision on the basis of these pre-European 
Tūhoe concepts of management.  
3 Tūhoe ability to control activities 
In addition to the general decision-making direction provided in 
section 18, the board is also mandated to control many different types of 
activity in Te Urewera. A continuum exists whereby some activities 
require specific approval from the board and others may be carried out as 
of right. A ‘concession’ is required from the board for all commercial 
activities carried out within Te Urewera, and a concession may only be 
granted if the activity is consistent with the management plan.321 Other 
non-commercial activities require an ‘activity permit’ from the board, 
including: taking indigenous or exotic plants; disturbing or hunting 
animals (except sports fish); possessing any dead protected wildlife for 
cultural or other purposes; entering specially protected areas; building 
roads; establishing accommodation; and farming.322 Significantly, the 
board can authorise the customary harvest of indigenous foods such as 
                                               
321 Section 62. This is similar to the National Parks Act 1980’s concessions system. See 
also Schedule 3 which sets out a number of matters which apply to the concessions 
regime over Te Urewera. 
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kereru,323 provided: the preservation of the species is not adversely 
affected, the effects on Te Urewera are no more than minor and the permit 
is consistent with the management plan.324 In deciding such an application 
a number of factors must be considered by the board, including whether 
the proposed activity “is important for the restoration or maintenance of 
customary practices that are relevant to the relationship of iwi and hapū to 
Te Urewera.”325 
 
It is noteworthy that one of possibly the most invasive resource 
activities in the modern world (mining) may be carried out as of right (i.e. 
without the need for a concession or an activity permit).326 The framework 
specifically reserves the right for resource extractors to mine the area, 
provided all other requisite permits are obtained. This fact is striking and 
a clear limitation on the ability of Tūhoe tangata to influence decision-
making within their ancestral whenua. 
 
                                               
323 Also known as New Zealand pigeon or hemiphaga novaseelandiae novaseelandiae. 
Philip Lyver and others “Tūhoe Tuawhenua mātauranga of kererū (Hemiphaga 
novaseelandiae novaseelandiae) in Te Urewera” 2008 32(1) New Zealand Journal of 
Ecology. 
324 Schedule 3, cl 1. 
325 See Schedule 3, cl 1(3). 
326 See s 56(b). Mining may only be carried out if it is authorised under the Crown 
Minerals Act 1991. A miner must also obtain any other requisite authorisations under 
any other relevant statute (s 55(2)). 







Similarly, any cultural, recreational or educational activities that are 
undertaken without any specific gain or reward (i.e. financial) may be 
carried out without authorisation from the board.327 Another feature of the 
framework is that it remains subject to the usual local authority and RMA 
mechanisms (regional policy statements, regional and territorial plans).328 
Although, similar to national parks, a resource consent is not required for 
work undertaken within Te Urewera by the board or DOC, provided that 
work is for the purpose of managing Te Urewera, is consistent with the Act 
and management plan, and does not have a significant adverse effect on 
the environment beyond the boundary of Te Urewera.329 
4 Management plan 
As at the date of writing, a draft management plan under section 44 
has been developed by the board, known as Te Kawa o Te Urewera (“Te 
Kawa”).330 The statutory purpose for this document is to identify how the 
purpose of the Act will be achieved in the management of Te Urewera, and 
to set objectives and policies for the same.331 Te Kawa continues the 
                                               
327 Section 56(a). See also s 64(1) which states that Te Urewera shall be treated as if it 
were Crown land described in Schedule 4 of the Crown Minerals Act. 
328 Section 41 states that the statutory functions and powers of local authorities over Te 
Urewera are not limited by the Act. 
329 Section 43. 
330 Te Urewera Board Te Kawa o Te Urewera - The Te Urewera Management Plan (draft) 
(2017). From the author’s understanding this is yet to be ratified at the time of writing. 
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overall scheme of the Deed and Te Urewera Act in that it is distinctively 
framed by the Tūhoe holistic perspective of the world, Tūhoetana. It notes 
“Te Kawa is about the management of people for the benefit of the land – 
it is not about land management.”332 (emphasis added). Te Kawa is aimed 
at “resetting our human relationship and behaviour towards nature”333 and 
disrupting the norm. The document is forthright in noting that it does not 
seek to replicate the style of previous management plans (i.e. a code of 
rules), instead, Te Kawa focuses on principles, traditions and beliefs as a 
guide. It seeks to move away from ‘Western’ liberal conceptions of 
property rights, which have “hidden from view the concept of nature … 
These human granted rights have displaced our devotion for Papatūānuku 
with ownership now serving individual advantage.”334 Overall, Te Kawa 
recognises the interconnectivity of all living things, Te Urewera itself 
being a living system, and connected to Papatūānuku, the personified earth 
mother. It emphasises the responsibilities that humans have for their 
environmental impact, the need for balance in the living system, the need 
to uphold the mauri of Te Urewera (the life force). 
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C Analysis against Anaya’s framework 
Constitutive self-determination 
This aspect of Anaya’s framework was considered above in the 
Whanganui settlement section. The reasoning outlined in that section, 
applies to treaty settlements generally (including the Te Urewera 
settlement). The inherent power imbalance in the Tūhoe treaty settlement 
negotiations and the fact that there is no legal mechanism available for the 
iwi to invoke and have their rights recognised means that the processes 
leading to the conclusion of the Te Urewera were incapable of fully 
satisfying Anaya’s conception of constitutive self-determination. 
 
Ongoing self-determination: subsidiarity  
The Te Urewera settlement framework is of a different ilk to the 
Whanganui model. In comparison, the Te Urewera model is less tied to the 
RMA regime and embodies many characteristics of a control model. In this 
sense it is closer to the traditional understandings of autonomous 
governance or so-called internal self-determination. 
 
The board is given the power to establish and enforce delegated 
legislation (and other executive functions) over a defined territorial area.335 
                                               
335 This may be because the residents of Te Urewera are predominantly Tūhoe 
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The board will soon be composed of 66% Tūhoe and 33% Crown 
appointees, which enables Tūhoe to steer decision-making at the executive 
level by virtue of their majority composition.336 The board is empowered 
to establish a number of components of the institutional framework, 
including: the management plan (setting the objectives and policies for 
how the purpose of the Act will be achieved in management of Te 
Urewera);337 an annual statement of priorities (outlining how the 
management plan will be implemented);338 and bylaws to regulate the use 
of Te Urewera.339 The board carries out other executive functions over Te 
Urewera, including the consideration of applications for concessions or 
activity permits.340 The overall institutional framework is similar to the 
national parks regime and is subject to a degree of Crown oversight (for 
example, any bylaws created by the board require ministerial approval). 
 
While Tūhoe, through the board, has a quasi-executive and a quasi-
legislative role in managing Te Urewera, the iwi is limited to working 
within the management parametres set by the Crown in legislation when 
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carrying out these functions. Any bylaws promulgated by the board require 
ministerial approval. Furthermore, the potential for mining, one of the most 
invasive activities possible, is explicitly reserved under the framework. If 
a large-scale mining operation was tabled for Te Urewera the iwi would 
have limited ability to interfere with this under the settlement framework. 
(The iwi would, if they were inclined to do so, be forced to object to such 
proposals through the usual, reactive, processes such as Part II of the 
RMA). This clearly limits the ability of Tūhoe to manage the resources of 
Te Urewera in accordance with their own wishes. Accordingly, while it 
goes some way towards it, it cannot be maintained that this control 
framework adheres to the subsidiarity requirements of the self-
determination norm to any material extent. 
 
Ongoing self-determination: cultural pluralism 
The above analyses regarding the adoption of a legal personality in 
the Whanganui partnership model, can be applied to the Te Urewera 
model. For Te Urewera, the new regime also marks a change in view from 
the previous national park governing structure, which embodies a mono-
cultural approach to setting land aside based on Western liberal value 
systems (for example, the land is set aside for the benefit it can provide to 







humans).341 The new framework moves toward a bicultural understanding 
of natural resource management, incorporating Tūhoe concepts into each 
layer of management.342 It recognises that Tūhoe have a distinct perception 
of the relationship between humans and natural resources (and the 
responsibilities to care for the latter), and allows this to permeate decision-
making structures. This is demonstrated through the purpose of the Act, 
which is: “to strengthen and maintain the connection between Tūhoe and 
Te Urewera”;343 through the direction for the board to value and respect 
Tūhoetanga in its decision-making;344 and through the discretionary power 
provided to the Board to “consider and give expression to” Tūhoetanga and 
Tūhoe concepts of management (including rāhui, tapu me noa, mana me 
mauri, and tohu).345 Furthermore, the draft management plan, Te Kawa o 
Te Urewera, is revolutionary as far as documentation for the management 
of natural resources is concerned. It embodies Tūhoetana in its entirety, 
ensuring that the Tūhoe voice and perspective is central to the future use 
of Te Urewera. As Jacinta Ruru states: “in contrast to nearly any other 
statutorily created body, including the Department of Conservation, [the 
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Board] is directed to reflect customary values and law.”346 This is 
comparable to Tupua te Kawa, the underlying iwi value system that applies 
to the decision-making of the Whanganui River. 
 
While the framework ranks highly against Anaya’s cultural 
pluralism requirements, the poor ranking against subsidiarity standards 
(for example, the lack of ability to influence mining proposals under the 
settlement framework) means that ultimately this model fails to give 
expression to Anaya’s conception of the self-determination. The case study 
is nonetheless insightful for the way that the institutional structure 
prioritises uniquely Tūhoe (i.e. Māori) concepts of environmental 
management. These insights can (and should) be adapted into any future 
model for operationalising the self-determination norm in Aotearoa. 
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VI  Section 33 of the RMA 
A Introduction 
This section considers whether section 33 of the RMA (another 
control model) is capable of giving expression to Anaya’s conception of 
the self-determination norm. Section 33 enables local authorities to transfer 
one or more of their RMA functions, powers or duties to “public 
authorities”, which was defined to include “iwi authorities”. The 
mechanism is regarded by some as “one of the most potentially rewarding 
provisions in the [RMA] for Māori seeking direct access to decision-
making authority.”347 While section 33 might have had potential initially, 
there are a number of deficiencies in the drafting and operation of the 
mechanism itself which must be canvassed. While some deficiencies in the 
mechanism have been amended and resolved since 1991,348 section 33 
remains in force today, virtually un-utilised and entirely unused in the 
context of iwi authorities. This section will now examine the workings of 
the mechanism itself. 
                                               
347 Elizabeth Clark “Section 33 of the Resource Management Act 1991” in Janine 
Hayward (ed) Local Government and the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, NZ, 2003) at 43. 
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Also, under the original formulation, the approval of policy statements or plans (or 
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B Operational aspects of the tool 
The first thing to note is that the transfer power provided to local 
authorities is discretionary: it is not mandatory for any local authority to 
execute a transfer if an iwi authority requests it. Nor does the local 
authority need to even consider the proposal, and, if it decides not to, there 
is no right of appeal against declinature. There is therefore no compulsion 
under section 33 (the effect of this will be discussed in more detail 
below).349 
1 “Iwi authority” 
Secondly, it is not clear what an “iwi authority” is. Section 33 was 
originally intended to exist beside the Runanga Iwi Act 1990, which 
enabled iwi representative organisations known as rūnanga to become 
bodies corporate, based on a principle of self-identification.350 When that 
statute was repealed in 1991, the reference to iwi authorities in section 33 
of the RMA lost its context,351 and as a result the precise definition of iwi 
authority under section 33 still remains unclear. Under section 33 local 
authorities appear to have the unilateral ability to define ‘iwi authority’ 
                                               
349 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 224. 
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organisations. See Kirsty Gover and Natalie Baird “Identifying the Māori Treaty 
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Cambridge [NZ]; Hamilton [NZ], 2000). 







based on any criteria they deem appropriate, which removes any element 
of iwi self-identification based on tikanga or kawa. The only case 
interpreting this phrase is Whakarewarewa Village Charitable Trust,352 
where the Planning Tribunal considered that the village, a Ngāti Wahaio 
hapū area of Te Arawa iwi, which consisted of well-defined lots and 
boundaries of hapū owned land, was a “prime example” of an iwi authority 
under section 33.353 Aside from this, there has been very little judicial 
comment on the definition of iwi authority. 
2 Functions, powers and duties under the RMA 
Thirdly, the functions, powers and duties (“FPDs”) under the RMA 
that are subject to section 33 must be considered. The RMA prescribes a 
number of FPDs for local authorities, including the duty to monitor both 
the state of the environment, and the efficiency and effectiveness of 
planning documents.354 However, the main FPDs for the present purpose 
are those that enable direct decision-making over resources, i.e. the 
promulgation of planning instruments (regional policy statements,355 
regional plans (including coastal plans),356 and district plans),357 the 
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consideration of resource consent applications, and the associated 
monitoring and enforcement processes.358 Through this framework the 
RMA enables local authorities to set the environmental objectives and 
rules for the region or district. They also classify the type of activities that 
are permitted as of right (i.e. not requiring a resource consent), those that 
require a resource consent (and may be subject to certain conditions), and 
those that are strictly prohibited.359 Any of the FPDs associated with this 
RMA framework are capable of transfer under section 33. 
3 Procedural and substantive requirements 
From the face of the provision it is not clear how the procedure for 
implementing a section 33 transfer is initiated, e.g. whether a formal 
written proposal or application is required by an iwi authority, and what 
this must contain (if it is required). This was found by Rennie et al to be a 
factor which disincentivises section 33’s use.360 Once the process is in fact 
initiated, a number of arguably draconian measures are required to be 
satisfied before the proposal can be concluded. Section 33 requires the 
local authority to serve notice of the proposal on the Minister for the 
Environment, and use the special consultative procedure contained in 
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section 83 of the Local Government Act 2002 (set out in the footnote).361 
This procedure is complex, usually reserved for the most important local 
authority decisions (e.g. adoption of bylaws and annual plans) and entails 
a lot of time, resources and bureaucratic navigation.362 
 
In addition, before the local authority may complete the transfer, 
both parties must be satisfied that a “three step test” has been met and 
therefore the transfer is desirable.363 The three criteria are: (1) the 
transferee represents the appropriate community of interest relating to the 
exercise of the FPD; (2) that the transfer is “efficient”; and (3) that the 
transfer is desirable on the grounds of technical or special capability or 
expertise. Joseph and Bennion contend that the community of interest 
                                               
361 Section 33(4)(a) and (b). The special consultative procedure is summarised below. It 
requires the local authority to: 
• prepare and adopt a statement of proposal (and a summary if the local authority 
reasonably believes it will be required for public understanding); 
• Ensure the following are publicly available: 
o The statement of proposal; 
o A description of how interested persons can have their say; 
o A time limit for when public views may be provided to the local 
authority; 
• Make the statement of proposal or summary as widely available “as is reasonably 
practicable as a basis for consultation”; 
• Provide an opportunity for oral submissions; and 
• Ensure anyone who wishes to make their views known is given a reasonable 
opportunity to do so; and is informed about how/when they may do this. 
362 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 224. 
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requirement suggests the transfer will need to be over a limited physical 
area opposed to a general blanket transfer of authority over part of a region 
or district.364 Without any previous examples of iwi transfers to consider it 
is difficult to know if this holds true. The efficiency and 
capability/expertise requirements may bring other issues for iwi seeking to 
adopt section 33. As Rennie et al have argued, local authorities usually 
interpret these requirements in terms of economic efficiency i.e. whether 
the transfer will result in a net financial gain for the council (and its 
ratepayer constituents). The difficulties with these requirements and the 
various interpretations will be discussed in further detail below.365 
 
Once the special consultative procedure has been executed, and both 
parties are satisfied that the proposal is desirable on the grounds set out in 
section 33(4)(c), the transfer must be effected via written agreement, which 
may be subject to any terms and conditions that are agreed. All successful 
transfers to date (to non-iwi) have been made by deed, and have contained 
clauses regarding reporting requirements of the transferee, the amendment 
of the agreement, revocation, indemnities, and dispute resolution (inter 
                                               
364 Robert Joseph and Tom Bennion “Challenges of incorporating Maori values and 
Tikanga under the Resource Management Act 1991 and the Local Government Bill - 
possible ways forward” 2003 6 Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence. 
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alia).366 A local authority has absolute discretion to change or revoke any 
transfer it makes to a public authority, “at any time,” simply by giving 
notice to the transferee.367 However, a transferee may only revoke a 
transfer in accordance with the terms of the empowering agreement.368 
Local authorities have a duty to monitor the exercise of any transferred 
FPDs, but are no longer ultimately liable for the exercise of the FPDs.369 
4 References to section 33 in national and local planning instruments 
Under the original RMA framework, it was envisaged that high level 
strategic policy direction for environmental management would be 
provided to local authorities by central government.370 This would come in 
the form of national policy statements (“NPSs”) and national 
environmental standards (“NESs”), which would sit above regional and 
district planning instruments in the RMA’s hierarchy. While NPSs and 
NESs have been scarcely promulgated since 1991, one such example is the 
New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement (“NZCPS”).371 The 1994 version 
of the NZCPS set out central government’s policy objectives in relation to 
                                               
366 Section 33(6). Also see Ministry for the Environment Section 33: transfer of functions, 
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the country’s marine and coastal area. The NZCPS contained a reference 
to the section 33 transfer power, directing that where characteristics of a 
special value to tangata whenua are identified (in the marine environment), 
the local authority should consider using section 33.372 As Rennie et al 
note, this was a clear direction from the Crown that local authorities should 
“actively consider” transfers to iwi under section 33,373 whom must 
implement the NZCPS. However, the latest version of the NZCPS, which 
was released in 2010, does not refer to section 33 and instead opts for other 
language regarding the involvement of tangata whenua in managing the 
marine environment (e.g. policy 2(d): to “provide opportunities in 
appropriate circumstances for Māori involvement in decision making…” 
(emphasis added)). This is problematic for iwi authorities seeking to adopt 
this tool to implement self-determination and is consistent with the thesis 
of the Waitangi Tribunal that the Crown has dis-incentivised the use of the 
mechanism.374 The removal of section 33 from the NZCPS removes one 
of the only central government encouragements for local authorities to 
adopt it. 
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None of the other NPSs in force currently375 refer to section 33. The 
NPS for Freshwater Management contains an objective to “provide for the 
involvement of iwi and hapū, and to ensure that tangata whenua values and 
interests are identified and reflected in the management of fresh 
water…”.376 But, there is no mention of section 33. Overall, it can be 
surmised that there has been little direction or encouragement from central 
government regarding the execution of section 33 transfers, and local 
authorities have been afforded a wide discretion to ignore the existence of 
the mechanism when dealing with the iwi in their area. 
 
With respect to local government policy and planning instruments, 
many local authorities’ instruments refer to the possibility of using section 
33. Although, most do not openly consider the idea and qualify the 
proposal with words such as “where appropriate”. For example, the 
Southland Regional Policy Statement (RPS) states the regional council 
will:377 
 
Provide for tangata whenua involvement in resource management, 
decisions and monitoring through: … (b) where appropriate … full 
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or partial transfer of the Southland Regional Council’s functions, 
duties or powers to tangata whenua through the recognised iwi 
authority, in accordance with Section 33 of the Act. [Emphasis 
added]. 
 
The Southland RPS further states that local authorities (regional 
councils and territorial authorities) will be encouraged to:378 
 
Consider, where appropriate, full or partial transfer of a council’s 
functions, duties or powers to tangata whenua through the 
recognised iwi authority, in accordance with Section 33 of the Act. 
 
The Southland Coastal Plan states that the methods to give effect to 
the objectives and policies of the plan include the potential adoption of 
section 33 transfers for “the management of areas containing high cultural 
values to tangata whenua.”379 The plan states that section 33 transfers are 
particularly useful “where such values are important to tangata whenua or 
in remote areas.” It seems that while many local authority planning and 
policy instruments refer to the possibility of using section 33 to involve 
Māori in resource management, the references are generally conditional, 
they extend a wide discretion to the councils, and, in any case, have not 
resulted in any successful transfers to iwi authorities. 
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C Examples of section 33 transfers 
In 2015 the Ministry for the Environment undertook a stocktake of 
section 33 and its adoption to date. The report noted that very few transfers 
had been concluded under the provision.380 It correctly noted that there had 
been no transfers to iwi authorities under section 33, but there had been 
some concluded between local authorities. The most common transfer 
identified was from regional councils to territorial authorities. Examples 
of this were Otago Regional Council (“ORC”), which in 1994 transferred 
to Queenstown Lakes District Council the function of determining consent 
applications for land use under section 13 (structures on river beds), as well 
as the administration and monitoring of such consents. Another example is 
the 2001 transfer by the Northland Regional Council to the Far North 
District Council of the function of processing, administering and 
monitoring consents for certain specified activities, including the discharge 
of contaminants (e.g. treated effluent) from dwellings. Less common were 
transfers from territorial authorities to regional councils, although one 
example of this was a transfer from Far North District Council to Northland 
Regional Council in 2001.381 The general trend has been for regional 
councils to transfer FPDs relating to consent administration, monitoring 
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and enforcement, as opposed to environment policy or planning 
development itself. There have never been any ‘blanket’ transfers i.e. of all 
FPDs from one council to another. 
D Analysis against Anaya’s framework 
Now that the legal framework of section 33 has been mapped out 
above, the following section will analyse the provision against Anaya’s 
self-determination standards to consider whether it is capable of giving 
expression to the norm.  
1 Constitutive self-determination 
The constitutive inquiry was canvassed in the context of the two 
treaty settlements analysed above. The analysis of section 33 against this 
heading could be considered from two points of view: (1) the inclusion of 
section 33 in the RMA originally; and (2) the establishment of a successful 
section 33 transfer under the regime. This section does not propose to go 
into any detail regarding (1), other than to point out that section 33 has 
been unilaterally framed by the Crown via the legislative process. As with 
the treaty settlement process, given the vastly different power dynamics 
between the legislature and minority Māori groups that existed at the time, 
the inherent power imbalance operated to ensure that Māori had very little 
input into the processes leading to the creation of the section 33 transfer 
mechanism. This section instead focuses on point (2), whether the 







processes leading to the implementation of section 33 transfers 
operationalise Anaya’s constitutive self-determination principle. 
 
There are various potential issues associated with section 33’s 
practical operation and these discourage its adoption in the first place. 
Natalie Coates has identified issues with the operation of section 36B joint 
management agreements (“JMAs”). JMAs are a “halfway house” to 
section 33 as they enable the joint implementation of FPDs by iwi and local 
authorities. The same criticisms of JMAs can be applied to section 33. 
Coates notes potential issues that arise based on the application of the 
maxim “nemo judex in sua causa”, which translates to “no one should be 
a judge in his/her own cause”. Iwi authorities exercising FPDs under 
section 33 expose themselves to judicial review claims for apparent bias, 
as, in their application of the FPDs, they will likely hear and adjudicate 
claims in which they have a conflicting interest.382 Rennie et al 
demonstrate this issue: “…how could iwi authorities possibly act 
unbiasedly when this is their ancestral mountain and Mr Smith wants to 
quarry at the base of it.”383 This litigation risk is an undesirable aspect of 
the mechanism that discourages its adoption by iwi authorities. Although, 
local authorities frequently face similar conflict of interest situations and 
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are able to develop practical solutions to resolve the issue. For example, in 
applications for resource consent for council sewerage or water reticulation 
developments. In these cases, the council is both the regulator as well as 
the adjudicator. In such cases the risk of actual conflict (or the perception 
of conflict) is mitigated through the adoption of transparent decision-
making mechanisms, for example, the incorporation of independent 
hearing commissioners.384 Iwi authorities could adopt similar decision-
making mechanisms to ensure the risk of actual or perceived conflict does 
not hinder the application of a section 33 transfer. 
 
The notable lack of adoption of section 33 must also be considered 
here. There is nothing in the legislation which compels local authorities to 
adopt the mechanism, or to even consider it seriously (beyond the 
ambiguous and non-committal references in local planning instruments). 
Accordingly, iwi interested in exploring this mechanism as a way to 
implement their self-determination face significant hurdles from the outset. 
This lack of compulsion is currently met with a lack of political willingness 
amongst local authorities to implement a transfer to iwi authorities. This 
can be attributed to a number of factors, including: it may be seen as a 
politically risky move by elected officials wishing to please their majority 
constituents; the procedure is cumbersome and costly (the special 
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consultative measures must be adopted, which are reserved for the most 
important council decisions); the three-stage test must be met; questions 
around financing must be resolved and the agreement itself must be 
negotiated.385 
 
This issue is not isolated to section 33 specifically and is related to a 
more inherent problem of a general lack of willingness to involve Māori in 
resource management decision-making at all levels. Early Waitangi 
Tribunal reports criticised the RMA framework for preventing iwi/hapū 
from controlling or managing their taonga or natural resources.386 Despite 
minor amendments to the Māori participation aspects of the RMA 
framework (e.g. JMAs), this criticism remains extant. The Wai 262 report 
notes that while the RMA was supposed to deliver a high level of Māori 
involvement in resource management decision-making, “Nearly 20 years 
after the RMA was enacted, it is fair to say that the legislation has delivered 
Māori scarcely a shadow of its original promise.”387 As one prominent 
Whanganui iwi member has said:388 
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The Resource Management Act has always provided the opportunity 
for Māori to participate at planning level, but it never happens 
because there is no willingness, we have no political weight. So we 
are shut out, and we become one voice amongst many other 
constituencies. 
 
This general comment on the efficacy of the RMA’s processes for 
realising Māori self-determination is strongly reflected in the operation of 
section 33 in particular (or lack thereof). 
 
Accordingly, there exist many deficiencies in the constitutive 
processes of section 33 which discourage its adoption by both local 
authorities and Māori (iwi authorities). Various practical issues with the 
mechanism discourage its adoption by iwi authorities (i.e. the potential for 
judicial review), and the ‘tyranny of the majority’ operates to discourage 
local authorities from adopting any measure that would displease their non-
Māori majority constituents.389 Accordingly, due to the deficiencies in the 
establishment of section 33 transfers, this mechanism fails to adequately 
comply with Anaya’s constitutive self-determination principle. The 
processes leading to the establishment of section 33 transfers cannot be 
seen as incorporating the will of the people, or as reflective of indigenous 
participation and consent. 
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2 Ongoing self-determination: subsidiarity 
The starting point for the subsidiarity aspect of Anaya’s ongoing 
self-determination is the fact that section 33, if applied, would allow iwi 
Māori to assume responsibility for FPDs under the RMA. As discussed 
above, this potentially applies to a wide range of FPDs, among the most 
significant are: the power to promulgate planning documents (RPS, 
regional and district plans),390 the power to adjudicate resource consent 
applications, the power to monitor compliance with consent conditions, 
and the power to generally enforce the RMA’s regulatory framework. 
Compared to the Whanganui River example above, section 33 has the 
potential to deliver to iwi authorities a higher level of autonomous 
decision-making power over resources (subject, of course, to central 
government oversight). In comparison, the ability of the Whanganui iwi to 
influence resource decision-making under their settlement is limited to the 
interpretation of statutory directives for ultimate (i.e. non-iwi) decision-
makers to variously “recognise and provide for” or “have regard to” iwi 
interests or specified Māori customary concepts of management (or other 
relevant considerations). The iwi is not the ultimate decision-maker under 
the Whanganui example for any context – ultimate decision-making for the 
awa and its catchment is in the hands of non-iwi, majoritarian institutions. 
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Under section 33, the iwi authority itself is capable of being the ultimate 
decision-maker with respect to resource decision-making through RMA 
FPDs (although, remain subject to central government oversight). This is 
the most significant feature of the mechanism when viewed against 
Anaya’s subsidiarity requirements. The Waitangi Tribunal itself has 
recognised the potential for this mechanism to deliver “kaitiaki control” 
over their taonga, in such cases where it is considered desirable for the 
kaitiaki interests to take priority over other third-party interests (after a 
balancing test is executed).391 
3 Ongoing self-determination: cultural pluralism 
This section assesses the extent at which section 33 transfers are 
capable of embodying the distinct cultural preferences and concepts of Te 
Ao Māori to give effect to Māori self-determination. This is both a 
requirement of Anaya’s conception of ongoing self-determination and a 
clear aspiration of Māori seeking to implement their self-determination 
over natural resources or taonga. Janet Stephenson, in reviewing the Māori 
submissions to the proposed Far North District Plan, notes:392 
 
It was clear that submitters wanted not only a higher level of 
involvement in management, but also the ability to base 
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management practices on Māori cultural and spiritual values and 
customary practices rather than western-centred concepts. 
 
There is an avenue for Māori concepts of resource management to 
be expressed within section 33 transfers, namely through the terms and 
conditions of the transfer agreement,393 where the management of the 
resource could be framed around the operation of Māori tikanga and kawa. 
This might then enable iwi authorities to draft and implement policy and 
planning documents, or otherwise exercise RMA FPDs, based on their own 
tikanga and kawa. However, given the lack of Māori representation on 
local authorities generally, the fact that Māori are a population minority, 
and the power imbalance inherent in the constitution of section 33 
transfers, it is unlikely that iwi authorities will be able to frame the nature 
of the transfer in their favour (or flavour) to any substantial extent. 
 
Further, as noted above, the parametres of decision-making under a 
section 33 transfer have been set by central government in drafting the 
legislation. Under a transfer arrangement an iwi would not be able to make 
resource decisions solely on the basis of their tikanga/kawa – decision-
making must comply with the RMA framework as well as any terms and 
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conditions contained in the transfer documents. As Joseph and Bennion 
say, an iwi authority:394  
 
… will have to act judicially – that is, fairly and impartially and in 
accordance with the RMA and relevant plans – when it considers 
any applications relating to that resource. For example, it will have 
to weigh Māori concerns in balance with other matters of national 
importance. It will also be bound by decisions of the Environment 
Court and other courts on the way in which Māori interests are to be 
considered under the RMA, even if it disagrees with the approach 
and result of those decisions. 
 
This is contrasted with both the Whanganui River and Te Urewera 
examples outlined above, which expressly enable decision-making to be 
made on the basis of Māori notions of resource management. As Rachael 
Harris says, section 33: “[does] not allow iwi to fully invest in resource 
management in a method compatible with tikanga Māori.”395 Accordingly, 
section 33 does not comply with the cultural pluralism aspects of the self-
determination norm. This renders this mechanism non-compliant on the 
basis of both aspects of Anaya’s framework. 
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VII  Chapter Conclusion 
It has been demonstrated that none of the current partnership 
(Whanganui River) or control models (Te Urewera and section 33) studied 
comply with Anaya’s principles of indigenous self-determination 
(constitutive or ongoing). With that said, the two Treaty settlement models 
are insightful for their adherence to the cultural pluralism principle 
(discussed below). 
 
Under the constitutive self-determination heading it was noted that 
Aotearoa’s treaty settlement process perpetuates the inherent power 
imbalance experienced by iwi Māori vis a vis the Crown in Aotearoa. As 
there is no legal mechanism for Māori to invoke and have their rights to 
self-determination (and Treaty of Waitangi rights) recognised, Māori are 
forced to participate in a political process to this end i.e. the negotiation of 
Treaty settlements. Given the inherent power imbalance extant in the 
Treaty settlement process, and the Crown’s inherent desire to appease its 
majority, non-Māori constituents, it is difficult to see how Anaya’s 
constitutive self-determination would find expression in this process. As 
such, the requirements of participation and consent embodied by this 
principle are absent in the Treaty settlement process (and therefore the 
Whanganui River and Te Urewera examples). As an ancillary point, this 
speaks to a wider need to move the processes of adjudication of indigenous 







rights from the political realm to the legal realm. This could be achieved 
by providing the Waitangi Tribunal with greater ‘teeth’ by widening its 
ability to provide for ‘binding recommendations’.396 
 
The chapter made similar findings regarding the section 33 model’s 
adherence to the constitutive self-determination principle (or lack thereof). 
Ultimately, the conclusion of a section 33 transfer agreement is dependent 
upon the local authority exercising its discretion, and this is unlikely to 
occur unless the local authority considers it will obtain further ‘political 
capital’ in the process. Furthermore, various inconsistencies in the drafting 
of the legislative provisions act to disincentivise the adoption of the 
mechanism by both iwi and local authorities. The section 33 model does 
not give expression to the constitutive self-determination principle. 
 
While it was noted that partnership (or power-sharing) models can 
be an effective mode for implementing indigenous self-determination in 
some cases, the existing prescriptions of partnership fail to reach the 
standards required by Anaya’s framework. For example, the extent that 
Whanganui iwi members can practically influence the outcome of resource 
decisions depends upon how the third party statutory decision-maker 
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interprets and applies the statutory directions on a case by case basis (i.e. 
the direction to ‘recognise and provide for’ or ‘have particular regard to’ 
Māori legal tradition).397 Under this model the overall decision power is 
exercised by non-iwi bodies, and very little practical authority is devolved 
to the relevant iwi. This framework is more accurately described as an 
influence model, which (as discussed) do not generally enable the 
expression of genuine self-determination. Accordingly, the Whanganui 
framework fails to adhere to Anaya’s subsidiarity principle. 
 
The two-purported control (or autonomous governance) models 
studied are also non-compliant when they are viewed against Anaya’s 
subsidiarity principle. The Te Urewera framework ultimately fails due to 
the iwi’s lack of ability to prevent mining in their ancestral homeland. This 
is one of the most invasive activities possible and the argument that Tūhoe 
are self-determining cannot be sustained if they have no real influence over 
the regulation of this activity. This speaks to a wider lack of provision of 
real decision-making power over Te Urewera to the iwi. Similarly, several 
aspects of section 33 of the RMA are problematic. The overall ability of 
iwi authorities to influence environmental decision-making under section 
33 depends upon the efficacy of the functions, powers and duties of the 
RMA itself (since section 33 enables the transfer of these to iwi 
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authorities). Section 33 might theoretically enable an iwi authority to 
assume responsibility for consenting or planning/policy development. But 
the ability to provide for their own iwi’s interests through these 
mechanisms is constrained as they must act within the parametres of the 
RMA framework and the principles of natural justice as defined by 
Aotearoa common law. There is little room for Māori tikanga or kawa to 
apply to decision-making under this tool. Even if it was effective, a lack of 
political willingness for local authorities to execute section 33, and a 
number of procedural disincentives continue to prevent the tool from being 
used. 
 
Bearing these considerations in mind, it cannot be argued that the 
three models studied provide for both the subsidiarity principles of 
Anaya’s framework. By extension, they fail to enable Māori to develop 
and make meaningful choices about their economic, social and cultural 
development. The first question of this chapter398 is therefore answered in 
the negative: Aotearoa is failing to give expression to Anaya’s conception 
of the self-determination norm, and legislative reform will be needed to 
introduce models that are norm-compliant.399  
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The second focus of this chapter asks whether, even if the current 
legal framework is failing to give effect to the norm, any insights can be 
adopted and adapted from the Aotearoa case studies to assist the 
formulation of a norm-compliant model. It was argued that the Whanganui 
and Te Urewera models are worthy of celebration for their implementation 
of the cultural pluralism aspects of the norm (i.e. through their ability to 
defer to Māori legal traditions in resource decision-making (Tupua te 
Kawa and Tūhoetana) and the embodiment of personified view of natural 
resources). These insights are positive and might enable a self-
determination compliant mechanism to be developed, provided they are 
matched with a genuine ability to influence environmental decision-
making (i.e. if the framework equally embodies the subsidiarity principle 
to an equally material extent), and the appropriate processes and 
procedures required by the constitutive aspect. 
 
Chapter 6 will adapt the cultural pluralism insights explored in this 
chapter and, along with the comparative insights analysed in chapter 4, will 
propose a model for the future of indigenous self-determination in 
Aotearoa based on the recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal in the 
Ko Aotearoa Tenei (Wai 262 report), which is explored in chapter 5.400 
                                               
400 The Wai 262 tribunal’s recommendations will be discussed in further detail in chapter 
5. 







Chapter 4: Foreign Models of Indigenous Self-
Determination – Insights for Aotearoa? 
I  Chapter Introduction 
The previous chapter concluded that the current resource 
management and environmental laws in Aotearoa are failing to give 
adequate expression to the international obligations of indigenous self-
determination, when viewed through the lens of Anaya’s framework. It 
did, however, note that certain aspects of the existing legal mechanisms 
could be adapted and developed further to assist the development of a 
framework that is norm-compliant. In other words, some parts of the 
existing framework go some way toward the expression of the 
requirements of the international norm (such as the legal personality 
approach of Te Awa Tupua and Te Urewera), but, as a whole, the they are 
non-compliant when analysed against Anaya’s schema. 
 
This chapter undertakes a similar analysis of various foreign 
environmental law frameworks. It has two purposes: (1) to evaluate the 
mechanisms against Anaya’s self-determination framework and consider 
whether they are giving adequate expression to the norm;401 and (2) to 
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ascertain how certain insightful concepts underpinning these models can 
inform the implementation of self-determination in Aotearoa.402 
 
First, the Sami people from northern Scandinavia and the Kola 
Peninsula, and various frameworks applying to them, are considered. 403 
Then, frameworks applying to the Aboriginal peoples of Canada are 
considered. There are many other indigenous peoples that could have been 
considered but it is not possible to cover them all in any sufficient detail. 
The chapter focuses exclusively on indigenous models because the thesis 
concerns the implementation of self-determination for the indigenous 
people of Aotearoa (Māori). Historically, many different indigenous 
peoples have experienced a similar context of colonisation, assimilation, 
integration, intergenerational protest and, to some extent, rights 
recognition. While there are significant differences between these peoples 
and their legal, political and historical contexts, it is helpful to assess case 
studies which involve similar conditions to obtain a more nuanced 
                                               
life on a continuous basis.” See Anaya, above n 45 at 106. This enables a normative 
evaluation of the autonomy mechanisms to be undertaken, which can inform the 
implementation of self-determination in Aotearoa. 
402 For example, further below the Draft Nordic Sami Convention is analysed, in 
particular, the ‘sliding scale’ or relativistic approach to self-determination that it 
embodies. Again, a normative assessment of the foreign tools based on Anaya’s 
framework can inform these observations. 
403 A limitation of the Sami research is that the author was only able to consider materials 
written in English in formulating this section. There were many publications that the 
author was unable to consider as he does not read or speak any of the Scandinavian 
languages. 







understanding of how self-determination can be implemented in Aotearoa 
law. With that said, the importance of context is recognised given there are 
many distinctions between the various case studies and Māori in Aotearoa, 
including: constitutional system (unitary or federal), system of law 
(common, civil, customary or a mixed system), the degree of integration 
between the indigenous and non-indigenous peoples, and the degree of 
population concentration within defined traditional territorial areas. The 
underlying context will be borne in mind for any understandings obtained 
from the case studies.404 
 
                                               
404 The thesis generally adopts the comparative legal method to carry out the analysis 
between different jurisdictions. See, for example, Montesquieu “The Spirit of the Laws” 
1748, and Mary-Rose Russell and others Legal research in New Zealand (LexisNexis 
NZ Limited, Wellington, 2016). 







II Scandinavia’s Sami Law 
A Introduction 
The Sami (also referred to as Saami or Sámi) are the native peoples 
of Northern Scandinavia and Russia’s Kola Peninsula. Historically a semi-
nomadic people, the Sami have traditionally hunted, fished, gathered and 
trapped food in Europe’s Arctic region where they developed, over many 
centuries, their own distinct legal, social, cultural and economic 
institutions and social governance systems. The various Sami sub-
groupings are united by common cultural values, languages and, as a 
collective, are often associated with reindeer husbandry. Like many other 
indigenous peoples throughout the world, the Sami have experienced land 
dispossession, the denial of basic human rights (including rights to land 
and waters), colonisation and government sanctioned assimilation.405 
Today, jurisdiction over the traditional Sami homeland, known as Sápmi, 
is divided between the modern states of Finland, Norway, Russia406 and 
Sweden. While there are no reliable statistics, there are between 50,000 
                                               
405 James Anaya “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous people. 'The situation of the Sami people in the 
Sapmi region of Norway, Sweden and Finland'” 2011; Mattias Åhren “The Saami 
Convention” 2007(3) Galdu Cala Journal of Indigenous Peoples Rights. 
406 The Russian government has made little effort to recognise the rights of its Sami 
citizens or to participate in international processes in this respect. As the Russian Sami 
exercise little autonomy, they will not be considered in any detail in this thesis. 







and 100,000 Sami people, with over half of the population residing in 
Norway.407 
 
The Sami people were selected as a case study in this thesis because 
the discourse of self-determination implementation is enriched by 
analysing a wide range of perspectives (i.e. both territorial and non-
territorial models). The Sami are also selected as, like Māori in Aotearoa, 
the Sami have an affinity for traditional food gathering and these rights 
have been the subject of state regulation and legal commentary.408 
Additionally, most Sami do not seek secession as a remedy for their self-
determination claims.409 
 
 This section first discusses the background to the development of 
the Nordic Sami parliaments (also known as ‘Samediggi’ and ‘Sameting’ 
in Norwegian) and the role they play in Sami self-determination. Finland, 
Norway and Sweden all have their own distinct Sami parliament 
established under their domestic law. Generally, the Sami parliaments are 
                                               
407 Torvald Falch, Per Selle and Kristin Strømsnes “The Sámi: 25 Years of Indigenous 
Authority in Norway” 2016 15(1) Ethnopolitics. 
408 The implementation of indigenous self-determination in Aotearoa in relation to a 
specific traditional Māori food gathering area will be discussed below in chapter 6. 
409 Margret Carstens “Sami land rights: the Anaya Report and the Nordic Sami 
Convention” 2016 15(1) Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe; John 
Henriksen “Sami Self-Determination: Scope and Implementation” 2008(2) Galdu Cala 
- Journal of Indigenous Peoples Rights. 







popularly elected institutions designed to represent the collective interests 
of the Sami. While each one is similar, they differ in many respects, such 
as legal basis, mandate and the degree of independence from the state 
institutions.410 First, an overview of the development of the three Sami 
parliaments will be given, followed by an analysis of certain autonomous 
tools of the Norwegian example. Later, a novel approach to exercising self-
determination, promoted by the 2005 version of the draft Nordic Sami 
Convention is analysed and considered for the insights it might provide for 
the future implementation of self-determination in Aotearoa. 
B Sami self-determination: background 
To analyse the formal mechanisms giving effect to Sami self-
determination in the Nordic states we must first look at the background 
which led to their development, and the legal context which they operate 
within. The establishment of the Sami Delegation in Finland in 1973, the 
first official representative Sami organisation, had a profound impact on 
the recognition of Sami rights in the other Nordic states.411 The Norwegian 
Samediggi can be traced to a protest movement over the proposed 
damming of the Alta/Kautokeino River in the 1970s. The development 
would have resulted in the flooding of traditional Sami villages and sites 
                                               
410 Eva Josefsen, Ulf Morkenstam and Ragnhild Nilsson “The Nordic Samediggis and the 
Limits of Indigenous Self-Determination” 2016(1) Galdu Cala - Journal of Indigenous 
Peoples Rights. 
411 Josefsen et al., above n 410. 







of importance, as well as a disruption to reindeer herding and other 
traditional livelihoods. The political resistance of the Sami people to the 
dam development gained international and national news media attention, 
leading to an increased dialogue between the government and Sami people, 
and eventually the establishment of the Norwegian Samediggi.412 
 
The Nordic states have been (relatively) active in the international 
indigenous rights arena. The Nordic states are signatories to the major UN 
human rights conventions, including the ICCPR and ICESCR, and all three 
states voted in favour of adopting the UNDRIP at the UN General 
Assembly. Norway is the only Nordic state to have ratified the 
International Labour Organization’s Convention No. 169 (“ILO 169”).413 
 
The three codified constitutions of Norward, Sweden and Finland 
recognise the Nordic countries as unitary states with all sovereign authority 
vested in the central government. Consistent with this approach, regional 
government enjoys no constitutional protection and its ongoing existence 
is subject to the legislative discretion of the central government.414 It has 
been argued that Sami self-determination is limited by this context as 
                                               
412 Josefsen et al., above n 410. 
413 It was, in fact, the first state in the world to ratify ILO 169. 
414 Broderstod, above n 166. An indigenous autonomy model within the context of a 
federal state will be discussed further below in the Canadian section. 







unitary states are generally less comfortable with accommodating sub-
groups in the constitutional order through a tiered government system.415 
There exists no constitutional guarantee of Sami territorial autonomy as a 
distinct order of government. In contrast, Canada has a federal system 
where the provinces enjoy a higher level of authority and protection in the 
constitutional structure.  It is perhaps the federal nature of the Canadian 
system has made indigenous territorial autonomy more palatable there 
(discussed further below). Although, this may be a convenient argument 
for the governments of unitary states, as these institutions generally seek 
to retain a ‘monopoly’ on constitutional authority or the notional 
‘sovereignty’. 
 
Under this unitary system, the extent of Sami rights recognition in 
the various Nordic constitutional arrangements has varied. The Swedish 
constitution makes some provision for the Sami, recognising them as the 
indigenous people of Sweden and noting that opportunities for them to 
develop and preserve their cultural and social life should be promoted.416 
Comparatively, the Finnish constitution appears to contain the strongest 
provisions recognising the Sami people and their rights. First, it recognises 
                                               
415 Timo Koivurova “The Draft for a Nordic Saami Convention” 2006 6 European 
Yearbook of Minority Issues. 
416 Instrument of Government (Sweden), art 2. 







the Sami as an ‘indigenous people,’417 and secondly, it recognises that in 
their home region they have “linguistic and cultural self-government,”418 
i.e., non-territorial autonomy which provides decision-making powers 
over linguistic and cultural development. Norway’s constitution 
incorporates a positive obligation for the state to protect Sami language, 
culture and ways of life.419 Although, the extent at which this is upheld in 
reality is questionable (discussed later with specific reference to the 
Planning and Building Act and the Finnmark Estate). 
 
The extent at which the constitutional references to Sami rights have 
been translated into further legislation has also varied. In all cases the 
constitutional references are accompanied by legislation creating a 
representative Sami parliament. The constitutional position, function and 
mandate of these institutions varies. The Swedish Samediggi has an 
unusual position in the constituting legislation which describes it as a 
“special government agency,”420 with its main function being to 
“…monitor issues concerning Sami culture in Sweden.”421 The Samediggi 
is therefore an advisory to the Swedish government on cultural Sami 
                                               
417 Section 17. 
418 Section 121. 
419 Norwegian Constitution as laid down on 17 May 1814 (May 2016 version), art 108. 
420 Sami Parliament Act 1992 (Sweden), chapter 1, s 1. 
421 Chapter 1, s 1. 







matters, and an administrative body tasked with delivering the 
government’s Sami policy.422 As a state organ, it would be difficult for this 
institution to express any meaningful level of self-determination. ‘Cultural 
self-government’ in Finland is almost exclusively consultative in nature. 
State authorities must ‘negotiate’ (i.e. consult) with the Samediggi when 
considering matters which may directly affect the Sami.423 However, state 
authorities are under no obligation to defer to the Samediggi when 
considering matters of importance to them and ultimately it has very 
limited authority of its own.424 The same could be said of the Norwegian 
Sami parliament, which has secured a consultation agreement based on the 
consultation provisions of the International Labour Organization’s 
Convention 169. The agreement provides the Sami with an opportunity to 
influence national policy and law making by providing their views on 
proposed law or policy changes. However, there is no requirement for the 
state authorities to commit to Sami views (they are one of many 
considerations for the ultimate decision-maker to consider). The agreement 
does not provide the Sami parliament with autonomous powers of decision. 
 
                                               
422 Henriksen, above n 409. 
423 This section applies to matters such as community planning/zoning, changes in state 
land use, applications for mining and mineral extraction (inter alia). 
424 Laila Vars “Political Aspects of the Sami's Right to Self-Determination” 2008(2) 
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The Norwegian case study warrants further analysis. As discussed, 
Norway contains the greatest number of Sami by population, and is the 
only state to have ratified the ILO 169 Convention. The section will focus 
on the Finnmark Estate legislation and (briefly on) the Planning and 
Building Act, both of which contain mechanisms to involve Sami in 
resource decision-making. The degree of self-determination provided to 
the Sami parliament through these tools will be assessed against Anaya’s 
ongoing self-determination standard. It will be further demonstrated that 
the Sami model in Norway is largely consistent with ‘relational’ notions of 
self-determination, discussed above in chapter 1. 
C Norway and Sami self-determination 
1 Finnmark legislation and Sami parliament 
The Norwegian Sami have assumed some ability to influence public 
decision-making regarding resource use in the Finnmark County through 
the Finnmark Estate legislation. The Finnmark Act 2005425 was adopted as 
a response to years of Sami protests to have their rights to lands and 
resources in Finnmark County recognised by the state, triggered by the 
conflict regarding the establishment of the Alta-Kautokeino hydro-electric 
development.426 The ratification of ILO 169 by the Norwegian state in 
                                               
425 Finnmark Act 2005 (Norway) [“Finnmark Act”]. 
426 Josefsen, Morkenstam and Nilsson, above n 410; Eva Josefsen “Norwegian Legislation 
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1990 also created obligations for the government to identify and recognise 
in law indigenous peoples’ traditional lands.427 Finnmark County itself is 
situated in northern Norway, the heart of the Sami homeland. The Act 
transferred ownership of about 95% of the area of Finnmark County 
(48,649 kilometres) to a new agency, the Finnmark Estate, to be held and 
managed by that agency on behalf of county residents. It applies to real 
property, as well as mineral and other natural resources. Prior to this, the 
land was owned and managed by a state-owned company (Statskog SF). 
The purpose of the Act is to:428 
 
… facilitate the management of land and natural resources in the 
county of Finnmark in a balanced and ecologically sustainable 
manner for the benefit of the residents of the county and particularly 
as a basis for Sami culture, reindeer husbandry, use of non-cultivated 
areas, commercial activity and social life. 
 
The board of Finnmark Estate is effectively co-managed and 
comprised of six representatives, three appointed by the Samediggi and 
three appointed by the Finnmark County Council.429 The Finnmark Estate 
board is mandated to act in a similar manner to other private landholding 
organisations with some additional executive powers of public decision-
making. For example, it is responsible for the authorisation of hunting, 
                                               
427 ILO 169, art 14. 
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fishing and trapping permits in the area.430 A related organisation, the 
Finnmark Commission, was established simultaneously to investigate and 
officially recognise individual Sami and non-Sami rights to land and 
resource ownership (or so-called ‘usufructory’ rights).431 
 
The Sami parliament interacts with the Finnmark Estate through 
certain prescribed decision-making processes. For example, the Sami 
parliament’s influence over proposals for the use or development of 
‘uncultivated lands’432 in Finnmark County is notable. Pursuant to section 
4, the Sami parliament is empowered to issue ‘guidelines’ directing how a 
proposal for change in uncultivated land use (i.e. similar to a ‘zoning’ 
change in Aotearoa law) is to be assessed by both the Finnmark Estate and 
public authorities for its impact on Sami culture, reindeer husbandry, the 
use of uncultivated areas and commercial activity. This mechanism would 
apply to, for example, applications to build housing or roading 
infrastructure, to carry out extractive activities or to establish wind power 
developments on previously uncultivated lands within the Finnmark 
Estate.433 The guidelines must be approved by central government 
                                               
430 Sections 1 and 6. 
431 Section 29. The legislation recognises that the Sami have individually and collectively 
acquired rights to land and resources through prolonged use since time immemorial (s 
5). 
432 I.e. unfenced, open country that is not cultivated. 
433 Ministry of Justice and the Police and Ministry of Local Government and Regional 
Development "The Finnmark Act - A Guide" (2005). 







authorities, whom must consider whether the guidelines are consistent with 
section 4 of the Finnmark Act. Central government, county and municipal 
authorities must follow the guidelines in assessing the impact of such 
proposals on Sami culture and reindeer husbandry (inter alia).434 For 
example, a municipality must follow the Sami parliament’s guidelines 
upon receipt of a proposal to rezone uncultivated Finnmark land for some 
other purpose where that land previously supported Sami reindeer 
husbandry (e.g. to allow for mineral exploration). Furthermore, section 10 
of the Act provides that the Finnmark Estate board itself must follow the 
guidelines of the Sami parliament in assessing proposals for their impact 
on Sami interests and reindeer herding etc., before they make their final 
decision on the proposed land-use change.  
 
Decisions of the Finnmark Estate board itself relating to uncultivated 
land-use changes are also subject to special voting procedures. The board 
has a standard quorum requirement of five members before decision can 
be made, and the board’s composition is six representatives. The Act 
provides that decisions relating to uncultivated land-use changes require 
the support of a majority of at least four board members (i.e. a ‘super 
majority’).435 If the proposal is only supported by four members (i.e. there 
                                               
434 Sections 4 and 10. 
435 Section 10. For other decisions, a simple majority will suffice (which can be three 
board members given the quorum requirement is five board members). See s 9. 







is not a full consensus of six, or at least five members in favour) the 
minority voters can require that the matter be referred to the Sami 
parliament for their decision. If the Sami parliament declines to approve 
the proposal (i.e. it does not ratify the decision of the majority), or if it fails 
to make a decision within a reasonable time frame, the majority voters can 
refer the matter to central government for a final decision.436 Central 
government is under no obligation to uphold the decision of the Sami 
parliament, or the board dissenters. 
 
The passage of the Finnmark Act also occasioned amendments to the 
Mining Act 1972,437 providing the Sami with an increased role in decision-
making regarding the permitting of mineral prospecting or extraction in the 
Finnmark Estate area. The amendments provided that both the Sami 
parliament and the Finnmark Estate board must be given written notice in 
advance if persons wish to undertake preliminary examinations for 
minerals within Finnmark. Furthermore, when public mining authorities 
are considering whether to grant applications for mineral extraction, the 
Sami parliament (along with county and municipal authorities) shall have 
a right to express their views regarding such applications. If either the Sami 
parliament or Finnmark Estate oppose the granting of the application, the 
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matter shall be decided by the Ministry of Trade and Industry.438 These 
amendments are reflected in section 17 of the new Minerals Act 2009. The 
Act is to be administered so that, amongst other interests, the foundations 
for Sami culture, commercial activity and social life are safeguarded.439  
 
Another mechanism that provides the Sami parliament with 
influence over resource decisions is the Planning and Building legislation, 
which is now considered. Both frameworks are then analysed against 
Anaya’s framework. 
2 Planning and building legislation and Sami parliament 
Another example of a legal framework providing for Sami 
participation in resource decision-making is the Norwegian Planning and 
Building Act 2008,440 which sets out the framework for land use and 
community planning at the differing tiers of government (municipal, 
county and central), as well as the administration of a building permitting 
system. It is the most important piece of legislation governing land-use in 
municipalities, performing a role similar to the New Zealand Resource 
                                               
438 Finnmark Act, Section 50; Malgosia Fitzmaurice “The UN Declaration on the Rights 
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Management Act 1991. Under the Act, municipal councils may adopt 
overarching land use plans, as well as more detailed zoning plans setting 
the framework for activities permitted within certain spatial areas. It allows 
conditions to be attached to permitted activities, such as compliance with 
air quality standards in industrial zones. The Act provides that all plans 
created pursuant to the Act must “protect the natural basis for Sami culture, 
economic activity and social life.”441 Significantly, the planning legislation 
allows the Sami parliament to raise formal objections to proposals 
regarding “the land-use element of the municipal master plan and the 
zoning plan” where there are “issues that are of significant importance to 
Sami culture or the conduct of commercial activities.”442 If the Sami 
parliament raises a planning objection, the municipality must consider 
whether to uphold the substance of the objection (or whether it should be 
disregarded). If the municipality disagrees with the objection, the matter is 
referred to mediation, and the mediator is to be chosen by the central 
government. If mediation is unsuccessful (i.e. no agreement is reached 
between the Sami parliament and the municipality regarding the 
objection), the matter, along with the mediator’s recommendation, is 
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forwarded to central government for final decision on whether the plan 
requires amendment.443  
 
3 Analysis against Anaya’s framework 
This section will now analyse, against the framework developed in 
chapter 1, the Norwegian Sami parliament and its interaction with both the 
Finnmark Act and the Planning and Building. 
 
Constitutive self-determination 
As discussed, the constitutive aspect of self-determination considers 
the efficacy of the processes leading to the establishment of the 
institutional order, and whether these processes have adequately 
incorporated the consent or participation of the indigenous people. This 
section therefore analyses the processes leading to the establishment of the 
Norwegian Finnmark Act and the Planning and Building Act. 
 
While they were initially flawed, the processes leading to the passage 
of the Finnmark Act ultimately gave effect to the requirements of 
constitutive self-determination. Else Broderstad notes that the first draft of 
the Finnmark bill, which was finalised in 2003 (based on a 1997 Report 
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from the Sami Rights Commission), was strongly criticised by the Sami 
parliament as it did not contain a process for the proper identification and 
recognition of Sami rights.444 The Sami parliament also criticised the lack 
of consultation on the bill generally prior to that point, as required under 
the provisions of the ILO 169 Convention (ratified by Norway). In 
response to these criticisms, the Norwegian parliament asked the Finnmark 
County Council and the Sami parliament to participate in a consultation 
process in relation to the bill, a mechanism that was not contemplated by 
the formal parliamentary procedures at the time.445 After this, the parties 
met four times leading to substantial changes to the first draft of the bill, 
including the adoption of a formal process to identify rights to land and 
resources (was sought by the Sami parliament to ensure the recognition of 
outstanding Sami rights claims). The Finnmark Act ultimately passed with 
the support of the Sami parliament, which indicates that the law creation 
processes embodied the necessary principles of indigenous participation 
and the resulting legislation can be said to reflect the will of the people. 
 
The lead up to the Finnmark Act was a catalyst for the negotiation of 
the formal ‘consultation agreement’ between the Sami parliament and 
central government in 2005, as noted above. This agreement regulates the 
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incorporation of Sami views into proposals for central government law or 
policy changes where these may directly affect the Sami (giving expression 
to article 6 of ILO 169). The consultation agreement was tested with the 
proposed passage of the Planning and Building Act. According to then 
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya, the 
consultation procedures adopted by the Ministry of the Environment 
regarding this legislation were “good examples of consultation with full 
information at all stages and a willingness on both sides to achieve 
agreement.”446 Essentially, the consultation agreement ensured that the 
Sami had “a substantial influence” on the drafting of the Planning and 
Building Act.447 As with the Finnmark Act, it can said that both the 
processes leading to the adoption of this legislation, and the act itself, 
reflected the will of the people. It can be further surmised that the adoption 
of ILO 169 by Norway has substantially contributed to adoption of norm 
compliant consultation mechanisms. However, it remains to be seen 
whether the substance of these mechanisms, their ongoing form and 
functioning, meets the requirements of Anaya’s framework (in terms of 
subsidiarity and cultural pluralism). 
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Ongoing self-determination: subsidiarity 
The level of authority afforded to the Sami in ‘non-cultural’ or non-
linguistic matters, is very limited, particularly over Sami lands and natural 
resources (the primary inquiry of this thesis). Under the Finnmark Act, in 
Finnmark County the Sami parliament can (through its promulgated 
guidelines) influence proposals for changes in land-use in respect of 
uncultivated land, based on Sami cultural and economic considerations 
(e.g. reindeer herding). The special voting procedures that apply to such 
applications also incorporate the Sami parliament into the decision-making 
structure: if a minority of the board opposes the change in land-use, it can 
require that the decision be referred to the Sami parliament for decision. 
The Sami parliament can also raise objections to community planning 
proposals under the Planning and Building Act (such as zoning 
designations) where there are concerns for their effects on Sami cultural 
and economic matters. If an objection is raised, municipal authorities must 
then consider whether to uphold the objection, or whether to refer the 
matter to mediation. These tools, along with the operation consultation 
agreement procedures, ensure that the Sami have a voice in natural 
resource decision-making. 
 
Although, under these mechanisms, the Sami are notably absent from 
the decision-making table itself. While the Finnmark legislation advances 
Sami self-determination through some participation in resource 







management, the board is perhaps best seen as a form of ‘co-
determination’ or ‘co-management’, or as a partnership model under the 
schema developed in chapter 3, and the other mechanisms as mere 
‘influence’ tools. As the Canadian Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples stated, “[s]imply put, the Sami Parliaments lack clout.”448 The 
Sameting’s ability to influence land use and resource management 
decision-making is constrained by the requirement for joint management 
of the Finnmark Estate board in partnership with the county council. While 
Sami interests are considered in changes of use of uncultivated land (i.e. 
through the requirement for the Finnmark Estate board and public 
authorities to apply the Sami parliament’s guidelines), Sami interests 
ultimately have the same weight as non-Sami interests in the application. 
The Sami parliament’s guidelines are incapable of compelling public 
authorities to give more weight to Sami interests over other interests (e.g. 
commercial), therefore they are one of a number of factors that the 
decision-maker must consider. This mechanism therefore can only provide 
the Sami with a limited influence over such decisions. Sami influence is 
further hindered by the fact that the locus of decision-making for resource 
proposals generally sits with external, majoritarian, public decision 
authorities. While the Finnmark Estate board must sign off a change in 
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uncultivated land use, ultimately, the Sami have limited ability to prevent 
such a proposal, even where it will have detrimental effects on Sami 
cultural or economic activities. For example, where the board is divided on 
the matter, applications for change in uncultivated land-use can be referred 
to the Sami parliament for decision by a board minority. If the Sami 
parliament does not ratify the proposal, the majority of the board can 
overpower this mechanism by referring the matter to central government 
for final decision. Therefore, in spite of outside appearances, the ultimate 
locus of decision-making on such proposals sits outside of Sami hands. 
 
The ability for the Sami parliament to raise objections to community 
planning proposals under the Planning and Building Act is ostensibly a 
promising form of Sami self-determination. Although, upon closer 
inspection, Sami objections are always subject to central government’s 
final decision power. If the relevant municipality disagrees with the 
substance of the Sami objections to the planning proposal, the matter is 
referred to mediation. If mediation fails, and the parties cannot agree on a 
way forward, the matter is referred to central government for ultimate 
decision. An example is the proposal for Norwegian investment company, 
Nussir ASA, to develop a copper mine within the Kvalsund municipality. 
Evidence existed that the mine would disrupt traditional Sami fishing, 
hunting and reindeer herding livelihoods, and that this would have 
damaging flow on effects for the erosion of Sami culture. Despite protest, 







the municipality granted the required zone change, prompting an objection 
from the Sami parliament under the above power. The matter was 
eventually referred to central government for decision. After consideration 
by four government ministries, the zone change was confirmed in 2014 by 
the Ministry of Local Government and Modernization, effectively ignoring 
the Sami objections.449 Koivurova points out the key deficiency of this 
mechanism as follows: “The Norwegian State can still decide that the 
national interests of the mining industry are more important than the 
interests of traditional Sami livelihoods.”450 
 
Overall, the institutional frameworks embodied in both the Finnmark 
Act and the Planning and Building Act are ultimately consultative in nature 
and fail to provide any real decision-making autonomy over resource 
management proposals. This is a low level of respect for the principle of 
indigenous subsidiarity. 
 
Ongoing self-determination: cultural pluralism 
The substance of both institutional orders produced by the Finnmark 
Act and the Planning and Building Act have little to offer under the cultural 
                                               
449 Timo Koivurova and others “Legal Protection of Sami Traditional Livelihoods from 
the Adverse Impacts of Mining: A Comparison of the Level of Protection Enjoyed by 
Sami in Their Four Home States” 2015 6(1) Arctic Review on Law and Politics. 
450 At 34. 







pluralism aspect of Anaya’s ongoing self-determination framework. This 
aspect provides that culturally bespoke accommodations should be made 
within the institutional framework. In other words, Sami laws and/or legal 
traditions should be valued and practically adopted under the model. While 
the Finnmark Act incorporates an approach to recognising traditional Sami 
landowners/‘usufructory’ rights holders, and the Sami parliament can raise 
planning objections under the Planning and Building Act where a planning 
proposal does not “protect the natural basis for Sami culture, economic 
activity and social life”,451 both structures are wholly framed through the 
lens of non-Sami (i.e. European) concepts of the law. That is, traditional 
Sami understandings of law or legal tradition do not, and are not able to, 
form the basis of decision-making under any of these mechanisms. 
 
On the above bases, it cannot be said that the Norwegian Sami 
parliament enables Sami individuals and groups to continuously develop 
freely in all spheres of life on an ongoing basis. The institutional structures 
examined fail to adequately adhere to Anaya’s self-determination 
principles, and the mechanisms discussed therefore offer little insights to 
the implementation of Māori self-determination in Aotearoa. 
 
                                               
451 Section 3-1. 







The section will now consider a developing matter of international 
law, the draft Nordic Sami convention, which has the potential to increase 
the level of influence that the Sami have over decisions affecting their 
interests. The concepts discussed below have the potential to inform the 
way self-determination is implemented in Aotearoa.







D Proposed Nordic Sami convention 
1 Background 
In 2002 an Expert Group comprised of representatives of the Nordic 
states (Norway, Finland and Sweden) and the three Sami parliaments 
began preparing an international convention based on existing positive and 
customary international law standards. The convention was intended to 
clarify how the international norms pertaining to indigenous peoples 
materialise for the Sami in the three Nordic states. A proposed convention 
text and a commentary was completed by the Expert Group in 2005.452 The 
2005 text is enlightening for its articulation of the operational aspects of 
the right to self-determination, including, the right to free, prior and 
informed consent (‘FPIC’), and the inclusion of a process to balance all 
Sami and non-Sami interests. While the 2005 version has undergone a 
redrafting process, culminating in a new version released in 2016 and the 
amendment of a number of provisions (including substantial changes to the 
provision on FPIC),453 it is nonetheless useful to consider the 2005 text for 
                                               
452 Henriksen, above n 409. 
453 The 2016 version is, at the time of writing, only available in the various Scandinavian 
languages. An English translation is yet to be officially approved. The Sami parliaments 
have since officially requested further amendments to the 2016 version, and this will 
not be finally approved by the states until the Sami parliaments formally approve the 
text.  Department of Sami and Minority Affairs (Norway) to the author Email from 
Bjørn Olav Megard (Director General) 2018). See also Atle Staalesen “Historic Sami 











the normative value it provides to the discourse of self-determination 
implementation, particularly as a case study of how the indigenous self-
determination right can materialise operationally outside of the Sami 
context.  
2 Provisions relating to self-determination 
The right to self-determination is a central provision of the draft 
convention, and its text is similar to the self-determination clause 
contained in the ICCPR, ICESCR and the UNDRIP.454 For present 
purposes the most instructive provisions are those that elaborate the scope 
and content of the right to self-determination (Chapter II). 
 
Chapter II embodies what Mattias Åhren terms a ‘sliding scale’ or 
‘relativistic’ approach to the implementation of self-determination.455 It is 
‘relative’ in the sense that the level of influence or involvement afforded 
in decision-making processes varies relative to the importance of the 
decision for the relevant indigenous agents. Under this approach, when a 
                                               
454 Article 3 of the draft convention states: “As a people, the Saami has the right of self-
determination in accordance with the rules and provisions of international law and of 
this Convention. In so far as it follows from these rules and provisions, the Saami people 
has the right to determine its own economic, social and cultural development and to 
dispose, to their own benefit, over its own natural resources.” While the statement 
referring to the right to “freely determine its political status” is not included in the draft, 
Vars argues this does not curtail the Sami’s right to self-determination in any way (as 
the Sami are owed the same right to self-determination as all ‘peoples’, regardless of 
the wording). See Henriksen, above n 409. 
455 Mattias Åhren a Sami legal expert, is a member of the ‘Expert Group’ appointed to 
draft the Nordic Sami Convention. See  Henriksen at above n 409. 







public authority (central or local government) is considering a proposal 
that will affect the Sami (e.g. culturally, economically or socially), the 
more important the decision is for the Sami the more influence they are 
afforded over that decision process. The importance of the proposal for the 
Sami is determined by considering the extent at which it will impact the 
fundamental underpinnings of Sami culture, Sami economies and Sami 
social patterns. Heinämäki contends that this was a guiding principle for 
the drafters of the convention, and accordingly this theory underpins 
certain provisions in the 2005 text.456 The sliding scale in this context 
means that the level of influence or involvement of the Sami can range 
from:457 
 
…a complete and exclusive decision right where no consideration 
has to be made to the non-Sami peoples [i.e. FPIC] to a right merely 
to be informed and briefed about a decision-making process by the 
non-Sami decision making bodies. 
 
 
In practice, this provision would find expression as a spectrum of 
Sami influence over decision-making procedures – at the lower end of the 
spectrum are rights to be informed of matters concerning Sami interests, to 
                                               
456 Heinämäki, above n 56. 
457 Mattias Åhren “International Conference on Sami Self-Determination: Scope and 
Implementation - Culture and Natural Resources” 2008(2) Galdu Cala - Journal of 
Indigenous Peoples Rights at 88; John Henriksen “Sami Self-Determination: Autonomy 
and Self-Government: Education, Research and Culture” 2009(2) Galdu Cala - Journal 
of Indigenous Peoples Rights; John Henriksen “Sami Self-Determination: Land, 
Resources and Traditional Livelihoods - Self-Determination and the Media” 2011(1) 
Galdu Cala - Journal of Indigenous Peoples Rights. 







be represented on public decision-making authorities, and to submit their 
views toward such processes (i.e. influence or consultative mechanisms), 
where the decision will have a negligible impact on the Sami. At the upper 
end a right of full free, prior and informed consent, i.e. a right to withhold 
consent to proposals that will have a substantially adverse impact on Sami 
culture, economies and society. The spectrum (or sliding scale, as Åhren 
terms it) can be found in articles 17, 16 and 36. 
 
Article 17, the lower end of the scale, provides certain procedural 
safeguards where matters are being considered by public authorities which 
concern Sami interests. This provision generally applies to matters of a 
‘less serious’ nature when the potential effects of the proposal on the Sami 
are considered.458 When this provision applies, the Sami parliaments have 
rights to: representation on public decision-making authorities considering 
such matters; to receive notice of the matters concerning Sami interests; 
and to submit their views on the decision, at a sufficiently early stage so 
that their views are able to influence the outcome.459 
 
                                               
458 Compared to “matters of major importance to the Saami,” which is covered by art 16 
and discussed below. 
459 These are ‘influence’ mechanisms in terms of the Waitangi Tribunal’s Wai 262 schema 
discussed above in chapter 3. 







Toward the middle of the scale, article 16(1) provides a more 
substantial right for the Sami parliaments to consultation, which applies to 
“matters of major importance” to the Sami. This entitles the Sami 
parliaments to participate in ‘negotiations’ with the public authorities 
before the decision is made, and in any case, this must be carried out 
sufficiently early to enable the Sami parliaments to have a real influence 
over the decision. A similar provision is contained in article 36(2), which 
states that similar negotiations shall be held with the Sami parliaments 
before a public authority grants prospecting or extraction permits for 
natural resources, or otherwise makes decisions regarding the utilisation of 
lands/resources owned/used by the Sami. This influence mechanism places 
a positive obligation on the public authority to enter into formal 
consultation (‘negotiation’) procedures with the Sami, a greater 
requirement than article 17. 
 
Importantly, and at the top end of Åhren’s sliding scale, article 16(2) 
provides a right for the Sami parliaments to withhold consent for certain 
projects when public authorities are considering proposals which may have 
a ‘significantly damage’ the Sami (culturally, economically or socially).460 
In other words, in such cases, public authorities are unable to sanction 
                                               
460 Martin Scheinin “Sami Self-Determination - A Nordic Perspective of Indigenous 
Peoples' Right to Self-Government” 2008(2) Galdu Cala - Journal of Indigenous 
Peoples Rights. 







certain activities if the consent of the Sami parliaments (or the ‘affected 
Sami’ under article 36(3)) is not forthcoming. It is linked to article 16(1), 
which applies to matters of ‘major importance’ to the Sami. Article 16(2) 
states: 
 
The states shall not adopt or permit measures that may significantly 
damage the basic conditions for Saami culture, Saami livelihoods or 




Article 36(3) also provides the Sami with the power to withhold their 
consent to, and prevent the granting of, proposed resource extraction 
and/or exploration permits in similar situations: 
 
Permits for prospecting or extraction of natural resources shall not 
be granted if the activity would make it impossible or substantially 
more difficult for the Saami to continue to utilize the areas 
concerned, and this utilization is essential to the Saami culture, 




Under the foregoing articles of the convention’s 2005 text, where 
proposals are being considered by public authorities that will have a 
‘substantial’ or ‘significant’ effect on the Sami (i.e. their culture, society 
or livelihoods), and the Sami interest that is impacted is of major 
importance to the Sami, the prior approval of the Sami must be obtained 
before the proposal is approved or officially sanctioned by the public 







authority.461 As Åhren notes “…if the proposed activity or legislation 
could potentially cause [considerable] damage to the fundaments for the 
Sami culture, the Sami always make the final call.”462 This approach is 
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3 Analysis against Anaya’s framework 
This section will now analyse the draft Nordic Sami convention 
(2005 text) against the principles of Anaya’s self-determination 
framework. It considers whether the convention can be used as a source of 
inspiration for the future operationalisation of self-determination in 
Aotearoa. 
Constitutive self-determination 
The section will first analyse the processes and procedures that led 
to the drafting (and potential future adoption) of the draft convention and 
consider whether these processes adequately embodied the constitutive 
requirements of Sami participation and consent.  
 
The expert group constituted to draft the proposed convention was 
comprised of six members, one appointed by each Sami parliament and 
one appointed by each Nordic state government. During its tenure the 
expert group convened 15 times to deliberate on the drafting of the 
convention.463 By contributing to this drafting forum the Sami were 
effectively able to participate and incorporate their views in the initial 
processes leading to the draft convention. This is a far cry from the 
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unilateral imposition of legislation or policy that the Sami and other 
indigenous peoples have experienced historically. 
 
With that said, the procedures underpinning the draft convention are 
not panaceaic: they are not the model representation of Anaya’s 
constitutive self-determination.  A major criticism of the draft convention 
is that the Sami or the Sami parliaments will not be parties to the final draft 
convention: only the three Nordic states are signatories. This is somewhat 
alleviated by the fact that the ratification of the convention is conditional 
upon the approval of the Sami parliaments.464 However, the Nordic states 
are the ultimate signatories of the convention, and the governments’ 
resource base and constitutional authority perpetuates an inherent power 
imbalance that disadvantages the Sami in negotiations (as discussed above 
under the Te Awa Tupua settlement). Ultimately, the states will only adopt 
a convention that appeases the majority of their political constituents, 
rendering the processes leading to the adoption of the draft convention 
highly subject to majoritarian political forces, instead of legal process. 
Further, once the document is ratified by all three states, the Sami will have 
limited ability to influence how it is given effect in domestic legislation. 
 
                                               
464 Articles 48 and 49. 







Overall, the processes underlying the drafting of the draft Nordic 
Sami convention are not without issue. However, these processes represent 
a significant improvement in the level of participation afforded to the Sami 
(compared with the historical imposition of law and policy experienced by 
many indigenous peoples historically). This embodies a greater adherence 
to Anaya’s constitutive self-determination principle than any other models 
discussed in this thesis (e.g. the Aotearoa examples in chapters 2 and 3 or 
the Canadian examples below). 
 
The thesis will now consider the form and functioning of the draft 
Nordic Sami convention itself, namely, the ‘sliding scale’ provisions. 
Ongoing self-determination: subsidiarity 
In considering the draft convention against Anaya’s subsidiarity 
precepts, it is prudent to consider the textual flaws of articles 16(2) and 
36(3), the provisions of the draft that provide the right to withhold 
consent.465 Heinämäki notes that “the content and scope of the draft’s 
negotiation requirements are formulated in a loose and unclear manner 
which could prove to be problematic.”466 As discussed, under article 16(2), 
                                               
465 It must be borne in mind that the author analyses an English translation of the draft 
Nordic Sami Convention, instead of the various Scandinavian versions. Thus, there are 
likely to be some minor differences in the precise textual meanings. Nonetheless, the 
issues discussed here are not simply minor translational matters, but relate to 
substantive gaps in the document itself. 
466 Heinämäki, above n 456 at 137. 







it is not known what types of measures would be considered to be of ‘major 
importance to the Sami’ or to ‘significantly damage’ Sami culture, 
livelihoods or society. Or, under article 36(3), what proposals would make 
it impossible or substantially more difficult for the Sami to continue to 
utilize the areas concerned (provided the utilization is essential to the Sami 
culture)?467 There are likely to be differences of opinion regarding the 
standard of proof that would apply for such decisions (with the Sami likely 
to promote a low threshold and the state vice-versa). A key point is the 
question of who decides whether a proposal is serious enough to warrant 
the right to withhold consent, i.e. whether this is a unilateral decision of 
the Sami parliament or a central government body.  It is also unclear as to 
what criteria will be applied in making this decision, i.e. whether it is an 
objective or subjective test (or mixed). It is not explicit as to who may 
provide the consent on behalf of “affected Saami” under article 36(3). Nor 
is clear what decision-making body would adjudicate disputes arising out 
of these matters.  
 
These are crucial uncertainties, particularly when considering the 
mechanism against Anaya’s subsidiarity requirements. If these decisions 
are able to be adjudicated by the Sami then the relativistic model of the 
draft convention enables the expression of indigenous subsidiarity to a high 
                                               
467 However, consultation rights in such cases will likely crystallise (discussed below). 







degree in cases involving a ‘major’ adverse impact on Sami interests of 
high importance. As Åhren points out, the approach affords the Sami a 
greater level of agency in environmental decision-making relative to the 
impact that the decision will have on them and their ways of life. For highly 
invasive proposals, this approach encourages decision-making at a very 
local level.  If, however, the decisions are to be made by public authorities, 
however, then the sliding scale mechanism is less noteworthy for its 
adherence to indigenous subsidiarity precepts. Further, proposals which 
affect the Sami less, or relate to a Sami interest of lesser importance, will 
attract a lower level of participation in the ultimate decision (i.e. a right to 
receive notice of such proposals, a right to be represented on the decision-
making board, or a right to provide their views to the decision-making 
panel). Subsidiarity principles are applied to a lesser extent in situations 
where the proposal will have less impact on the Sami. In such cases, the 
Sami will have little influence over the outcome.  
 
Ongoing self-determination: cultural pluralism 
The relativistic approach of the draft Nordic Sami convention can 
also be considered against the cultural pluralism heading. Where proposals 
will have a highly adverse effect on highly important Sami interests, the 
convention promotes an approach that values and provides for the 
protection of Sami ways of life, Sami culture, Sami economies and Sami 







social considerations. However, as discussed, under the wording of the 
2005 draft it is not known who or what institution decides whether a matter 
is of high importance for the Sami, or whether a development proposal will 
have a high impact on the Sami (culturally, economically or socially). This 
further means that it is not known what considerations the decision-maker 
is able to take into account in making these decisions (i.e. whether 
Scandinavian civil law (i.e. ‘positive’ law promulgated by the legislature) 
take precedence or whether Sami law can be considered). The principle of 
cultural pluralism would be upheld if the decision-maker is able to apply 
wholly Sami derived conceptions of the law. Although, this seems unlikely 
as the draft convention will ultimately be interpreted and applied by the 
governments of the Nordic states. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the 
application of the Nordic Sami convention will reflect the unique cultural 
characteristics or preferences of the Sami people, as required by Anaya’s 
ongoing self-determination framework. 
 
In summary, this section has demonstrated that the processes leading 
to the draft Nordic Sami convention are insightful for their relative 
adherence to the constitutive self-determination norm (when compared 
against other models analysed in this thesis), as the Sami were highly 
involved in the drafting of the draft convention. Further, the sliding scale 
approach ensures that the Sami assume a high level of decision-making 
where decisions will have a major impact on them. This is insightful for 







the implementation of the subsidiarity principle in other contexts. The draft 
convention is less noteworthy for its application of the cultural pluralism 
aspect of Anaya’s framework.  
 
The chapter will now consider various models that apply to the 
Aboriginal peoples of Canada. 
 







III  Canada’s Aboriginal Law 
A Introduction 
This section analyses aspects of the legal framework of Aboriginal468 
self-determination in Canada. First, the historical development of the 
contemporary self-government arrangements is discussed. While there are 
multiple models of indigenous self-determination applied in Canada, this 
section focuses on First Nations band governments constituted under the 
Indian Act 1876469 for an analysis of a practical structure of indigenous 
autonomy (i.e. a control model). It then considers the more abstract concept 
of the common law duty to consult and accommodate. The section 
ultimately concludes that while both mechanisms are poor examples of 
indigenous self-determination for various reasons, the duty to consult and 
accommodate offers some insights around how both indigenous and non-
indigenous interests can be balanced to give expression to indigenous self-
determination. 
B Canada’s aboriginal peoples 
Unlike Scandinavia and Aotearoa, Canada has many different 
indigenous groups which comprise the catch-all term ‘Aboriginal’. For 
administrative purposes these groups are divided into three sub-groups: 
                                               
468 For consistency with the Canadian scholarship, the thesis uses the term ‘Aboriginal’ 
when broadly referring to the collective Indigenous Peoples of Canada. 
469 Indian Act 1876 (Canada) [Indian Act]. 







‘Indians’ (or First Nations), Inuit and Metis. Within each grouping there 
exists many distinct linguistic, ethnic and cultural groups, such as 
“Mi’kmaw, Innu, Inuit, Cree, Lakota, Dene, Haida, and many others who 
were established societies when Europeans arrived about 500 years 
ago.”470 There are approximately ten linguistic families and over fifty 
distinct languages amongst the Aboriginal population.471 When settlers 
arrived Aboriginal groups lived in organised societies with sophisticated 
legal, political and economic systems, and various governance systems 
which reflected their diverse cultures and spiritual beliefs.472 
 
Beyond the initial contact period and as European colonisation 
became systematic Aboriginal peoples endured a similar fate to other 
Indigenous Peoples globally, involving land loss, displacement, cultural 
genocide, the erosion of traditional institutions, assimilation and 
‘civilisation’. Today, unfortunately, the statistics regarding Aboriginals 
make for poor reading: “no matter how statistics are evaluated or assessed, 
Aboriginal peoples as a group remain at the bottom of the socio-economic 
                                               
470 Frances Abele and Michael J. Prince “Four Pathways to Aboriginal Self-Government 
in Canada” 2006 36(4) American Review of Canadian Studies. 
471 Bradford Morse “Common roots but modern divergences: aboriginal policies in 
Canada and the United States(Indigenous Renascence: Law, Culture & Society in the 
21st Century)” 1997 10(1) St. Thomas Law Review. 
472 See, for example, the Canadian Supreme Court’s overview of this history in Calder v 
British Columbia (AG) [1973] SCR 313; Morse n 471. 







heap.”473 As of 2016 approximately 5% of the Canadian population 
identifies as Aboriginal (1,673,000), 58.4% of which is First Nations, 
35.1% is Metis and 3.9% are Inuit.474 
 
Aboriginal Canadian models of self-determination are assessed 
because of the wide array of arrangements that exist and the territorial 
delineation of the jurisdiction. Aboriginal self-determination has been 
shaped by the British colonial experience in a similar way to Aotearoa. 
Unlike Aotearoa and the Nordic states, however, Canada is a federal state. 
Federalism was adopted due to political and cultural realities in 1867 (i.e. 
strong British and French communities).475 Furthermore, Aboriginal and 
treaty rights are protected under Canada’s constitution (unlike Māori rights 
in Aotearoa). This section examines these ideas further, but first, the 
historical development of the current Aboriginal self-government 
arrangements is explored. 
                                               
473 Comparative to other sections of the population, Aboriginals face high unemployment, 
low life expectancy, high suicide rates, high welfare and infant mortality rates, high 
teenage pregnancy rates, a high rate of alcohol-related deaths, high rates of domestic 
abuse, and high incarceration rates etc. See Roger Maaka and Augie Fleras The politics 
of indigeneity: challenging the state in Canada and Aotearoa New Zealand (University 
of Otago Press, Dunedin, N.Z, 2005) at 165. Also see John H. Hylton Aboriginal self-
government in Canada: current trends and issues (Purich Pub, Saskatoon, 1994). 
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C Aboriginal self-determination: background 
Prior to European contact, Canadian Aboriginal peoples lived under 
their own systems of government and legal traditions/customs. In the initial 
period of European contact, Aboriginal self-determination was respected 
by the newcomers whom mostly lived symbiotically with the Aboriginal 
residents, and often forming military alliances (particularly as the British 
and French sought to establish their dominance in the continent). 
Commentators argue that the Royal Proclamation 1763 exemplifies this 
approach by dealing with the Aboriginal peoples on a sovereign nation-to-
nation basis and providing that pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty and 
rights ought to be respected. Interpreted in accordance with Aboriginal 
custom, various commentators argue the Proclamation set out an 
agreement respecting the self-governing nature (or ‘sovereignty’) of 
Aboriginal communities.476 At the same time, a number of treaties were 
drafted and signed between the British and Aboriginal communities 
(before and after confederation in 1867). These generally provided for the 
cession of Aboriginal land in return for reserve lands, rights to hunt and 
fish and various other inducements.477 
                                               
476 See John Borrows “Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal 
History, and Self-Government” in Michael Asch (ed) Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in 
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Canada, 2002); Peter Russell “Indigenous Self-Determination: Is Canada as Good as it 
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Indigenous Self-Determination (Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra, Australia, 2005); 
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Respect for Aboriginal self-determination soon dissipated as the 
balance of power shifted in favour of the settlers, exemplified by a steady 
increase in population and military capacity.478 Europeans steadily began 
to extend their influence over the internal affairs of Aboriginal society and 
their traditional lands and resources. At this time, the settler government’s 
laws and policies reflected the dominant social theories which classed 
Aboriginals as uncivilised savages in need of guidance from ‘higher 
civilisations.’479 Such views pervaded Aboriginal law and policy for many 
years, leading to an erosion of Aboriginal self-determination (and by 
extension, Aboriginal cultures, societies and economies) and an imposition 
of foreign governance and legal institutions. This is exemplified by the 
Indian Act 1876, which has been described as a means to eliminate the 
political structures of Indian peoples.480 The Indian Act, which 
consolidated the existing laws relating to ‘Indians,’ was passed pursuant to 
the federal government’s exclusive jurisdiction over Aboriginal peoples 
provided under the Constitution Act 1867.481 According to Maaka and 
                                               
478 Russell, above n 476. 
479 Ian Ward and Peter Ward Introduction to critical legal theory (2nd ed, Taylor & 
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481 Section 91(24), Constitution Act 1867 (Canada). Then known as the “British North 
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Fleras, the Indian Act had three key functions: (1) to ‘civilise’ Indians;482 
(2) to better manage Indian individuals, their lands and their resources; and 
(3) to define which Indians were entitled to federal resources.483 It achieved 
this by usurping Aboriginal authority and replacing it with federal 
jurisdiction, governing “almost all aspects of Aboriginal life on Canadian 
Indian reserves.”484 The initial version of the Indian Act brought major 
changes to First Nation societies, which were previously governed by the 
pre-contact Aboriginal institutions, legal traditions and value systems. It 
addressed governance structures (by introducing the band system), rules 
for on reserve taxation, the creation of reserve bylaws, band membership 
(a legal definition of ‘Indian’ was imposed based on blood quantum), and 
the creation of a Lockean system of property rights.485 Under the 
legislation, band governments faced a high level of federal oversight in 
their management of reserve lands and resources. While elected band 
councils were delegated some autonomous powers over reserves, federal 
authorisation was (and still is) required in many circumstances of on-
reserve resource use (e.g. leasing, timber development, agricultural 
                                               
482 For example, through the infamous ‘residential school’ system, which was designed to 
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483 Maaka and Fleras, above n 473. 
484 Christopher Alcantara “To Treaty or Not to Treaty? Aboriginal Peoples and 
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production).486 In spite of many amendments, the Indian Act is still in force 
today and many of the issues caused by its paternal nature remain extant.487 
 
The assimilationist paradigm of Aboriginal law and policy, 
demonstrated by the Indian Act, began to shift in the mid-twentieth century 
with the conclusion of two world wars and a global push for the universal 
application of the principles of freedom, equality and human rights. Liberal 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau was elected in 1968 on a policy platform of 
Aboriginal ‘desegregation’ and absolute equality before the law.488 In 1969 
his now infamous ‘White Paper’ was released proposing to repeal the 
Indian Act, eliminate Indian status, divide up reserves, terminate treaties 
and dismantle the Department of Indian Affairs. The regressive proposals 
were met with strong opposition by the Aboriginal sectors of society and 
sparked nationwide Aboriginal mobilisation and unification. Somewhat 
paradoxically, the White Paper influenced a further paradigm change in 
Aboriginal law and policy in the 1970s toward the recognition of the 
Aboriginal right to self-government.489 In 1973, the Supreme Court 
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delivered its judgment in Calder v British Columbia,490 recognising in 
Canadian law the common law doctrine of Aboriginal rights, and opening 
the door for the recognition of an inherent Aboriginal right to self-
government.491 At the same time, momentum was building for a significant 
constitutional adjustment, which was eventually provided for in the new 
Constitution Act 1982.492 The 1982 Act became supreme law and set out 
the machinery of government in Canada. Significantly, section 35(1) 
states: “The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples 
of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.” While the provision does 
not define the content of those Aboriginal rights, the 1983 ‘Penner Report’ 
concluded that it must encompass a right to self-government.493 A 
referendum to have this recognised and entrenched in the constitution 
failed, but in 1995 the federal government released a policy framework 
regarding the implementation of the inherent right to self-government.494 
In spite of the introduction of the self-government policy framework, the 
Indian Act remains in force and sets out the governing framework for the 
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majority of First Nations communities. That is, unless and until they opt-
out of parts of the legislation, or they negotiate comprehensive self-
government (e.g. Nisga’a) or public government arrangements (e.g. 
Nunavut), as discussed below. 
 
Today, therefore, three general categories of Aboriginal self-
determination (over land and resources) can be identified in Canada: (1) 
modern self-government treaties,495 based on an inherent Aboriginal right 
to self-government;496 (2) public government;497 and (3) arrangements 
                                               
495 Negotiated arrangements based on the 1995 federal government’s self-government 
policy framework, which derives from a loose acknowledgment by the federal 
government of an inherent Aboriginal right to self-government. The policy enables, 
through negotiation, the creation of exclusive domains of Aboriginal jurisdiction over 
matters which concern their collective survival as a people. The policy cannot be 
unilaterally invoked or enforced by First Nations through the courts. The  Nisga’a Final 
Agreement (1998) is one of few arrangements concluded under this policy. Under the 
agreement, the Nisga’a people obtain the right to legislate and control certain matters 
within their reserve lands (e.g. culture, language, membership and property). Although, 
the power is not comprehensive and exclusive federal jurisdiction remains in place for 
matters such as crime, health, education and child welfare. Such arrangements are not 
constitutionally protected and could easily be revoked by the executive/legislature if the 
political will existed.  
496 See R v Pamajewon [1996] 2 SCR 821, where an inherent Aboriginal right to self-
government was pleaded (encompassing a right to regulate high stakes gambling on 
reserve). The Supreme Court of Canada applied the Van der Peet test for recognition of 
Aboriginal rights (the claimed right must be integral and central to the Aboriginal 
people’s distinct culture): R v van der Peet [1996] 2 SCR 507. The case failed as the 
claim was couched too broadly. 
497 Arrangements where Aboriginal groups obtain expression of their inherent right to 
self-government through accommodations within the existing constitutional and local 
government structures. One example is the creation of the Nunavut Territory for the 
Inuit people under the  Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (1993). This agreement led to 
the partition of the Northwest Territories in order to create a territory where the majority 
population would be Inuit. The territorial government has the same powers of local 
government afforded to other territories The vast territory has a population of 37,000, 
and some 30,000 residents claimed Inuit ancestry in the 2016 census (Statistics Canada 
“Census Profile, 2016 census” (2017) http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-
recensement/2016/dp-pd/prof/index.cfm?Lang=E 
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under the Indian Act. It is not possible to analyse all three categories in any 
detail given the word restrictions of this project. Instead, the section 
focuses on the operation of the Indian Act and its ability to give expression 
to the self-determination of First Nations peoples. The section concludes 
that the Indian Act framework itself is, in many ways, problematic and 
antithetical to the realisation of Aboriginal self-determination. 
D Indian Act: enabler of self-determination? 
The Indian Act and the system of governance and control it imposed 
on ‘Indians’, their way of life and their lands/resources, was introduced 
above. This section explores the framework further and considers the 
extent at which it provides for indigenous self-determination (if at all), and 
whether any insights can be obtained for future Aotearoa models. First, a 
brief overview of the general features of the legislation is required. 
1 Background 
While the Indian Act does not apply to Metis or Inuit peoples, the 
Indian Act has had a significant bearing on the lives of First Nation peoples 
whom belong to one of more than 600 federally recognised bands, or 
whom reside on one of the 2,800 reserves (comprising approximately 0.5% 
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of Canada’s territory).498 The Indian Act imposed the band as the mode of 
reserve governance, which, together with the minister499 and the Governor-
in-Council, acts as a system of local government, without the need for a 
municipality. The band council comprises democratically elected 
representatives and a chief. Through the Indian Act the federal government 
also imposed a statutory definition for ‘Indian’, thereby preventing First 
Nations communities from determining their own membership criteria in 
accordance with their own legal traditions. The Indian Act and the 
framework it creates is not constitutionally protected. 
 
The underlying governance scheme of the Indian Act can be seen 
through several of its sections, particularly those that relate to 
land/resource use on reserve. It is immediately demonstrable that the 
federal government has a lot of authority and oversight over the 
management of reserve resources. First Nation bands are at the mercy of 
the federal government in most instances of on-reserve resource 
development. First, the Minister500 can direct that certain reserve lands be 
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created out of the dissolution of Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC). 
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used for schools, administration, burial grounds, health projects etc.501 The 
Minister can also determine the general plan and layout of the reserve by 
planning, subdividing and determining the location of roads.502 Under 
section 60 the Minister may, at the band’s request, grant the band a right 
to control and manage the reserve, but this right may be withdrawn at any 
time. Under section 71 the Minister can operate farms without the consent 
of the band. Any transactions of agricultural goods from Indians to non-
Indians are void unless written approval is given by INAC.503 The removal 
of minerals, stone, sand, gravel, clay, soil, trees, timber, cordwood or hay 
from reserves is prohibited without ministerial approval.504 INAC controls 
the regulation of both timber cutting licences505 and oil and gas 
resources.506 As Sanderson says, “Indians can sell neither the produce of 
their farms, nor the naturally occurring wealth of their reserve lands 
without ministerial approval.”507 
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While the federal government is heavily involved in the regulation 
of land use, resource management and economic development on reserves, 
First Nation governments are, under the Indian Act, given some limited 
powers to create laws governing these matters. The powers conferred on 
bands are similar to those provided to municipal governments. Bands may 
promulgate bylaws over certain on-reserve matters such as: health, traffic, 
law and order, trespass, animal control, public works and infrastructure, 
land allotment, zoning and building regulation, agriculture, wildlife 
management and commercial activities (inter alia).508 Bands may also 
make bylaws in respect of on-reserve taxation.509 The powers closely 
resemble those given to municipal governments under provincial 
legislation, but ultimately bands operate with less independence and power 
than municipalities due to the high level of federal oversight.510 Again, the 
authority to make bylaws is not constitutionally protected: it is delegated 
by legislation and exercised under close supervision of the federal 
government. Until 2014 the Minister had the power to veto all bylaws 
made by band governments under section 81.511 The following section 
critiques the Indian Act against Anaya’s self-determination framework. 
                                               
508 Section 81. 
509 Section 83. 
510 Abele and Prince, above n 470. See also Jack Woodward Native Law (Carswell, 
Toronto, 1989). 
511 The right to establish bylaws relating to taxation remains subject to ministerial 
approval. 







2 Analysis against Anaya’s framework 
Constitutive and ongoing self-determination (subsidiarity and cultural 
pluralism) 
The 141-year-old legal framework governing First Nation reserves 
is a poor example of indigenous rights by any measure. It would be difficult 
to conclude that the Indian Act positively contributes to the realisation of 
First Nations’ self-determination, particularly when viewed against 
Anaya’s constitutive and ongoing self-determination. As Metallic says:512 
 
Certainly, both the dark history of the Indian Act as a tool for 
assimilation and the status of by-laws as a form of ‘delegated’ 
governance powers make the prospect of using the Indian Act to 
advance self-government somewhat unpalatable. 
 
The Indian Act is very much a creature of its time, reflecting many 
of the paternal and assimilationist leanings of 1876 Anglo-European 
colonial thought. As discussed, the Indian Act imposed a Western designed 
scheme of governance on First Nation peoples, which was designed to 
remove and replace the pre-contact traditional institutions of indigenous 
governance. First Nations groups were not involved in the development of 
the law, an archetypal breach of the constitutive self-determination frame. 
As a tool of assimilation, the legislation directly promoted the erosion of 
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traditional indigenous notions of resource management, which has strongly 
prevented First Nation peoples from pursuing their cultural development. 
This is the antithesis of the cultural pluralism principle. 
 
Until very recently almost every aspect of Indian life on reserve was 
regulated by the federal government. This included many decisions 
relating to land use, resource management, primary industry development, 
and many other matters relating to the governance or lands, resources and 
‘status-Indians’ themselves. Under the Indian Act, federal approval is 
required for many decisions relating to the use of reserve lands and 
resources (for example, leasing; trading agricultural goods with non-
Indians; logging). The high level of oversight creates inefficiencies in 
reserve economies by increasing compliance requirements and transaction 
costs. Many commentators have argued that the status quo therefore 
prevents the economic development of First Nations peoples: in spite of a 
desire to improve the lives of their nation members, they are hamstrung by 
a legal framework which inhibits their ability to be competitive participants 
in the market economy.513 In some ways First Nation governments are 
afforded similar powers to those of municipalities under provincial 
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legislation: they are empowered to create local bylaws relating to taxation, 
zoning, building regulation, and traffic management etc. However, these 
powers are subject to a high level of scrutiny and oversight by the federal 
government, which retained the power to veto First Nation bylaws until 
2014.514 While the scheme ensures some autonomy over administrative 
matters, ultimately it constrains the development of First Nations 
(culturally, economically, socially). In many ways, the system embodies 
the antithesis of indigenous subsidiarity and cultural pluralism, and 
therefore, Aotearoa has very little to learn and gain from the Indian Act 
framework regarding the implementing indigenous self-determination. To 
conclude this point, the Indian Act does not enable Aboriginal Canadians 
subject to its provisions to develop and make meaningful choices about 
their economic, social and cultural development. 
 
Mohawk scholar Taiaiake Alfred sums up this point accurately in the 
author’s view:515 
 
In terms of solving the problems, it is not so much the types of rules 
that govern the band council that are the problem; it is the whole 
band council system itself. What it does is serve as the main obstacle 
to the recovery of our power, which is born out of the unity of our 
people and is most accurately expressed in our traditional forms of 
government. 
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E Duty to Consult and Accommodate Aboriginal Interests 
While the Indian Act system offers very little assistance to the 
operationalisation of indigenous self-determination in Aotearoa, Canada’s 
common law ‘duty to consult and, where appropriate, accommodate,’ 
(‘duty to consult’) does have the potential to offer insights for this task. As 
noted, the thesis contends that a number of principles need to be satisfied 
to ensure a proposed self-determination model is both compliant with the 
international norm and sustainable. The model must: (1) be formed through 
processes embodying indigenous participation (constitutive self-
determination); and (2) embody the concepts of indigenous subsidiarity 
and cultural pluralism (ongoing self-determination).516 A further theme 
that emerges from the comparative analysis is that, to be sustainable, the 
model needs to adequately balance and give expression to indigenous and 
non-indigenous interests. In other words, given the large population of 
non-indigenous people and interests in modern liberal states, how can the 
various interests (indigenous and non-indigenous) be balanced in a way 
that enables the meaningful and lasting expression of indigenous interests 
(to the extent that the two conflict)?517 This section will analyse the duty 
to consult generally and then consider whether this Canadian doctrine 
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offers some conceptual insights to this issue for future self-determination 
models in Aotearoa. 
1 Background 
The duty to consult is a common law doctrine developed by the 
Canadian judiciary and is most clearly articulated in two seminal Canadian 
Supreme Court cases: Haida Nation518 and Taku River Tlingit.519 The duty 
to consult is grounded in the principle of the ‘honour of the Crown’, 
recognised by the courts as developing out of the need to reconcile the 
British assertion of sovereignty with the interests of pre-existing aboriginal 
societies.520 Pursuant to the honour of the Crown doctrine, the Crown must 
be ‘honourable’ in all of its dealings with aboriginal peoples (including the 
assertion of sovereignty, the negotiation of modern land claim treaties and 
the recognition of aboriginal rights and interests); ‘sharp dealing’ is 
prohibited. The rationale for the honour of the Crown is to achieve 
reconciliation, which triggers differing duties in different circumstances.521 
For example, where the Crown voluntarily assumes discretionary control 
over specific aboriginal interests, fiduciary duties arise, and the Crown 
must act in the best interests of the aboriginal people in exercising that 
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discretion. Whereas, where an aboriginal right or title claim has been 
asserted, but not yet recognised, no fiduciary duty arises (i.e. where a first 
nation claims aboriginal title over land that is presently owned in fee 
simply by the provincial government, but this claim has not yet been 
finalised or upheld). In such cases, the duty to consult can be invoked to 
protect the subject of the claim from irreversible exploitation (for example, 
a large stockpile of virgin timber).522 As the Supreme Court said in Haida 
Nation:523 
It is a corollary of s. 35 that the Crown act honourably in defining 
rights it guarantees and in reconciling them with other rights and 
interests. This, in turn, implies a duty to consult and, if appropriate, 
accommodate. 
 
Accordingly, the duty to consult, which applies to both federal and 
provincial governments, arises when the Crown has knowledge of the 
existence of an aboriginal right or title and proposes conduct/actions that 
may adversely affect that right or title (i.e. the granting of forestry 
licences).524 In such cases, as the Supreme Court states: “… the Crown, 
acting honourably, cannot cavalierly run roughshod over Aboriginal 
interests where claims affecting those interests are being seriously pursued 
in the process of treaty negotiation and proof.”525 
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Importantly for this thesis, precisely what the duty to consult requires 
the Crown to do (i.e. the scope and content of the duty) varies with the 
circumstances, namely, the strength of the claim to the asserted aboriginal 
interest, and the extent that the interests will be adversely impacted by the 
proposed action or activity.526 This results in what can be described as a 
spectrum of consultation where if an aboriginal group has a strong prima 
facie case to the asserted right, and the proposed activity will have a large 
impact on that right, a higher level of consultation is likely to be required. 
This could entail “deep consultation, aimed at finding a satisfactory interim 
solution,” i.e.:527 
… the opportunity to make submissions for consideration, formal 
participation in the decision-making process and provision of written 
reasons to show that Aboriginal concerns were considered and to 
reveal the impact they had on the decisions. 
 
Whereas, at the other end of the spectrum, where the claim to the 
right is perceived as ‘weak’ and/or the potential infringement on that right 
is minor, a lower level of consultation will be warranted. In those cases, 
“the only duty on the Crown may be to give notice, disclose information, 
and discuss any issues raised in response to the notice.”528 The overall 
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question in all cases will be whether the Crown’s honour is maintained and 
whether the process gives expression to the reconciliation envisaged by 
section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982. Upholding the honour of the 
Crown may require the accommodation of aboriginal interests in certain 
cases, bearing in mind the various indigenous and non-indigenous interests 
that exist. 
 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Delgamuukw argued that the 
duty to consult could, in some cases, “require the full consent of an 
aboriginal nation…”.529 However, Haida Nation clarified that this does not 
entail a general veto right over what can be done on the land subject to an 
aboriginal rights claim pending formal recognition of that right. Aboriginal 
consent may only be required where aboriginal title or rights have been 
formally recognised: “Rather, what is required is a process of balancing 
interests, of give and take.”530 
2 Analysis against Anaya’s framework 
Overall, the duty to consult is an ‘influence mechanism’ in terms of 
the conceptual schema adopted by the Waitangi Tribunal in its Ko 
Aotearoa Tenei report, as it does not allow for unilateral or joint decision 
making by aboriginal peoples over resources, but it does allow for some 
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influence over decisions relating to resources that are subject to 
outstanding aboriginal rights claims.531 
 
Constitutive self-determination 
In terms of Anaya’s constitutive self-determination, the duty to 
consult is a common law doctrine that is interpreted and applied by the 
judicial and executive wings of government. Of relevance here is the 
ability for aboriginal peoples to invoke the mechanism and to have it 
upheld by the third-party decision-maker (in respect of asserted aboriginal 
tile/rights). Aboriginal groups are effectively at the mercy of executive and 
judicial bodies whom they must first satisfy that the relevant legal test has 
been met. When the claim is made through litigation, aboriginal groups 
must provide adequate evidence of their pre-existing aboriginal rights and 
meet the relevant evidential thresholds to convince the court that the 
Crown should be held to the duty to consult. Accordingly, it is difficult for 
Aboriginal peoples to receive the benefit of this mechanism as its 
interpretation, application and the parametres of the scope/content are all 
decided by third party, non-indigenous groups, and aboriginal peoples 
must expend a lot of time and resources in the pursuit of such claims. For 
these reasons, the invocation of the duty to consult at the level of individual 
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cases is unlikely to comply with Anaya’s constitutive self-determination 
principle. 
 
Ongoing self-determination: subsidiarity 
In terms of Anaya’s ongoing self-determination, the duty to consult 
offers some noteworthy insights. The duty to consult is similar to the draft 
Nordic Sami Convention (discussed at the beginning of this chapter) in that 
it embodies a ‘relativistic’ or ‘sliding scale’ approach to managing 
resources by balancing the various interests that are associated with 
particular resources. For example, the level of consultation required under 
the duty is dependent upon an assessment of the strength of the underlying 
aboriginal claim, the importance of the subject matter to the aboriginal 
group, and the extent at which the right will be adversely affected by the 
proposed activity. Beyond this, the question as to whether aboriginal 
interests should be accommodated requires the Crown to balance all 
relevant indigenous and non-indigenous interests. As the Supreme Court 
stated in the Haida Nation case:532 
Where accommodation is required in making decisions that may 
adversely affect as yet unproven Aboriginal rights and title claims, 
the Crown must balance Aboriginal concerns reasonably with the 
potential impact of the decision on the asserted right or title and with 
other societal interests. 
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This approach recognises that while underlying aboriginal interests 
should be given expression in certain resource management decisions, 
there are non-indigenous interests that, in some cases, might legitimately 
require expression in the decision-making process as well. To extrapolate, 
the approach is insightful for the implementation of self-determination as 
it recognises that the long-term sustainability of a notional self-
determination model is dependent upon the consideration of, and provision 
for, all relevant interests (indigenous and non-indigenous). To use Anaya’s 
terms, if the institutional framework encompassing the self-determination 
model is not sustainable then it cannot empower individuals and groups to 
develop and make meaningful choices in all spheres of life (the core 
rationale for the ongoing self-determination principle). These conceptual 
underpinnings of the duty to consult will be considered in further detail in 
chapter 6 where a framework for implementing self-determination in 
Aotearoa in future is discussed. 
 
Aside from these considerations, the duty to consult enables some 
indigenous agency in environmental decision-making, by providing that a 
high level of consultation should be undertaken by the Crown when there 
is a strong case for the underlying aboriginal right/title, and where the 
proposed activity will have a high impact on that underlying interest. The 
case law has deliberately not defined the boundaries of these concepts (i.e. 
what is a ‘strong case’ and what is a ‘high impact’). However, in cases 







where aboriginal groups are unable to satisfy the executive or judicial 
decision-maker that they have a strong case for the underlying interests, a 
much weaker form of consultation will be allowable. This is problematic 
and a clear limitation regarding the utility of the duty to consult for the 
expression of indigenous self-determination. 
 
Ongoing self-determination: cultural pluralism 
The duty to consult has little to offer under the cultural pluralism 
heading of Anaya’s ongoing self-determination framework. While it is 
related to the common law doctrine of aboriginal title/rights (which enables 
recognition of underlying aboriginal interests that existed prior to the 
assertion of European sovereignty), that doctrine itself is derived from non-
indigenous, liberal conceptions of the law. Indigenous understandings or 
systems of law are not given expression under this framework as the 
executive or judicial body that is applying the duty to consult does not 
consider the matter through the lens of pre-European aboriginal 
conceptions of law. 







IV  Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has two key foci: (1) to consider various foreign legal 
frameworks against Anaya’s framework to determine whether they are 
complying with the self-determination norm; and (2) to consider whether 
any insights can be obtained from these examples to inform the way that 
indigenous self-determination can be operationalised in Aotearoa in future. 
The chapter explored two case studies: the Sami in Scandinavia and the 
Aboriginal peoples of Canada. These examples were selected to enable a 
wide range of perspectives to be considered, given the varied and rich 
contexts associated with each. Within each case study, various historical 
institutional structures, and more recent legal developments, were analysed 
against Anaya’s framework (developed in chapter 1). 
 
An analysis based on comparative law methodologies is useful as it 
considers whether any legal insights can be obtained from external 
jurisdictions to assist with answering the research questions of the thesis. 
In this case, the thesis considers how indigenous self-determination might 
be operationalised in Aotearoa in the future. As such, this chapter 
considered the extent that selected jurisdictions are currently giving 
expression to the indigenous self-determination norm. To the extent that 
the jurisdictions are giving adequate expression to the norm, the normative 
assessments can be adapted to enrich the current understandings about how 







the right is, or might in future be, implemented in Aotearoa. Similarly, 
Aotearoa can learn from the aspects of the studied models that are 
archetypal breaches of self-determination. 
 
The chapter considered the Norwegian Sami parliament and its 
interactions with the institutions of the Finnmark Act and the Planning and 
Building Act. It was positively noted that a high level of consultation was 
undertaken in the lead up to the passage of both pieces of legislation. The 
‘consultation agreement’ between Sami and the Norwegian state was also 
produced from these processes. Aotearoa has a lot to learn from Norway’s 
adherence to the constitutive self-determination principle. Although, this 
course of action was highly influenced by Norway’s ratification of the 
ILO’ Convention 169, which entails binding legal requirements in respect 
of indigenous consultation where policy and law development will affect 
indigenous interests. Aotearoa should ratify this convention and reconsider 
the way that Māori are consulted in the legislative/policy drafting 
processes. 
 
Under the ongoing self-determination frame, it was demonstrated 
that the Norwegian Sami parliament is able to incorporate the views of its 
people and matters of cultural/economic importance into various decision-
making fora through mechanisms such as the guidelines for changes in 
uncultivated land use in Finnmark, and objections to community planning 







proposals. While this form of participation is positive, it falls short of 
affording the Sami any meaningful level of autonomy over land use or 
resource management decisions. The locus of decision-making in these 
contexts ultimately lies with the non-Sami public authorities and these are 
merely ‘influence’ models (in terms of the Wai 262 schema). Any 
objections lodged by the Sami under these processes are ultimately subject 
to the state’s final decision power. Further, these Norwegian frameworks 
fail to adhere to Anaya’s cultural pluralism requirements. 
 
This chapter demonstrated that the Indian Act framework was the 
archetypal breach of both Anaya’s constitutive and ongoing self-
determination. The Indian Act revolutionised the way that First Nations 
people and their lands were governed by imposing the reserve and band 
council systems, thereby removing Aboriginal systems of law and 
governance. Today, the 1876 legislation retains the majority of its original 
assimilationist and paternal leanings. The majority of decisions regarding 
life on reserve and the use of lands and resources attract at least some form 
of oversight from the federal government. As Sanderson notes, “Indians 
can sell neither the produce of their farms, nor the naturally occurring 
wealth of their reserve lands without ministerial approval.”533 As such, 
indigenous subsidiarity and agency is almost non-existent under the band 
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system. The power to make bylaws under sections 81 and 83 does not 
render this diagnosis any more favourable – the power is narrowly 
prescribed by the federal government (instead of a recognition of inherent 
authority), and until 2014, the federal government retained the power to 
veto any bylaws promulgated under section 81.534 Ultimately, the Indian 
Act framework embodies the antithesis of indigenous subsidiarity and 
cultural pluralism, and, when viewed against Anaya’s framework, it fails 
to register as a meaningful form of self-determination. Hence, it offers 
minimal insights for the implementation of self-determination in Aotearoa. 
 
In addition to the above institutional structures the chapter analysed 
various recent legal developments for each case study: the relativistic 
approach embodied in the draft Nordic Sami Convention and Canada’s 
common law duty to consult and accommodate. 
 
The processes leading to the drafting of the draft Nordic Sami 
convention are strongly reflective of Anaya’s constitutive self-
determination. As discussed, the Sami comprised 50% of the drafting 
panel, and the convention provides that its ratification is conditional upon 
Sami assent. The Scandinavian states have come a long way from the 
historical approach of Western governments i.e. the unilateral imposition 
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of law and policy on indigenous peoples without extending any agency to 
those peoples in the process. Aotearoa has much to learn from these 
inclusive approaches. 
 
The chapter also demonstrated that the form and functioning of the 
draft Nordic Sami convention is strongly insightful for its adherence to the 
subsidiarity principle. While there are some uncertainties that arise from 
the ambiguous wording of some provisions (i.e. when a proposal will 
‘significantly damage’ Sami culture, triggering the right to withhold 
consent), if these matters are ultimately interpreted in favour of the Sami 
then this mechanism will provide a level of influence over environmental 
decision-making relative to the level of impact on their interests (e.g. 
highly impactful projects will trigger a high level of Sami influence). This 
relativistic approach operationalises the right to free, prior and informed 
consent, giving effect to the ratio of the Poma Poma and Saramaka cases 
(discussed in chapter 1) i.e. that consent is required for ‘major impact’ 
proposals. The draft convention will enable the expression of Anaya’s 
understandings of subsidiarity, and, as Åhren maintains:535 
 
The [draft convention] is a unique project and instrument, also 
worthy of study beyond the Nordic context. It can serve as a model 
                                               
535 Mattias Åhren “Nigel Bankes and Timo Koivurova (eds.), review of The Proposed 
Nordic Saami Convention: National and International Dimensions of Indigenous 
Property Rights” 2014 32(3) Nordic Journal of Human Rights at 283. 







for contemporary, constructive arrangements between indigenous 
peoples and states around the world. 
 
Canada’s common law duty to consult, and, where appropriate, 
accommodate Aboriginal interests, is also insightful for a similar 
relativistic approach that it promotes. As with the draft Nordic convention, 
where a case involves strongly arguable indigenous interests the duty to 
consult requires a stronger level of protection of those interests (and vice 
versa). Such an approach recognises that the balancing of all extant 
interests is required in formulating a harmonious and lasting self-
determination model. In other words, indigenous peoples are not able to 
develop and make meaningful choices in all spheres of life (the key 
rationale for Anaya’s ongoing self-determination) unless the self-
determination model is sustainable, and sustainability is dependent upon a 
pragmatic approach that appropriately weighs all extant issues.






Chapter 5: Waitangi Tribunal and Ko Aotearoa 
Tenei: Potential Insights? 
I Chapter Introduction 
This chapter returns to the Aotearoa context and analyses a 
conceptual framework posited by the Waitangi Tribunal in its Wai 262 
report, known as Ko Aotearoa Tenei.536 The Wai 262 inquiry produced a 
‘whole of government’ report, the result of a comprehensive inquiry into 
“the place of Māori culture, identity and traditional knowledge in 
Aotearoa’s laws, and in government policies and practices.”537 A key focus 
of the tribunal in Wai 262 was an analysis of the environmental law 
framework against the requirements of the Treaty of Waitangi and its 
principles. To this end, the tribunal determined what it perceived to be the 
fundamental features of a Treaty of Waitangi compliant environmental law 
framework, one that adequately protects the interests of Māori kaitiaki.538 
                                               
536 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 227. 




538 The tribunal defines ‘kaitiakitanga’ as “the obligation, arising from the kin 
relationship, to nurture or care for a person or thing . it has a spiritual aspect, 
encompassing not only an obligation to care for and nurture not only physical well-
being but also mauri.” 
It continues in relation to ‘kaitiaki’: Kaitiaki can be spiritual guardians existing in non-
human form . They can include particular species that are said to care for a place or a 
community, warn of impending dangers and so on . every forest and swamp, every bay 
and reef, every tribe and village – indeed, everything of any importance at all in te ao 
Māori – has these spiritual kaitiaki . But people can (indeed, must) also be kaitiaki . in 
the human realm, those who have mana (or, to use treaty terminology, rangatiratanga) 






The conceptual framework developed by the tribunal, which prioritises the 
identification and balancing of all legitimate vested interests, is the focus 
of this chapter. As will be demonstrated below, the tribunal’s underlying 
approach is insightful when viewed against Anaya’s principles of 
indigenous self-determination, and should be adopted to assist the 
operationalisation of the norm in future. 
II   Waitangi Tribunal, Environmental Law and Te Tiriti 
A ‘Balancing test’ – overview 
As noted above, one key focus of the compendious Ko Aotearoa 
Tenei report was whether Aotearoa’s environmental management 
framework was compliant with the Treaty of Waitangi and its principles, 
namely, the requirement for the Crown to actively protect the relationship 
of kaitiaki over their taonga.539 In this portion of the claim inquiry, the 
claimants sought “Māori control of taonga Māori,”540 i.e. the ability to 
exercise authority over matters or resources of importance to them. 
Whereas, Crown counsel argued that the Crown/local authorities should 
                                               
must exercise it in accordance with the values of kaitiakitanga – to act unselfishly, with 
right mind and heart, and with proper procedure.” 
 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 227 at 17. 
539 The tribunal defines ‘taonga’ as follows: “Finally, where kaitiaki obligations exist, 
they do so in relation to taonga – that is, to anything that is treasured . taonga include 
tangible things such as land, waters, plants, wildlife, and cultural works ; and intangible 
things such as language, identity, and culture, including mātauranga Māori itself.” 
Waitangi Tribunal, above n 227 at 17. 
540 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 224 at 112. 






retain control of all decision-making affecting taonga, to the exclusion of 
Māori. The tribunal was tasked with reconciling these submissions and 
developing a workable framework to enable this to occur. 
 
The tribunal first considered that a clear understanding of the 
fundaments of the pre-European Māori resource management system, was 
required: “we must first understand the deep values that impel the Māori 
voice.”541 The tribunal noted that prior to European contact the principle 
of kaitiakitaka governed all resource management, and that this was based 
on a principle of whanaukataka:542 
Whanaungatanga is the basis on which the world is ordered, the 
organising principle of mātauranga Māori, the source of whakapapa, 
and the origin of all rights and obligations – including kaitiakitanga 
over the environment. 
 
These two fundamental concepts (kaitiakitaka and whanaukataka) 
interact in Māori environmental management “not necessarily by 
forbidding [resource] use, but by using them in ways that enhance rather 
than damage kin relationships.”543 Instead of the transactional and Lockean 
property rights focus of ‘western’ environmental management, kaitiakitaka 
                                               
541 At 105. 
542 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 227 at 267-269. The tribunal defines ‘whanaungatanga’ as 
a defining principle of kinship. It notes: “In te ao Māori, all of the myriad elements of 
creation – the living and the dead, the animate and inanimate – are seen as alive and 
inter-related. All are infused with mauri (that is, a living essence or spirit) and all are 
related through whakapapa.” At 17. 
543 At 269. 






is more akin to a familial relationship, that is “permanent and mandatory, 
binding both individuals and communities over generations and enduring 
as long as the community endures.”544 
 
This idea of a kinship relationship between humans and the natural 
world (or between kaitiaki and their taonga) was fundamental to the Māori 
system of resource management (as discussed in chapter 3). For the 
modern resource management system to be compliant with the 
requirements of Te Tiriti, this fundamental principle, the tribunal opined, 
had to be embodied in the framework. In other words, and using the 
language of the existing treaty principles,545 the tribunal determined that 
article two of Te Tiriti, the right to tino rangatiratanga, requires the Crown 
to “actively protect” the ability of kaitiaki to control and regulate their 
relationship with the environment in accordance with their tikanga and 
mātauraka.546 In other words, the Crown must enable kaitiaki to maintain 
their position of authority with respect to natural resources, in accordance 
with their own cultural understandings of this kinship relationship. 
 
                                               
544 At 269. 
545 I.e. those derived from the SOE case, above n 191. 
546 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 227 at 269. The tribunal defines ‘Mātauranga’ as: “the way 
of perceiving and understanding the world, and the values or systems of thought that 
underpin those perceptions. ‘Mātauranga Māori’ therefore refers not only to Māori 
knowledge, but also to the Māori way of knowing.” At 16. 






But how would the tribunal determine if the current legal framework 
was complying with the relevant treaty requirements? To answer this the 
tribunal articulated what is essentially an analytical framework for 
measuring the current environmental law system against the requirements 
of the principles rights and interests sourced from Te Tiriti.547 If the legal 
framework failed to reflect and give expression to the fundamental 
principles articulated in the tribunal’s analytical schema, the legal 
framework would not be compliant with Te Tiriti. The essence of the 
analytical framework is captured as follows:548 
 
In the end, it is the degree of control exercised by Māori and their 
influence in decision-making that needs to be resolved in a 
principled way by using the concept of kaitiakitanga. The exact 
degree of control accorded to Māori as kaitiaki will differ widely in 
different circumstances and cannot be determined in a generic way. 
Finding the appropriate degree of control will depend on several 
factors. … [These] include the importance of the taonga in question 
to the iwi or hapū, the health of that taonga, and any competing 
interests in it. 
 
 To this end, the tribunal concluded that a Treaty compliant 
framework would enable Māori to exercise one of three decreasing levels 
of influence over decision-making (control, partnership or influence), 
depending on the circumstances. The tribunal contended that all extant and 
                                               
547 At 269-273. 
548 At 270. 






legitimate interests associated with the resource would first need to be 
identified and balanced against each other before an appropriate outcome 
could be selected.  As the tribunal states:549 
 
what is needed here is a system that allows all legitimate interests 
(including the interests of the environment itself) to be considered 
against an agreed set of principles, and balanced case by case. 
 
This ‘balancing test’ will now be elaborated in further detail. 
B  ‘Balancing test’ – in more detail 
As touched on above, the tribunal’s view was that a treaty-compliant 
environmental law framework would embody two essential elements:550 
(1) identification and balancing of all legitimate interests (kaitiaki 
and non-kaitiaki): 
i. kaitiaki relationship? 
ii. Legitimate third-party interests? 
(2) identification of an appropriate level of authority to give 
expression to the interests of kaitiaki (to the extent that they 
should be paramount): 
i. control; 
ii. partnership; and 
iii. influence. 
1 Identifying legitimate interests 
The first limb of a treaty-compliant framework is the identification 
of all ‘legitimate interests’ associated with the taonga, an assessment of the 
relative importance of the subject taonga for each ‘interested party’, and a 
determination regarding the extent at which the kaitiaki interest should 
                                               
549 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 224 at 112. 
550 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 278. 






prevail over other interests in the management regime. The first part of this 
step involves the identification of whether a kaitiaki relationship exists 
with the taonga, and this can be achieved by identifying whether a body of 
mātauraka Māori (i.e. traditional Māori knowledge) exists in relation to the 
taonga. The tribunal notes that that the environment in its entirety is not 
capable of being deemed a taonga in this context: a taonga will have 
identifiable ‘korero tuku iho’ (a body of inherited knowledge) associated 
with it, or a whakapapa that can be recited regarding it. The tribunal argues 
that the existence and credibility of the asserted kaitiaki relationship can 
be tested.551 
 
A treaty-compliant framework would also require consideration of 
whether any legitimate third-party interests exist, in other words, any non-
kaitiaki parties whom hold a legitimate interest in respect of the taonga or 
resource. Such interests necessarily include ‘the environment’ itself (in the 
widest sense of the term), those interested in the development, active use 
or exploitation of the environment (e.g. primary industries, farmers, 
fishermen, miners, or hydroelectricity operators etc.), and other interests 
(such as tourism operators, local authorities, homeowners and other 
                                               
551 At 269. 






property owners).552 There will be many other legitimate interests that cut 
across these interests, and it is not possible to exhaustively list them all. 
 
Once all interests are identified, a treaty-compliant framework 
requires value judgements to be made regarding the level of priority that 
should be attributed to the respective interests (both iwi and non-iwi).553 
For example, the tribunal notes that the RMA is an example of a legal 
framework that allows interests to be considered against one another (i.e. 
demonstrated through the RMA’s statutory purpose and operationally 
through the resource consent process). Given the extensive range and 
complexity of interests that exist, “there can be no one-size-fits-all 
approach” to balancing interests in environmental management: there are 
situations where control by the kaitiaki or by the local authorities/Crown 
would be inappropriate (and vice versa).554 As the tribunal notes, policies 
or standards could be set by central government as to how interests should 
be balanced, “but ultimately every decision about use or development of a 
resource will be centred around its own particular set of circumstances and 
interests, and will therefore be unique.”555 In some cases there will be no 
conflict between various interests which will be easily reconcilable. Where 
                                               
552 At 270. 
553 At 227. 
554 At 272. 
555 At 272. 






there is conflict, “some interests will be entitled to greater protection than 
others.”556 The tribunal also notes that some taonga will be more important 
to hapū or iwi identity than others (as evidenced by the relevant body of 
mātauranga), and therefore some will be more deserving of protection than 
others.557 The health of the taonga itself should also be a key balancing 
consideration. 
2 Appropriate level of authority 
Once all legitimate interests (kaitiaki and non-kaitiaki) have been 
identified and balanced, a treaty-compliant framework would enable the 
kaitiaki to exercise an appropriate level of authority in respect of the 
taonga, relative to the outcome of the balancing test. The tribunal theorises 
three levels of authority that will be appropriate in differing circumstances: 
‘control’, ‘partnership’ and ‘influence’. 
 
A ‘control’ model will be appropriate where the balancing test 
identifies that the kaitiaki interest should be paramount in environmental 
management, over all other interests. The tribunal contends that the more 
important the taonga is for the iwi, the greater the need for a control model. 
An example given of a control model in Aotearoa’s environmental 
                                               
556 At 272. 
557 At 272. 






management is section 33 of the RMA (discussed in detail in chapter 3), 
although the tribunal notes section 33 has some serious shortcomings. 
 
‘Partnership’ models should be opted for when the balancing test 
determines that both kaitiaki and non-kaitiaki interests shall be heard in the 
management framework. An example of a partnership model is joint 
management agreements under section 36B of the RMA (discussed in 
chapter 3), which allow specified RMA functions, powers and/or duties to 
be jointly exercised by an iwi authority and a local authority (although, the 
tribunal outlines how this mechanism fails to reach the requisite standard). 
 
At the bottom of the tier, the ‘influence’ model will be appropriate 
where, after undertaking the balancing of interests, the circumstances do 
not justify either a control or partnership model. In such cases, the 
Waitangi Tribunal contends there is still a strong case for kaitiaki to be 
able to influence environmental management within their takiwā in 
accordance with kaitiakitanga principles (albeit in a less formal manner 
than the control/partnership models). The treaty principle of active 
protection requires this. An example of an influence model is Part II of the 
RMA, which relates to the consideration of the Māori voice in resource 
management decision-making (albeit, inadequately as discussed by the 
tribunal and in chapter 3 above). 
 






Overall, the tribunal argued that:558 
 
… these are the key requirements of an environmental management 
regime that is Treaty compliant and provides adequately for the 
kaitiaki interest: it must deliver kaitiaki control, partnership, and 
influence, whichever of those outcomes is appropriate. 
 
C Nexus between Wai 262 and indigenous self-determination 
 
Although the Wai 262 model’s genesis is within Aotearoa’s Treaty 
jurisprudence, analogies can be made between the nature of the model (i.e. 
ensuring domestic environmental law gives expression to Treaty rights and 
interests), and the operationalisation of the international law right to 
indigenous self-determination (ensuring domestic law gives expression to 
the self-determination norm). The implementation of rights and interests 
derived from Te Tiriti o Waitangi is, at essence, an exercise in international 
law. This view is consistent with the ratio of Hoani Te Heuheu Tukino, i.e. 
that Te Tiriti, as a treaty of cession under international law, is legally 
unenforceable except to the extent that it is incorporated into municipal 
law.559 As discussed, the balancing test articulated by the tribunal in Ko 
Aotearoa Tenei was designed to test whether Aotearoa’s environmental 
law framework gives adequate expression to the rights and interests 
                                               
558 At 227 at 272. 
559 Te Heuheu Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land Board [1941] AC 308. 






articulated in Te Tiriti. Analogies can be drawn between this task, and the 
operationalisation of the international law norm of indigenous self-
determination (they both involve the implementation of international law 
standards relating to indigenous peoples). Given the fundamental 
similarities between the two rights, their international law source, and their 
underlying objectives, it is appropriate for Wai 262’s conceptual model to 
act as a source of inspiration for the operationalisation of indigenous self-
determination. 
D Analysis against Anaya’s framework 
The conceptual model articulated by the Waitangi Tribunal in Ko 
Aotearoa Tenei will now be considered against Anaya’s principles of self-
determination. As with the previous chapters, this assessment will 
determine its normative value as a model for implementing indigenous 
self-determination in Aotearoa using Anaya’s framework explored in 
chapter 1. 
1 Constitutive self-determination 
As discussed in the preceding chapters, the constitutive self-
determination principle considers the processes leading to the development 
of the model (and whether these adequately embody indigenous 
participation and consent). The Wai 262 model discussed above is unique 
compared the previous models analysed in this thesis in that it is not an 
existing, positive, legal framework – it is merely a theoretical model 






adopted by the Waitangi Tribunal as a means to consider whether the 
Crown is adequately implementing the Treaty of Waitangi. 
Notwithstanding this difference, the Wai 262 model can still be considered 
against this principle. The indigenous subjects of the model had adequate 
opportunities to participate in the development of this model. The Wai 262 
inquiry was lodged in October 1991 and, after nearly 20 years of hearings 
the tribunal’s report was released in 2011. Throughout this period, the six 
initial claimants and their whānau members participated in two rounds of 
hearings, the first in 1995 and the second in 2005.560 These processes of 
the tribunal allowed the claimants to pursue their claims with evidence, 
and to shape the overall outcome of the report. In following the principles 
of natural justice, the formation of this model was consistent with the 
precepts of Anaya’s constitutive self-determination. 
2 Ongoing self-determination: subsidiarity 
This heading assesses the ‘form and functioning’ of the model itself. 
As discussed above, the balancing test is an abstract means to determine 
whether the current environmental law framework is complying with the 
rights and interests derived from Te Tiriti, and, as such, it is not a ‘black 
letter’ legal framework. The tribunal notes that a treaty-compliant 
                                               
560 Haana Murray (Ngāti Kurī), Hema Nui a Tawhaki Witana (Te Rarawa), Te Witi 
McMath (Ngāti Wai), Tama Poata (Ngāti Porou), Kataraina Rimene (Ngāti 
Kahungunu) and John Hippolite (Ngāti Koata). 






framework would: (1) identify and balance all interests associated with a 
taonga (kaitiaki and non-kaitiaki); and (2) enable the expression of a level 
of kaitiaki authority relative to the circumstances. The analysis is then 
applied to existing legal frameworks to determine whether they are treaty-
compliant (where they are not, the tribunal recommends reforms to the 
relevant legislation or policy). 
 
 Throughout this process, where the balancing test determines that 
the kaitiaki interest should be paramount to all other interests, a control 
model will be appropriate. Control models theoretically provide iwi with 
responsibility for exclusive regulatory control over taonga, providing for 
the management of the resource at the most local level. As discussed 
above, the control model essentially resembles a model of autonomous 
governance (chapter 3). The tribunal argues that a Treaty compliant 
environmental management framework must allow for the expression of 
control models when they are deemed appropriate by the balancing test.561 
Accordingly, the model encourages the Crown to create space for iwi 
decision-making authority in environmental management in certain 
                                               
561 The tribunal concludes that the current framework is not capable of delivering the 
control model: “In particular, the [RMA] has failed to deliver any iwi control of iconic 
taonga within their environment, despite the existence of the section 33 transfer 
power...” This provides strong support for the contention of this chapter that section 33 
of the RMA does not enable the expression of indigenous self-determination. Waitangi 
Tribunal, above n 224 at 116. 






situations. By extension, this promotes adherence to the indigenous 
subsidiarity principle (albeit, in cases where this is deemed appropriate). 
 
The tribunal holds that partnership models are appropriate when 
legitimate third-party interests exist which should be provided for in the 
regulatory framework alongside legitimate kaitiaki relationships. As 
discussed in chapter 3, partnership models are essentially power-sharing 
or co-management arrangements, entailing the sharing of decision-making 
power and influence between public authorities and local communities (in 
this case, iwi, hapū or whānau). Partnership models rank lower against 
Anaya’s framework than control models (particularly with regard to 
subsidiarity considerations) because they provide Māori with less ability 
to directly influence environmental decision-making (less subsidiarity). 
Nonetheless, the partnership model still enables Māori to exercise 
authority over their taonga (albeit in conjunction with the Crown). The 
tribunal contends: “Partnerships can themselves be seen as a form of tino 
rangatiratanga in some circumstances.”562 It is contended that the same 
applies to partnership models and the right to self-determination. The Wai 
262 model, through its promotion of partnership models, encourages the 
operational expression of indigenous subsidiarity in tandem with the 
Crown. 
                                               
562 At 24. 







One of the insightful aspects of the Wai 262 model is that it 
encourages the pragmatic implementation of Māori authority (article 2) by 
considering all interests (Māori and non-Māori) and reconciling these to 
find a workable balance in the ensuing institutional framework. The 
tribunal characterises this as “perfecting the treaty partnership”563 that 
exists between the two founding cultures: “Kupe’s people” and “Cook’s 
people”.564 The tribunal determines that the Treaty and its principles (e.g. 
partnership and tino rangatiratanga) requires this balancing approach. 
Justice Joe Williams captures the essence of the approach in the cover letter 
to Wai 262: “...Aotearoa and New Zealand must be able to co-exist in the 
same place.”565 
 
David Williams’ view is that in fact, the Waitangi Tribunal was “too 
intent on being pragmatic”, compared to the more radical tribunal reports 
that preceded Wai 262.566 Williams contends that the tribunal has 
historically articulated the “high ground” of treaty guarantees, and the 
Crown, based on the tribunal’s position, tends to “find a negotiated middle 
                                               
563 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 227 at 714. 
564 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 224 at xxiii. 
565 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 227 at xxiii. 
566 David V. Williams “Ko Aotearoa Tenei: Law and Policy Affecting Maori Culture and 
Identity” 2013 20(3) International Journal of Cultural Property at 322. 






ground to resolve a political impasse.”567 In Wai 262, however, Williams 
argues the tribunal opts directly for the middle ground. This author has 
some sympathy for this view, noting the tribunal’s premise that “it is no 
longer possible to deliver tino rangatiratanga as full autonomy in all cases 
in which taonga Māori are ‘in play’, as it were.”568 It seems contrary to the 
pursuit of indigenous rights to begin with such a concession. 
 
Notwithstanding this, in the author’s view there is a legitimate place 
for the pragmatic approach of the tribunal in Wai 262. As discussed above 
in chapter 4,569 approaches that balance all extant interests are insightful as 
they promote the sustainable operationalisation of indigenous rights. To 
use Anaya’s terms, if the institutional framework established pursuant to 
the Wai 262 model is not sustainable (i.e. capable of acceptance by a broad 
majority of society) then they cannot empower individuals and groups to 
develop and make meaningful choices in all spheres of life (the core 
rationale for the ongoing self-determination principle). But, in terms of 
Anaya’s framework, the necessity for pragmatism to ensure sustainability 
must not override adequate provision for the principle of subsidiarity. 
                                               
567 At 323. 
568 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 224 at 24. 
569 In the context of the Canadian duty to consult and Anaya’s framework. 






3 Ongoing self-determination: cultural pluralism 
Aside from subsidiarity considerations, the theory underpinning the 
model itself is highly reflective of Māori cultural concepts. As discussed, 
a treaty-compliant framework would first consider the existence of a 
kaitiaki relationship in order to determine the importance of the taonga or 
resource for the kaitiaki. This would be achieved by considering the 
existence of a body of mātauraka Māori relating to the resource. This is 
indicative of a Māori approach to the implementation of treaty rights. The 
approach gives expression to Jeff Corntassel’s argument that the 
operational expressions of self-determination should be inextricably linked 
to indigenous ways of seeing the world (for example, that environmental 
management should be seen through the lens of relationships, rather than 
rights-based discourses which are ultimately crafted by ‘the state’ itself).570 
In terms of Anaya’s scholarship, this model goes a long way toward 
promoting the reflection of the groups character and cultural preferences 
in environmental management. 
                                               
570 Corntassel, above n 158. See chapter 1. 






III  Chapter Conclusion 
Wai 262 sets out an approach to measuring whether Aotearoa’s 
environmental law framework complies with Te Tiriti. This ‘balancing 
model’ is pragmatic in the sense that it requires the legal framework to 
consider all legitimate and extant interests (kaitiaki and non-kaitiaki), and 
to provide an appropriate level of authority for the kaitiaki (depending on 
the outcome of the balancing test). The conceptual framework recognises 
that the kaitiaki voice is important, but in some circumstances, compromise 
will be required to accommodate other vested interests. The chapter 
contends that this form of pragmatism is required to ensure longevity in 
operational expressions of indigenous rights. The approach in Ko Aotearoa 
Tenei appreciates the fundamental kinship relationships between people 
and the natural environment inherent to pre-European Māori 
environmental management, and promotes the recognition of these kaitiaki 
relationships. The tribunal’s approach is therefore highly framed by Māori 
cultural concepts, a key requirement of the cultural pluralism aspect of 
Anaya’s framework. Overall, the conceptual framework ranks favourably 
against Anaya’s principles and is a strong source of inspiration for the 










Chapter 6: Future of Indigenous Self-Determination 
in Aotearoa? 
I  Chapter Introduction 
The thesis has demonstrated a widespread lack of adherence to the 
international norm of indigenous self-determination in nearly all of the 
examined contexts, by applying Anaya’s framework of indigenous self-
determination. Chapter 2 concluded that Aotearoa’s historical legal 
developments failed to embody Anaya’s principles. In fact, in some cases 
these models embodied an archetypal breach of the constitutive self-
determination principle (i.e. the unilateral imposition of law or policy on 
indigenous peoples without consent or participation in its development). 
Similarly, for the reasons outlined in chapter 3, it was demonstrated that 
the current environment and resource management law framework in 
Aotearoa is failing to give expression to Anaya’s principles of indigenous 
self-determination. Accordingly, law reform is needed to fill the void of 
norm compliant mechanisms in Aotearoa law. 
 
The potential nature of this law reform is the subject of the second 
major inquiry of the thesis. This aspect of the thesis concluded that while 
the various analysed models fail to adhere to Anaya’s principles as a 
whole, there are severable aspects of the selected models that are compliant 
with parts of Anaya’s analytical framework, and these parts therefore offer 






valuable insights into how indigenous self-determination could be 
operationalised in Aotearoa in future.571 
 
For example, While the current Aotearoa frameworks were held to 
be non-compliant when viewed as a whole, it was noted that severable 
portions of the studied frameworks are insightful for their adherence to the 
cultural pluralism aspects of Anaya’s ongoing self-determination. The 
Aotearoa models that embody Stone’s legal personality concept 
(Whanganui and Te Urewera) were found to be highly favourable against 
Anaya’s cultural pluralism aspect of the norm.572 These frameworks are 
also insightful for their prioritisation of tikanga Māori in the decision-
making framework itself. 
 
Furthermore, chapter 4 analysed two overseas contexts (Canada and 
Scandinavia). The aim was to consider whether any insights could be 
obtained from these foreign models to inform the future implementation of 
indigenous self-determination in Aotearoa. The most celebrated aspects of 
the foreign frameworks for the purposes of this thesis, i.e. the concepts that 
were notable for their adherence to Anaya’s principles, are those relating 
                                               
571 Irrespective of the findings that the models studied as a whole are non-compliant with 
Anaya’s principles. 
572 See chapter 3 for an analysis of the Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River) and Te Urewera 
settlements. Stone, above n 242. 






to the ‘pragmatic balancing of interests’ (both indigenous and non-
indigenous) and the allocation of decision-making authority based on an 
analysis of interests and their legitimacy.  This was observed in the ‘sliding 
scale’ or ‘relativistic’ approach embodied in the draft Nordic Sami 
Convention, and, to an extent, in Canada’s common law duty to consult 
and accommodate Aboriginal interests. A similar approach was also 
observed in the context of the Waitangi Tribunal’s Ko Aotearoa Tenei 
report in chapter 5, which noted the normative value of this model against 
Anaya’s self-determination framework. 
 
In light of these analyses, it is necessary to consider how the various 
insights might contribute to the operational expression of indigenous self-
determination in Aotearoa. With this in mind, the present chapter looks to 
chart a possible path for the future of indigenous self-determination in 
Aotearoa. It does this by elucidating the fundamental principles that are 
required of a self-determination compliant domestic legal framework 
(balancing of interests, decision-making authority, adequacy of influence 
and the application of indigenous laws), and then by ‘populating’ these 
principles into the Wai 262 balancing framework.573 The suggested 
                                               
573 As will be outlined below, this thesis takes a similar approach to that of the Waitangi 
Tribunal in Wai 262, which formulated an analytical framework for determining 
whether Aotearoa’s environmental and resource management was giving expression to 
article two of Te Tiriti. 






framework is then applied to a case study: the Rakiura Tītī (or muttonbird) 
Islands. 






II  Background 
As this thesis demonstrated in chapter 1, the operationalisation of 
indigenous self-determination cannot be achieved by one specific type of 
institutional framework (i.e. by copying an autonomous framework from 
an existing external jurisdiction, for example). Such a view not only 
promotes an ‘essentialist’ approach to indigenous self-determination, but 
also unduly focuses on the remedial aspects of the norm.574 That is, it 
focuses on the design of the institutions that might be required to remedy 
a substantive breach of self-determination, without considering the 
substance of the norm itself.575 This thesis has not promoted such an 
approach to operationalising indigenous self-determination. 
 
Instead, as outlined in chapter 1, the thesis has adopted Anaya’s 
holistic approach to self-determination which: (1) considers whether a 
substantive breach of self-determination has occurred (by measuring the 
framework against the constitutive and ongoing self-determination 
principles); and (2) once a substantive breach has been observed, considers 
the ‘shape’ of the framework required to remedy that breach of self-
determination (remedial self-determination).576 
                                               
574 Gunn, above n 138. 
575 Anaya, above n 45. 
576 See chapter 1 for a discussion regarding Anaya’s framework. Anaya, above n 45. 







This chapter considers the second part of Anaya’s framework: the 
realm of remedial self-determination. It posits that there are identifiable 
fundamental principles that underpin the remedial operationalisation of the 
international norm of indigenous self-determination. This chapter draws 
on the analysis of the previous chapters and concludes that a norm-
compliant (i.e. remedial) legal framework would give expression to the 
following principles: the balancing of interests; locus of decision-making; 
indigenous influence over decision-making; and pluralism. The chapter 
adopts a similar conceptual approach to the Wai 262 report, which 
articulated the fundamental characteristics of a Treaty of Waitangi-
compliant environmental law framework.577 For example, a remedial 
framework that gives full expression to these principles will likely be in 
compliance with the norm, and have remedied the underlying substantive 
breach. The remedial principles will now be explored in more detail.
                                               
577 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 227. 






III  Principles of a Norm-Compliant Model 
A Balancing interests 
The first principle, and a significant theme of this thesis, provides 
that a self-determination norm-compliant legal framework must identify 
and pragmatically balance all interests (both indigenous and non-
indigenous) before allocating to the indigenous actors an appropriate level 
of decision-making authority.578 
 
Both the draft Nordic Sami convention and the Canadian duty to 
consult promote the balancing of various interests.579 However, the most 
useful articulation of such an approach is contained in Wai 262’s Ko 
Aotearoa Tenei report, which was explored in chapter 5.580 To recap, in 
Wai 262 the Waitangi Tribunal developed an analytical framework for 
determining whether the environmental law framework was compliant 
with article 2 rights of Te Tiriti (tino rangatiratanga). A compliant legal 
framework, the tribunal held, would do two things: (1) identify and balance 
all legitimate interests (kaitiaki and non-kaitiaki); and (2) the identify an 
appropriate level of authority to give expression to the interests of kaitiaki 
                                               
578 An idea that is adopted from the Wai 262 inquiry, but is echoed in many other contexts, 
such as the draft Nordic Sami Convention and the Canadian duty to consult and 
accommodate. 
579 See chapter 4. Draft Nordic Sami Convention. Haida Nation. 
580 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 227. 






(to the extent that they should be paramount, based on the balancing test: 
i.e. control, partnership or influence models).581 
 
As discussed in chapter 5, analogies can be made between the 
rationale of the model developed in Wai 262 (i.e. ensuring domestic 
environmental law gives expression to Treaty rights and interests), and the 
operationalisation of the international law right to indigenous self-
determination (ensuring domestic law gives expression to the self-
determination norm). Furthermore, the implementation of rights and 
interests derived from Te Tiriti o Waitangi is, at essence, an exercise in 
international law. Both article 2 of Te Tiriti and the self-determination 
norm seek to achieve similar outcomes, and although self-determination is 
“philosophically distinct from tino rangatiratanga... the right of self-
determination will support and complement Māori claims to self-
determination.”582 Therefore, it is appropriate for the Wai 262 balancing 
test to assist the conceptual development of self-determination 
operationalisation as the exercises are conceptually similar. 
  
As touched on above, a similar pragmatic approach to 
operationalising self-determination can be found in the draft Nordic Sami 
                                               
581 These models are outlined in greater detail in chapter 5. Waitangi Tribunal, above n 
227. 
582 Toki, above n 31 at 143-144. 






convention (discussed in chapter 4), which adopts a comparable approach 
by considering the importance of the underlying resource to various 
stakeholders. The draft Nordic Sami convention holds that the greater the 
importance of the resource to the Sami, the greater the level of authority 
the Sami should hold. The draft convention was intended to be a reflection 
of existing international norms applying to the Sami, including the right to 
self-determination. 
 
A similar approach was also found in the Canadian common law duty 
to consult and accommodate Aboriginal interests, whereby the level of 
consultation required in any given case is dependent upon the strength of 
the underlying Aboriginal claim, the importance of the subject matter to 
the aboriginal group, and the extent at which the right will be adversely 
affected by the proposed activity.583 The question as to whether Aboriginal 
interests should be accommodated requires the Crown to balance all 
relevant indigenous and non-indigenous interests.584 
 
A principle requiring the legal framework to balance all interests 
(indigenous and non-indigenous) is pragmatic in the sense that it is more 
likely to produce a sustainable model of self-determination than one that 
                                               
583 Haida Nation; see chapter 3. 
584 Haida Nation. 






does not.585 This accords with Åhren’s view that the pragmatic approach 
adopted in the draft Nordic Sami convention offers a ‘blueprint’ for 
implementing self-determination when there is a high level of ‘mixing’ of 
indigenous and non-indigenous peoples on the lands once occupied only 
by the former, as it recognises and attempts to reconcile the interests of 
both parties.586 
B Subsidiarity: decision-making ‘locus’ 
It was identified in chapter 1 that indigenous self-determination in 
this context can manifest itself as ‘autonomy’ and/or free, prior and 
informed consent, and the scope and content of these rights was explored 
in that chapter.587 Based on these aspects of the norm, a further principle 
of norm-compliant legal frameworks is the idea that indigenous peoples 
should not only be participants in decision making processes, but should, 
in certain situations, be afforded full agency to be the ultimate decision-
maker itself.588 This thesis suggests that full decision-making authority will 
be appropriate where, once all indigenous and non-indigenous interests are 
balanced (on the basis of the balancing test discussed above), the 
                                               
585 As discussed in chapter 4 in relation to the Canadian duty to consult. 
586 Åhren, above n 457. 
587 Articles 4, 10, 19, 29 and 32, UNDRIP. 
588 It was noted in chapter 4 that none of the existing mechanisms in Norway’s Sami legal 
framework enable Sami to make decisions regarding their resources, all decisions are 
made by public authorities. The same applies to the Whanganui River settlement, where 
all decision-making regarding land use in the catchment is regulated by the relavant 
local authorities pursuant to the RMA. See chapter 3. 






indigenous interest is deemed to require priority. In other words, in terms 
of the Wai 262 model, the control model.589 
 
The locus principle can be identified within the international 
jurisprudence of indigenous peoples. At essence, the devolution aspect of 
the right to autonomy under the UNDRIP (and ‘internal self-
determination’) contemplates the transfer of a decision-making locus from 
the state/local authorities to the indigenous people.590 Under the FPIC 
aspect of self-determination, indigenous peoples should be afforded the 
ability to withhold consent for proposals where the proposed activity will 
have a ‘major impact’ on the indigenous peoples’ interests.591 The key 
theme of these aspects of the norm is that the ‘locus’ of decision-making 
is with the indigenous people, within certain prescribed parametres. As the 
scope of indigenous self-determination is limited to the “internal and local 
affairs” of the indigenous people,592 any decision-making powers afforded 
to indigenous peoples must be exercised within the context of the state’s 
overarching sovereignty.593 In other words, as discussed in chapter 1, there 
                                               
589 Waitangi Tribunal, n 227. 
590 Article 4, UNDRIP. See the discussion regarding territorial and non-territorial 
autonomy (and other forms of autonomy) in chapter 1. 
591 Although, this aspect of the norm is still developing. See Poma Poma v Peru and 
Saramaka, discussed in chapter 1. Also see the discussion regarding FPIC in chapter 4, 
which considered the draft Nordic Sami convention’s operationalisation of the FPIC 
right. 
592 Article 4, UNDRIP. 
593 Articles 46, UNDRIP. 






is no ability to use the international norm to secede from the state, and that 
is not what the locus principle espouses. 
 
It was demonstrated that the legal mechanisms analysed in this thesis 
are inadequately providing for the norm, but, there are some promising 
aspects of the models (when viewed against the subsidiarity aspects of 
Anaya’s framework). For example, section 33 of the RMA enables ‘iwi 
authorities’ to assume authority over functions, powers or duties under the 
RMA (e.g. planning, policy setting or adjudicating resource consents), a 
clear transfer of autonomous decision-making authority from local 
authorities to an indigenous people, and this is perhaps the Aotearoa 
mechanism that is the closest to expressing the locus principle. Although, 
as noted in chapter 3, there are several issues inherent in section 33 that 
render the mechanism ultimately non-compliant with the norm (i.e. the 
unwillingness of local authorities to adopt the mechanism and the lack of 
ability to compel).594 
 
 Further, under the Te Urewera settlement, the governance board is 
able to promulgate bylaws, and authorise concessions or activity permits 
over a range of matters within Te Urewera, effectively taking the place of 
                                               
594 Further issues regarding the ability of iwi authorities to actually influence 
environmental decision-making under section 33 are discussed below. 






the Department of Conservation in making these executive decisions. This 
is a transfer of certain autonomous powers from the central government to 
the Te Urewera board. Although, as discussed in chapter 3, the ability of 
the Tūhoe people to make decisions regarding their whenua is carefully 
prescribed by the Crown in the Tūhoe settlement documents, and the board 
has no power to prevent mining or resource extraction, some of the most 
invasive activities possible in their whenua. Thus, while this framework 
provides positive adherence to the locus principle, it comes short of 
satisfying the influence principle to any material extent (discussed below). 
 
In comparison, the Norwegian Sami parliament has very little power 
of decision with respect to resources of importance to their people. It was 
demonstrated that the legal frameworks related to the Planning and 
Building Act provide the Sami parliament with the ability to raise 
objections to planning proposals where they raise issues that are of 
“significant importance to Sami culture or the conduct of commercial 
activities.”595 Similarly, the Sami parliament can promulgate ‘guidelines’ 
directing how a proposal for change in uncultivated land-use is to be 
assessed by both the Finnmark Estate and public authorities for its impact 
on Sami interests.596 While both mechanisms are positive, the fail to 
                                               
595 Planning and Building Act 2008 (Norway), s 3-2. 
596 Finnmark Act 2005 (Norway). 






provide any real decision-making power to the Sami – the locus remains 
with central and local government. These mechanisms are more akin to 
‘influence’ mechanisms referred to in the Wai 262 model. 
 
Nor does Te Pou Tupua, the ‘human face’ of the Whanganui River 
assume any direct decision-making power over the Whanganui awa or its 
catchment. All decision-making in respect of these matters remains with 
the pre-existing decision-maker (for example, the regional and district 
councils).597 
 
Overall, a norm compliant framework would, when it is deemed 
appropriate after all interests are identified and balanced, require 
indigenous peoples to assume responsibility for environmental decision-
making. 
C Subsidiarity: influence over outcomes 
Related to the above principle is the principle that not only should 
indigenous peoples have the opportunity to be the ultimate decision-maker 
(in some situations), but their interests must be able to be both influential 
and upheld in the outcome of the decision-making process, where this is 
                                               
597 See chapter 3 and Te Awa Tupua Act. 






deemed to be appropriate in the balancing test.598 That is, any devolved 
decision-making power must actually be effective at providing for 
indigenous interests for it to give effect to Anaya’s principle of 
subsidiarity. As Åhren contends, “the core element of the internal aspect 
of the right to self-determination is not a right to participate in decision-
making processes, but to effectively determine the material outcome of 
such.”599 
 
This ‘influence’ principle can be drawn from the international 
jurisprudence applying to indigenous peoples, for example, the right of 
indigenous peoples to autonomy (article 4 of the UNDRIP)600 and the 
various rights to free, prior and informed consent outlined in the 
UNDRIP.601 For the purposes of this thesis, the influence principle 
interrelates to the balancing principle (discussed above) in that the level of 
indigenous influence required in any given circumstance will be dependent 
upon the identification and balancing of all extant indigenous and non-
indigenous interests in the underlying subject matter.602 
 
                                               
598 This principle therefore requires a differing level of influence depending upon the 
outcome of the balancing test. 
599 Åhren, above n 79 at 138. 
600 Discussed in chapter 1. 
601 Also discussed in chapter 1. 
602 See the discussion regarding the Wai 262 balancing test above and in chapter 5. 






The content of the right to FPIC is an example of the higher levels of 
influence that the self-determination norm will require in some 
circumstances. While the precise content of FPIC remains somewhat 
unsettled at international law, it is arguable that the norm provides 
indigenous peoples with a right to withhold their consent to substantial 
development proposals where such projects will have a substantial impact 
on them culturally, socially, or economically.603 This part of the influence 
principle was demonstrated in chapter 4 with reference to the draft Nordic 
Sami convention, which attempted to operationalise a right to FPIC along 
these lines.604 For this thesis, these ideas are linked to the Wai 262 model. 
A high level of influence is likely to be warranted where the balancing test 
identifies that Māori interests should be paramount and where there are 
little (if any) legitimate third party interests. These are conceptualised in 
Wai 262 as ‘control models’. 
 
However, the thesis accepts that such a high level of influence (i.e. 
full FPIC entailing the right to withhold consent) is unlikely to be 
practicable in all cases, particularly where many legitimate third party 
interests are identified and deemed worthy of recognition in the balancing 
                                               
603 Poma Poma v Peru, above n 132; Saramaka People v Suriname (Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs), above n 128. See also chapter 1 for a 
discussion regarding the parametres of the FPIC aspect of self-determination. 
604 Articles 16 and 36. See also Åhren, above n 79. 






test outlined above.605 Therefore, some compliant schemes of self-
determination will give effect to something less than fully autonomous 
power sharing, and may be closer to the traditional notions of collaborative 
management (otherwise referred to as ‘co-management’). Chapter 3 
provided that co-management can be used to operationalise indigenous 
self-determination in certain cases,606 provided that Anaya’s principles of 
subsidiarity and cultural pluralism are given expression to a material 
extent. In terms of the Wai 262 model, therefore, there are times when the 
influence principle will necessitate the implementation of a partnership 
model, opposed to a control model.607 
 
For example, the parametres of the thesis’ influence principle are 
demonstrated in the draft Nordic Sami convention which, in some cases, 
gives the Sami a right of withhold their consent to invasive projects, but in 
other cases, where the subject matter is of less importance, a lesser right of 
influence applies (e.g. a right to be consulted, heard, and to appear on 
decision-making panels).608 
 
                                               
605 In accordance with the balancing test outlined in Wai 262. See chapter 5. 
606 See chapter 5 below for a discussion on the balancing test suggested by the Waitangi 
Tribunal in Wai 262. The tribunal’s conceptual model suggests that partnership models 
may be appropriate when there are many third parties interested in the resource, as well 
as iwi. Waitangi Tribunal, above n 224. 
607 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 224. 
608 See chapter 4. 






Further, a relatively low level of influence is afforded to the 
Whanganui iwi in the Te Awa Tupua framework, as the effective influence 
they have over decision-making is dependent upon the ultimate (non-iwi) 
decision-maker’s interpretation and application of statutory directives to 
‘recognise and provide for’ and ‘have particular regard to’ iwi interests.609 
The iwi can only indirectly influence environmental decision-making 
through the development of Te Heke Ngāhuru, the awa strategy which 
specified decision-makers must “have particular regard to”. This 
framework, it was demonstrated in chapter 3, does not provide the 
Whanganui iwi with a high level of influence over environmental decision-
making. 
 
Another example analysed was section 33 of the RMA. While 
section 33 can enable the transfer of the decision-making locus to an iwi 
authority, the level of actual influence afforded under the mechanism is 
highly dependent upon the efficacy of the functions, powers and duties 
contained within the RMA,610 and their (in)ability to prioritise iwi 
interests.611 In other words, while section 33 potential provides iwi with a 
power of decision, the legal framework it is tied to is deficient as it 
                                               
609 See chapter 3; Te Awa Tupua Act, s 15. 
610 As those are the powers transferred to iwi under the RMA. 
611 See chapter 3; RMA, s 33. 






inadequately provides for the expression of Māori interests by default.612 
As such, the section 33 mechanism is narrowly prescribed and lacks 
‘teeth’, a poor example of the influence principle.  
 
Overall, the key rationale for this principle is that holding a power of 
decision (the locus principle) serves little purpose if that power is unable 
to be wielded to give priority to indigenous interests where appropriate. 
Operationalising the self-determination norm, the author argues, requires 
both. 
D Cultural pluralism: indigenous laws and epistemologies 
Another key principle of the norm is the requirement for indigenous 
institutions, structures, legal traditions, customs and/or value systems to be 
embodied in the form and functioning of the governing institutional order 
instead of, or in addition to, non-indigenous paradigms (pluralism). In 
other words, self-determination requires that a governing institutional 
order is framed by indigenous epistemologies and is empowered to apply 
indigenous legal traditions in the regulation of their ‘internal and local 
affairs’.613 Indigenous ideas and value systems should no longer be 
relegated and seen as inferior to western liberal conceptions of law and 
                                               
612 See analysis on this point in chapter 3. 
613 In other words, in applying their autonomous governance rights under article 4 of the 
UNDRIP. 






society. As Anaya notes, Western societies, until relatively recently, did 
not value indigenous cultures and, in fact, “promoted their demise through 
programs of assimilation. Even as such policies have been abandoned or 
reversed, indigenous cultures remain threatened as a result of the lingering 
effects of those historical policies and because, typically, indigenous 
communities hold a non-dominant position in the larger societies in which 
they live.”614 
 
This is a key aspect of the indigenous right to self-determination and 
is referred to in articles 5, 20, 25, 26, 27, 31, 33 and 34 of the UNDRIP. 
For example, article 34 provides: 
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain 
their institutional structures and their distinctive customs, 
spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where 
they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance with 
international human rights standards. 
 
This is also the essence of Anaya’s ongoing requirement for cultural 
pluralism. 
 
Several examples of this cultural pluralism principle have been 
examined in this thesis. For example, while they were in some ways 
problematic, the early Aotearoa ‘experiments in Māori autonomy’ 
                                               
614 Anaya, above n 45 at 138-139. 






exhibited some of the hallmarks of cultural pluralism. Under the Native 
Exemption Ordinance, Māori could regulate criminal justice within their 
own villages in accordance with tikanga Māori.615 Similarly, section 71 of 
the Constitution Act, the Native Districts Regulation Act 1858 and the 
Native Circuit Courts Act 1858 all enabled the creation of autonomous 
‘native districts’ which could be regulated by tikanga Māori.616 Even 
though the frameworks were designed to further the Crown’s own 
objectives (and amounted to breaches of Anaya’s constitutive and 
subsidiarity considerations), they were nonetheless early expressions of the 
cultural pluralism principle in Aotearoa. 
 
Aotearoa’s use of in recent Treaty settlements provides an example 
of how this requirement can be operationalised in modern day. For 
example the Te Urewera board, in managing the whenua, is empowered to 
make management decisions on the basis of Tūhoetana i.e. Tūhoe legal 
tradition.617 Similarly, although to a lesser extent, statutory decision-
makers regarding the Whanganui River are directed to at least consider the 
legal traditions of the manawhenua (the statutorily identified Tupua te 
                                               
615 Native Exemption Ordinance 1844. See chapter 2. 
616 Although, as discussed in chapter 2, these measures were ultitmately designed to 
further the Crown’s objectives. 
617 Te Urewera Act, s 18. See also chapter 3. 






Kawa).618 Furthermore, in both examples indigenous epistemologies are 
given expression through the recognition of the underlying resource as an 
ancestor of the mana whenua and the attribution of a legal personality to 
the ancestor.619 These phenomena give expression to the whakapapa-based 
worldview of pre-European Māori.620 
 
A norm-compliant legal framework would therefore embody the 
requirements of cultural pluralism by, for example, allowing tikanga Māori 
to form the basis of final decision-making, and by incorporating 
fundamental Māori concepts into the institutional framework (such as 
whakapapa relationships with te ao tūroa and the legal personality 
concept). 
                                               
618 Te Awa Tupua Act, s 15. See also chapter 3. 
619 Stone, above n 242. 
620 Te Urewera Act, s 11; Te Awa Tupua Act, s 14. 






IV  Operationalising the ‘Remedial Principles’ of Indigenous 
Self-Determination 
A Overview 
As discussed above, the remedial principles of indigenous self-
determination have been identified, which are the features of a norm-
compliant self-determination framework. It is necessary to consider how, 
in any given case, these might be translated from the theoretical and into 
the operational or practical realm. The remainder of this chapter considers 
a means to achieve this by invoking aspects of the Wai 262 model and 
applying the remedial principles to a case study: the Tītī Islands. 
Accordingly, the balance of this chapter explores a practical process that 
could be used to determine an appropriate operational remedial framework 
where it is held that substantive self-determination has been breached. This 
involves: 
 
(1) The identification and balancing of all interests, 
indigenous and non-indigenous; and 
(2) identification of an appropriate level of authority to give 
expression to the indigenous interests (to the extent that 
they should be paramount). 






B Step 1: Balancing interests 
As noted above, and in detail in chapter 5, step 1 involves the 
identification and balancing of the various interests (indigenous and non-
indigenous) which relate to the subject of the self-determination claim.621 
This serves to identify the extent of the indigenous interests in the subject 
matter, or, in terms of te ao Māori, to identify the existence and extent of 
the kaitiaki relationship with the taonga. It also aims to determine the 
existence and legitimacy of competing, non-indigenous claims and 
interests.  
1 Kaitiaki interests 
First, the importance of the taonga (or the subject) to the kaitiaki 
must be established. According to mātauraka Māori precepts (as discussed 
in chapter 3), the environment is the manifestation of various atua (e.g. 
Rakinui, Papa-tū-ā-nuku, Tāne-mahuta and Haumia-tiketike), and these 
atua have dominion over particular taonga.622 The taonga can be iconic 
mountains or rivers or specific genera of flora or fauna. The importance of 
the taonga and the existence of a kaitiaki relationship will be evident if a 
significant body of mātauraka Māori exists relating to the taonga: e.g. 
“kōrero telling its stories, describing its qualities and characteristics, 
explaining its importance to iwi identity, and describing how the kaitiaki 
                                               
621 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 224. 
622 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 224. 






relationship should be conducted.”623 Other indicators could include 
waiata, karakia, rāhui practices, tauparapara, whakapapa, whakataukī, 
whakatauākī, pepeha, kōrero – anything describing the nature of the 
taonga, the nature of the kaitiaki relationship and the importance of the 
taonga to the peoples’ identity. The stronger the evidence of the taonga’s 
importance to the kaitiaki, the greater the need to consider a kaitiaki control 
model. 
2 Legitimate third-party interests 
Secondly, once the importance of the taonga for the kaitiaki is 
established, the third-party interests must then be considered. As the 
tribunal notes, in any given taonga the interests “are many, varied, and 
complex,”624 and can include the environment itself, the kaitiaki 
themselves, commercial operators, energy generators, non-commercial 
interests, recreational interests, infrastructure providers, the community 
itself, individuals, homeowners and even future generations (inter alia). 
Property rights holders cut across all of these interests, and the tribunal 
argues that “where the interests of property owners or resource users will 
be affected by restrictions proposed by the kaitiaki, an exclusive control 
model may well be inappropriate.”625 Once identified, the legitimate third-
                                               
623 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 227 at 275. 
624 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 227 at 271. 
625 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 227 at 275. 






party interests should then be balanced and attributed an appropriate 
weighting. It is possible that some cases will involve very few legitimate 
third-party interests, particularly in situations such as the Tītī Islands, 
demonstrated below. 
3 Rationale 
The rationale behind undertaking this exercise is to recognise that a 
level of pragmatism is required when operationalising the right to self-
determination, and that this can be achieved by adhering to the remedial 
balancing principle. In other words, the importance of the subject matter to 
the claimant vis-a-vis other parties should inform the resulting level of 
influence embodied in the institutional structure. If there are no other 
legitimate interests in the subject matter, there is less of a reason to deny 
the claimant a comprehensive power of decision. 
 
Hence, this step considers how the implementation of a scheme of 
self-determination will affect all legitimate interests related to the subject-
matter. This accords with Åhren’s argument that self-determination 
implementation (at least in the Sami context) must account for the right 
owed to both the indigenous and non-indigenous population. Åhren argues 
that the 2005 text of the draft Nordic Sami convention embodies such an 
approach by considering the relative interests of all legitimate parties: 
“given that a substantial part of the Sami people’s traditional territory 






today have a mixed population” ... “The Convention hence recognizes that 
it is not possible for two people sharing the same territory to exercise a 
complete right to self-determination.”626 It is arguable that in some ways 
Aotearoa shares a similar context with the Sami in that a large part of 
traditional Māori territories are now shared with Pākehā or other non-
Māori.627 The draft Nordic Sami convention gives expression to the 
balancing principle by providing that the more important an issue is for the 
Sami, the more influence they should have over the decision, ranging from 
a right to withhold consent (FPIC) down to a right to simply be briefed or 
informed about a decision process. Adopting this approach, Åhren notes 
that there will be cases where the indigenous people and the majority 
people will disagree and the indigenous peoples’ will should prevail.628 
C Step 2: Level of influence and operational aspects 
This section considers the second stage of the remedial model, the 
selection of an appropriate level of influence based on the outcomes of the 
balancing test. As with step 1, this section borrows the conceptual 
framework offered by the Waitangi Tribunal in Ko Aotearoa Tēnei, and 
applies it in the international law context.629 In Wai 262, the tribunal mused 
                                               
626 Åhren, above n 457 at 88. 
627 Noting that this reality was caused by historical Crown breaches of self-determination 
through raupatu (confiscations) under the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863, the 
introduction of the Native Land Court and by ‘questionable’ land sales. 
628 Åhren, above n 457. 
629 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 224. 






that a Treaty-compliant system of environmental management would, once 
all interests are accounted for, be able to deliver to the kaitiaki one of three 
descending levels of authority, depending on the circumstances (models of 
control, partnership or influence). This step, therefore, considers the 
identification of an appropriate level of influence appropriate for the 
situation, bearing in mind the strength of the kaitiaki interest and the 
strength of all legitimate third parties. The section considers the 
operational features of each model based on the analysed case studies, 
incorporating the remedial principles discussed above. 
1 ‘Control’ models 
Where the balancing test determines that the kaitiaki interest should 
be paramount, then a model affording the kaitiaki full control of the 
resource should be implemented, within the confounds of the state’s 
sovereignty and without impairing the territorial integrity of the state. In 
such cases, step 1 will have identified that the taonga and the kaitiaki 
relationship to it are of crucial importance to the takata whenua. There are 
likely to be either no legitimate third-party interests associated with the 
taonga, or the balancing exercise will determine that any third-party 
interests should not be given priority in the operational framework.630 
 
                                               
630 See chapter 5 and above for a discussion regarding this model; also see Waitangi 
Tribunal, above n 223. 






At essence, this model embodies similar characteristics to the 
traditional understandings of autonomous governance, i.e. the transfer of 
effective decision-making powers from central government to a sub-state 
autonomous entity, exercised within the framework of the state.631 Under 
the control model, the decision-making locus for managing the resource is 
transferred to the kaitiaki (and this might encompass quasi-legislative, 
quasi-administrative or quasi-judicial powers).632 Unlike the partnership 
model, under this model the locus sits fully with the indigenous entity, 
giving expression to the locus principle outlined above. In other words, the 
underlying responsibility for regulating the resource is no longer held by 
majoritarian central government or local authorities, although, given that 
the norm has to operate within the confounds of the state’s sovereignty, 
central government will always retain some form of oversight over such 
mechanisms.  
 
Of all the frameworks studied, the Te Urewera settlement is the 
closest existing example of an operational control model. For example, the 
statutorily appointed board of Te Urewera is given various decision-
making powers over the management of the area: e.g. the promulgation of 
bylaws in respect of a wide range of matters; the consideration of 
                                               
631 Weller and Wolff, above n 108. 
632 See chapter 1 for a discussion regarding the types of autonomy and their precise 
parametres. 






commercial concessions and activity permits; and the policy setting role of 
developing the management plan for the whenua. Prior to settlement, these 
matters were the responsibility of the Department of Conservation.633 
 
Decision-making competency alone is not enough to give full effect 
to the control model. As discussed previously in the thesis, powers of 
decision are only effective at enabling the expression of self-determination 
if the indigenous interests are able to be given sufficient priority in 
decision-making processes (the remedial influence principle). This point 
can be demonstrated by examining section 33 of the RMA. While this 
mechanism allows iwi authorities to receive statutory powers of decision 
under the RMA, iwi are limited in their ability to prioritise their own 
interests as they must adhere to the letter of the RMA legislation (which 
inherently limits the influence of Māori interests) and are bound by 
appellate procedures and precedents. Section 33 is ineffective under this 
heading because the RMA itself generally is flawed in its ability to protect 
Māori interests. 
 
Under the Tūhoe settlement, the interests of the Tūhoe people are 
able to strongly influence the decision-making of the board (short of giving 
expression to a right to FPIC). Although, the board is unable to prevent 
                                               
633 See chapter 3 for a discussion regarding Te Urewera. See also Te Urewera Act. 






mining activities within Te Urewera, which significantly limits the efficacy 
of that model under this heading. 
 
A control model in the fullest sense would give expression to the 
developing FPIC norm, embracing a right to withhold consent for 
development proposals that have the potential to substantially impact the 
people culturally, economically or socially (Poma Poma; Saramaka). This 
would apply to situations involving a taonga of critical importance to the 
kaitiaki, and possibly where little or no third-party interests arise.634 
 
The pluralism principle will also need to be embodied in any 
remedial control model. Tikanga Māori should not only be able to govern 
decision-making processes, but should form the basis of the entire 
institutional framework. In other words, the framework should embrace 
and embody Māori values and epistemologies at all levels, beyond mere 
‘window dressing’. 
 
The Tūhoe settlement offers a promising example of this principle in 
practice: the purpose of the statute is to strengthen and maintain the 
connection between Tūhoe and Te Urewera;635 decision-makers under the 
                                               
634 See above and chapters 1 and 4 for a discussion regarding FPIC. 
635 Te Urewera Act 2014, s 4. 






legislation must act so that as far as possible Tūhoetana is valued and 
respected;636 and the board may consider and give expression to Tūhoetana 
in its decision-making.637 
2 ‘Partnership’ models 
Where the balancing test outlined in step 1 determines that both 
kaitiaki and third-party interests should be heard in the management of the 
taonga, then a partnership model will be appropriate. The balancing test 
will have identified that the taonga and the associated kaitiaki relationship 
is of importance to the tangata whenua, and that legitimate third-party 
interests also exist in relation to the subject matter. In such cases, adopting 
the approach envisaged by Wai 262, a partnership model between Māori 
and the Crown/local authorities should be put instituted.638 
 
Unlike the control model, partnership involves the sharing of the 
decision-making locus between the kaitiaki and a public authority. This 
model, therefore, is closer to the traditional notions of collaborative 
management than autonomous governance. A pragmatic approach to 
implementing self-determination recognises that there are competing 
interests in modern society (both indigenous and non-indigenous) which 
                                               
636 Section 5. 
637 Including concepts such as mana me mauri, rāhui, tapu, tapu me noa, and tohu: s 18. 
638 Waitangi Tribunal, above n 223. 






must be accounted for in operationalising self-determination. In some 
cases, a partnership model may be the only means of giving expression to 
self-determination in contexts which involve highly contested and 
contrasting indigenous and non-indigenous interests. 
 
Of the models analysed, the Whanganui River settlement provides 
the closest expression of the partnership model. Although the Whanganui 
model is not a legitimate partnership or co-management model, and better 
models are needed to give effect to these aspects of the norm,639 
nonetheless, the model is useful when conceptualising the operational 
parametres of the proposed partnership model. 
 
Under the settlement, Te Pou Tupua is established to be the human 
face of the awa’s new legal personality. This entity, which entails one 
member appointed by the interested iwi and one by the Crown, is tasked 
with advocating for the health and wellbeing of the awa and administering 
a $30 million clean-up fund.640 While this is positive, the major 
environmental decision powers are held fully by majoritarian public 
authorities and are not shared with the manawhenua. For this reason, 
                                               
639 See chapter 3 for further depth to this argument. 
640 Te Awa Tupua Act, Subpart 6. 






chapter 3 concluded that the Whanganui settlement is an inadequate 
example of the partnership model.641 
 
In fact, although they were not analysed in any detail in this thesis, 
joint management agreements (JMAs) under section 36B of the RMA 
would be a closer expression of the partnership model. JMAs enable iwi 
authorities and local authorities to jointly perform the local authority’s 
functions relating to natural or physical resources in the region/district. 
Under JMAs, the decision-making locus is shared between the parties.642 
 
In addition to the joint decision-making locus, the partnership model 
should enable the kaitiaki interest to be elevated above other third-party 
interests where this is deemed appropriate (the influence principle). The 
partnership model must give expression to a fair balancing of both 
indigenous and non-indigenous interests in decision-making, but allow 
indigenous interests to trump in certain circumstances. The Whanganui 
settlement, although not a pure partnership model, grapples with this aspect 
of the influence principle by directing various non-iwi statutory decision-
makers to either “recognise and provide for” or “have particular regard to” 
                                               
641 See Chapter 3; Te Awa Tupua Act. 
642 JMAs are very similar to s 33 of the RMA, except under JMAs the decision-making 
power is held jointly instead of solely by the iwi authority. Although, similar criticisms 
regarding s 33 would likely equally apply to JMAs. 






the new legal personality and Tupua te Kawa (Māori legal traditions of the 
manawhenua), in addition to the pre-existing statutory considerations. 
Although, the influence of indigenous interests under this framework 
ultimately depends upon the willingness of public authorities to interpret 
and apply these provisions in favour of the iwi, this is one way to 
operationalise the influence principle for partnership models. 
 
Again, in accordance with the remedial pluralism principle, tikanga 
Māori should not only be able to govern decision-making processes, but 
should form the basis of the entire institutional framework. As discussed, 
the Whanganui framework elevates the prominence of Māori legal 
tradition in statutory decision-making processes.643 The conclusions 
regarding Te Urewera and the pluralism principle (above) also apply here. 
3 ‘Influence’ models 
In some cases, as discussed, the balancing test will conclude that 
neither a control nor a partnership model is appropriate in the 
circumstances. In such cases, a strong argument nonetheless exists for a 
principle of kaitiaki influence over the regime of environmental 
management in some form. To warrant this outcome, the balancing test 
                                               
643 As discussed above, Tupua te Kawa must either be ‘recognised and provided for’ or 
‘had particular regard to’ by third party authorities when making decisions about the 
river or its catchment. 






will determine that the taonga is not of high importance to the kaitiaki and 
perhaps that the subject matter is considered external to the internal/local 
affairs of the people. At the same time, there are likely to be many 
legitimate third-party interests and good reasons will exist to elevate these 
in the decision structure. Nonetheless, effective influence and an 
appropriate priority should be given to the interests of the kaitiaki when 
environmental management decisions are made by others. 
 
While the institutional framework under this model provides that the 
locus of decision-making sits with non-kaitiaki, majoritarian, public 
authorities, kaitiaki interests should still be given an appropriate level of 
priority in environmental decision-making, and Māori legal traditions 
should be incorporated in to the framework. Of the mechanisms explored 
in this thesis, Part II of the RMA is the closest to the influence model. This 
mechanism requires non-iwi RMA decision-makers to consider Māori 
interests when exercising functions or powers under the Act (for example, 
when considering resource consent applications or in planning/policy 
setting). For example, section 6 provides that decision-makers shall 
“recognise and provide for ... the relationship of Māori and their culture 
and traditions with their ancestral lands, water, sites, waahi tapu, and other 
taonga.” Where a Māori party considers that a decision-maker has not 
applied this section sufficiently, they are open to appeal the decision to the 
Environment Court. 







Nonetheless, this tool is deficient in that it is reactive (iwi must 
respond to the priorities of public authorities) and the ability for Māori to 
influence outcomes depends upon the priority afforded Māori interests in 
sections 6, 7 and 8.644 As noted earlier in the thesis, Māori views continue 
to be side-lined under the RMA, in spite of this tool. Furthermore, tikanga 
Māori has very little to do with the operation of Part II. Instead, better 
models are required to give expression to the remedial influence 
mechanism. 
4 Rationale of step 2 
Step 2 gives further expression to the balancing principle and the 
need for pragmatism in implementing the right to self-determination in 
shared territories. Such an approach recognises that control of the resource 
by the kaitiaki is required as a matter of international law in some 
situations, but that this will not be appropriate in all cases (resulting in the 
control, partnership and influence model spectrum). This part of the 
proposed model embodies the relativistic approach of the draft Nordic 
Sami convention by providing that the indigenous people shall have a level 
of influence relative to their level of interest in the subject matter. In other 
                                               
644 E.g., to ‘recognise and provide for’ matters of national importance (including the 
relationship of Māori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, water ... 
and other taonga) (s 6); ‘have particular regard to kaitiakitanga’ (s 7), and ‘take into 
account’ the principles of the TOW (s 8). 






words, the more important a matter is for the indigenous agents, the more 
influence they should be afforded over environmental decision-making. 
The sliding scale approach recognises that some resources, areas or matters 
are so important to indigenous peoples, or of very little importance to the 
non-indigenous, and therefore that a high level of indigenous authority is 
possible and appropriate in its management. Conversely, if the matter is of 
low significance to the indigenous people, but very high importance to “the 
welfare of society at large” then the indigenous people may be afforded 
very limited influence over the decision-making process.645
                                               
645 Åhren, above n 599 at 139. 






V Case Study: Application to Tītī Islands 
A Introduction 
It is necessary to demonstrate how the remedial principles of 
indigenous self-determination can be operationalised by applying this 
framework to a practical example: the tītī islands. There are 36 tītī islands 
located around Te Ara-a-Kewa (Foveaux Strait) and Rakiura (Stewart 
Island).646 The largest island, Taukihepa, encompasses an area of some 910 
hectares. These islands are where the tītī,647 a pelagic seabird, come to 
breed after completing their annual migration around Te Moana-nui-a-
Kiwa (the Pacific Ocean). Studies claim it is the most abundant seabird in 
the southern hemisphere.648 The tītī islands will now be considered against 
the framework and remedial principles developed earlier in this chapter. 
B Step 1: Balancing interests 
1 Kaitiaki interests 
It will be demonstrated below that kā manu tītī (muttonbird) and kā 
moutere tītī (tītī islands) were, and still are, crucially important to Kāi 
                                               
646 See Figure C below for a map of the islands. 
647 Also known as the muttonbird, sooty shearwater or puffinus griseus. 
648 David Hawke and others “A possible early muttonbirder's fire on Poutama, a Rakiura 
titi island, New Zealand” 2003 33(2) Journal of the Royal Society of New Zealand. 






Tahu, culturally, economically and socially.649 Both oral tradition and 
archaeological evidence records that Kāi Tahu have been travelling to the 
islands to harvest the manu since well before Europeans reached Aotearoa, 
and potentially as early as AD 1470.650 Traditionally, the birds were 
cooked in their own fat and stored in pre-made rimurapa (kelp) bags known 
as poha. The tītī were an important source of food for southern Kāi Tahu 
families, and was often used as a tradeable commodity.651 As Anderson 
says, “Preserved muttonbirds were an important source of winter food and 
a major commodity in Māori exchange networks.”652 Today, many 
southern Kāi Tahu whānau make the annual pilgrimage to the tītī islands 
to participate in te hopu tītī (the customary harvest of tītī), and many 
consider this to be a foundational aspect of their Māori cultural identity.653 
To recognise its importance for the Kāi Tahu iwi, the manu itself was listed 
as a ‘taonga species’ under the Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998.
                                               
649 Stevens, above n 249. Also see Matthew Rout and others “Muttonbirding: Loss of 
executive authority and its impact on entrepreneurship” 2017 23(6) Journal of 
Management and Organization. 
650 Hawke and others, above n 648. 
651 James Herries Beattie, Atholl Anderson and Museum Otago Traditional lifeways of 
the Southern Maori: the Otago University Museum ethnological project, 1920 
(University of Otago Press in association with Otago Museum, Dunedin [N.Z.], 1994). 
652 Atholl Anderson “Origins of Procellariidae Hunting in the Southwest Pacific” 1996 
6(4) International Journal of Osteoarchaeology at 406. 
653 Michael Stevens “Kai Tahu Me te Hopu Titi ki Rakiura: An Exception to the 'Colonial 
Rule'?” 2006 41(3) The Journal of Pacific History. Also see Hana O'Regan Ko Tahu, 
ko au: Kāi Tahu tribal identity (Horomaka Publishing, Christchurch, N.Z, 2001). 






Figure C. Kā Moutere Tītī Ki Rakiura654 
 
 
Prior to European contact, Kāi Tahu developed a unique body of 
mātauraka Māori relating to the management of the islands, their bounty 
and the human interactions with these phenomena. As noted in chapters 3 
and 5, pre-European Māori perceived the world as a system of whakapapa 
connections. Within this taxonomy sat everything from flora/fauna, 
through to the weather and emotions, all arranged into interrelated 
genealogical groups derived from Raki and Papa. The tītī and other birds 
                                               
654 Figure C was sourced from Rout and others, above n 649. 






were included in these taxonomies, and, as the following whakapapa 
demonstrates, tītī were considered to be the progeny of Haere-nui:655 
Figure D. He Whakapapa a te Tītī 
 
 
                                               
655 Stevens, above n 649 at 22. 






Certain sayings or whakataukī developed amongst Māori regarding 
the tītī’s resilience and physical capabilities as a migratory seabird. These 
sayings complement recent findings that the tītī could travel up to 74,000 
km in their annual pacific migration.656 Elsdon Best, a renowned Māori 
‘ethnographer’ noted:657 
 
The saying He manawa titi seems to refer to the powers of flight 
possessed by the titi, and so a man possessed of good staying power 
may be described as a manawa titi. Another old saying connected 
with this bird is: He titi rere ao ka kitea; he titi rere po e kore e kitea 
(a day-flying titi can be seen, a night-flying titi cannot be seen). 
 
More specifically for Kāi Tahu, many legal traditions were 
developed regarding the tītī and the tītī Islands (many of which have been 
retained to this day). The islands were traditionally divided into defined 
areas known as ‘manu’ which were allocated to a family to work. Tau 
contends “these manu belonged to the family elder with rights...”658 As Tau 
notes, an elder at an 1887 Native Land Court hearing explained that 
Papatea Island (an island adjacent to Ruapuke) was divided into manu and 
                                               
656 Scott Shaffer and others “Migratory Shearwaters Integrate Oceanic Resources across 
the Pacific Ocean in an Endless Summer” 2006 103(34) Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 
657 Elsdon Best Forest lore of the Maori: with methods of snaring, trapping, and 
preserving birds and rats, uses of berries, roots, fern-root, and forest products, with 
mythological notes on origins, karakia used, etc (Polynesian Society in collaboration 
with Dominion Museum, Wellington, N.Z, 1942). 
658 Te Maire Tau “Property rights in Kaiapoi” 2016 47(4) Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review. 






each one was named after an important ancestor.659 Kāi Tahu also 
developed legal traditions relating to the harvest of the birds. Rāhui 
(prohibitions against harvesting) were, and still are, openly practiced in 
some spatial areas660 and outside of the tītī season (tītī may only be 
harvested from 15 March to the end of May).661 There were also strict 
prohibitions against harvesting adult birds, known as kaiaka (which is still 
culturally prohibited and considered to be against tikanga today).662 
 
When the Crown was negotiating the sale of Rakiura in 1864, 
southern Kāi Tahu rakatira ensured that some tītī islands were retained to 
ensure the maintenance of their special association with the islands. 
Accordingly, eighteen islands were reserved out of the sale for the benefit 
of the named rakatira and their descendants.663 These islands became 
known as the ‘beneficial tītī islands’ and are today held as Māori freehold 
land by the descendants of the original owners.664 The remaining islands 
                                               
659 In fact, many of the Tītī Islands and their manu are adorned with names from important 
Kāi Tahu ancestors. Stevens, above n 649. 
660 Corey Bragg and others “Variation in abundance and harvest of sooty shearwaters 
(Puffinus griseus) by Rakiura Maori on Putauhinu Island, New Zealand” 2009 36(3) 
New Zealand Journal of Zoology. 
661 Tītī (Muttonbird) Islands Regulations 1978 [“Tītī Regulations”] and Rakiura Tītī 
Islands Bylaws 2005 [“Tītī Bylaws”]. 
662 Tītī Regulations, reg 4(2). 
663 However, not all islands were reserved (another 18 went to the Crown) and nor were 
all people with customary interests provided for in the new regime. Stevens, above n 
653. 
664 Pursuant to the Māori Purposes Act 1983 and Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993. 






became known as the ‘Crown tītī islands’, and were eventually made 
available to those whānau whom had an ancestral right to bird, but had 
been left off list of owners of the beneficial islands.665 Kāi Tahu continued 
to exclusively frequent both sets of islands and exercise their ancestral 
rights to harvest tītī in accordance with their tikanga, until this day. In 
1998, under the terms of the Kāi Tahu settlement, the Crown tītī islands 
were vested in Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu (“TRONT”), to be managed by 
and on behalf of those Kāi Tahu with customary interests in the tītī islands. 
 
Overall, there is strong evidence that an extensive body of mātauraka 
or kōrero tuku iho exists in relation to southern Kāi Tahu and the tītī 
islands. 
2 Third party interests 
There are very little, if any, legitimate third-party interests directly 
concerned with the Tītī Islands. Property rights to all islands are held by 
the kaitiaki: the Beneficial Islands are owned by the individual successors 
to the original owners; the (now ex-) Crown tītī islands are owned by the 
collective Kāi Tahu statutory entity (TRONT). At law, title to the islands 
is inalienable beyond the descent group. Both sets of islands are governed 
by the rights holders: the Beneficial Islands by an elected committee of 
                                               
665 Rout and others, above n 649. 






owners (Rakiura Tītī Committee) and the ex-Crown islands by an elected 
administering body (Rakiura Tītī Islands Administering Body). Indeed, 
non-rights holders or descendants are not even permitted to enter the 
islands without a permit, which can only be issued under strict 
circumstances (e.g. to carry out maintenance, research, or transport 
services etc.).666 The nearest third-party interests to the islands might be 
commercial fisher people who operate around the tītī islands from time to 
time. In some cases the interests of the tītī kaitiaki are elevated above the 
commercial fisherman in that commercial fishing is prohibited near the 
whare of many tītī whānau, indicating an acceptance by central 
government that the interests of the kaitiaki are of high importance over 
non-kaitiaki interests.667 Adjacent landowners on nearby Rakiura are the 
Department of Conservation (Rakiura National Park) and the Rakiura 
Māori Lands Trust (which holds in trust the majority of Māori freehold 
land on Rakiura). Hydrocarbon exploration has also been carried out and 
further mooted for the Great South Basin, which is in the vicinity of the 
eastern tītī islands.668 
                                               
666 Tītī Regulations, reg 3; Tītī Bylaws, cl 4. 
667 Special regulatory closures prohibit commercial fishing of some species around 31 
sites on the Tītī Islands. See the recent amendments to the Fisheries (Southland and 
Sub-Antarctic Areas Commercial Fishing) Regulations 1986, which came into force on 
9 July 2015. 
668 Southland Energy Consortium “The Great South Basin” (2014) 
http://www.oilgasmineralsnz.com/Great-South-Basin < 
http://www.oilgasmineralsnz.com/Great-South-Basin>. 






3 Assessment of interests 
None of these third parties can convincingly argue that they are 
entitled to a degree of input into the management of the tītī islands 
themselves as their interests specifically relate to matters beyond the 
islands themselves.669 On the other hand, it is clearly demonstrable that the 
tītī and the tītī Islands are of high importance to those Kāi Tahu people 
who have inherited ancestral interests to frequent the islands and harvest 
tītī. As the Waitangi Tribunal noted in The Ngai Tahu Report: 670 
 
Ngai Tahu’s relationship with the Titi Islands is undoubtedly very 
important... Mutton birding has always been an integral part of Ngai 
Tahu society-an ancient tradition and mahinga kai right that is 
greatly valued and carefully guarded. 
 
The tītī itself held a clear place in Māori cosmogony, and sayings 
evolved around their hardy characteristics, signalling their reverence 
within mātauraka Māori. Kāi Tahu developed strong connections with the 
islands surrounding Rakiura, one of the major strongholds of tītī in pre-
European times, developing their own unique body of mātauraka Māori 
and legal traditions relating to environmental management. In spite of 
settler colonialism, these processes remained largely in place, and continue 
                                               
669 Conversely, it is very arguable that since the core activities of these third parties have 
the potential to impact the Tītī Islands (e.g. commercial fishing affects the food supply 
of Tītī harvesters; rodents travel from Rakiura and negatively impact the biodiversity 
of the islands; and a potential oil spill would have detrimental impacts on the Tītī 
population and all other wildlife) that the kaitiaki of the Tītī Islands should be entitled 
to a certain degree of influence over those activities. 
670 Waitangi Tribunal The Ngai Tahu Report (Wai 27, 1991) at 2.12 (pdf p. 157). 






to be exercised to this day.671 The islands remain owned and managed by 
the tītī kaitiaki to the exclusion of anyone else. The lack of any legitimate 
third-party interests directly associated with the islands is striking and the 
adage of one Pākehā commentator in 1906 that the islands have always 
been “beyond the white man’s dominion” rings true some 112 years 
later.672 Under these circumstances, the interests of the kaitiaki should be 
paramount in the resulting self-determination model. 
C Step 2: Level of influence and operational aspects 
In all of the particular circumstances, considering the critical 
importance of the tītī and the tītī islands to southern Kāi Tahu and the 
notable lack of any third-party interests associated with the islands, a 
control model would be an appropriate vehicle to implement remedial self-
determination over the tītī islands. Such a control model, as discussed 
above, would transfer to the kaitiaki the locus of decision-making over 
environmental law and resource management, and empower them to have 
a real influence over the decisions made by, for example, allowing kaitiaki 
interests to prevail. A remedial control model for the tītī islands would also 
be wholly framed by tikanga Māori and kawa pertaining to the islands, to 
                                               
671 In fact, as Michael Stevens notes, the Tītī Harvest is quite exceptional in that it is one 
of the only customary harvest activies that continued relatively in tact in spite of 
colonisation. This is an exception to the norm of Crown dominance and subjugation 
experienced in most areas directly affected by colonisation. Stevens, above n 653. 
672 Poverty Bay Herald, Volume XXXIII, Issue 10632, 6 April 1906. 
 






the extent that this is possible (given the loss of mātauraka Māori due to 
colonisation). The legal personality concept could be applied to the tītī 
islands as a step in the right direction. To give further expression to the 
pluralism principle, the unique Māori legal traditions of the islands and 
their southern Kāi Tahu occupants should form the basis of the regulatory 
framework applying to the islands.






VI  Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter circled back to Anaya’s framework and considered the 
potential parametres of an approach based on his remedial self-
determination.673 It articulated what the thesis calls the ‘remedial 
principles’ of indigenous self-determination: the principles that must be 
practically implemented to create a norm-compliant model. Drawing on 
the international law sources, and aspects of the analysed legal 
frameworks, the remedial principles are: (1) the balancing of interests; (2) 
the locus of decision-making; (3) influence over outcomes and (4) 
pluralism. A legal framework that translates these principles from the 
conceptual/theoretical realm into operational practice will go a long way 
toward self-determination compliance. It was demonstrated that the tītī 
islands are a likely ‘high water mark’ for the control model. The model can 
be applied to other contexts to determine an appropriate operational 
remedial framework where it is held that substantive self-determination 
has been breached.
                                               
673 Anaya, above n 45. 






Te Mutuka o Te Tuhikaroa – Thesis Conclusion 
While the history of indigenous peoples since colonisation has been 
bleak, there are exciting developments on the horizon in international law, 
and these will hopefully contribute to the reversal of the most insidious 
effects of colonisation. As the case studies have shown, law reform is 
needed to bring this to fruition, as well as a greater level of debate 
dedicated to the operationalisation of indigenous self-determination in the 
post-UNDRIP era. This thesis has aimed to contribute to the start of these 
conversations by positing a way forward for indigenous self-determination 
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